Part A: Discuss (explain & explore) Mill’s distinction between sanction and persuasion,
between coercion and free choice, ultimately between rules of law and rules of opinion
[10]
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty grapples with a fundamental question in political philosophy:
the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the
individual. Mill approached this issue through utilitarianism in its “largest sense” – indirect
utilitarianism - seeking to prove that utility can be sufficient grounds for the coherent and
cogent arguments for negative liberties and rights, best understood as freedom from
government or societal interference. In the previous three chapters, Mill extended the
liberty of the individual – freedom of opinion and thought, and freedom of action – to its
limit, via appealing to the Harm Principle. In Chapter 4, however, Mill now returns to a more
detailed and systematic examination of the Harm Principle itself. With precision, Mill now
must differentiate between self-regarding and other-regarding actions – hitherto,
individuals are free to engage in self-regarding acts irrespective of their improperness,
however, a societal interference may be imposed, provided it is compatible with utility,
when other-regarding actions harm the ‘rights-based interests’ of others.
Mill commences the chapter by claiming that in return for the valuable general security with
society provides, individuals have a duty to obey the rules of other-regarding conduct. Mill,
however, argues for this on a utilitarian basis, and does not advocate for a social contract.
These rules, or conditions that society was allowed to impose upon the individual, include:
not injuring the interests of another – “certain interests, which either by express legal
provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights”, bearing one’s share
of the “labours and sacrifices incurred for defending society or its members from injury and
molestation”, and ensuring that one refrains from hurting others even if not to the full
extent of violating their constituted rights, as this may be punished by opinion, though not
the law. Mill, therefore, has differentiated between acts subject to the rules of law, and
those subject to the rule of opinion: acts that violate one’s constituted [legally protected]
rights ‘ are subject to the former, and those that do not, are subject to the latter.
Society, therefore, had jurisdiction over any part of one’s conduct which prejudicially
affected the interests of others, yet Mill reaffirmed that if an action was self-regarding, the
individual enjoyed ‘perfect freedom’, and total ‘free choice’, from all forms of coercion -
that is, from the rules of law and opinions (legal and social measures).
Perhaps in response to the communitarian viewpoint, Mill then declares that his doctrine
doesn’t espouse “selfish indifference”, where it is assumed that humans have no business
with each other’s conduct in life, or where they do not care for the well-being of another.
His doctrine, instead, propounds “disinterested benevolence”, where one, through
“disinterested exertion” promotes the good of others – which is necessary to the self-
development and character formation that his overall project addresses - through
encouragement, yet not compulsion. Mill’s ‘disinterested’ exertion, therefore, propounds
persuasion, but not coercion.
It is here where Mill distinguishes artificial and natural penalties; artificial penalties are
deliberately inflicted on the individual due to his “moral vices” that subject others to harm,
between coercion and free choice, ultimately between rules of law and rules of opinion
[10]
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty grapples with a fundamental question in political philosophy:
the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the
individual. Mill approached this issue through utilitarianism in its “largest sense” – indirect
utilitarianism - seeking to prove that utility can be sufficient grounds for the coherent and
cogent arguments for negative liberties and rights, best understood as freedom from
government or societal interference. In the previous three chapters, Mill extended the
liberty of the individual – freedom of opinion and thought, and freedom of action – to its
limit, via appealing to the Harm Principle. In Chapter 4, however, Mill now returns to a more
detailed and systematic examination of the Harm Principle itself. With precision, Mill now
must differentiate between self-regarding and other-regarding actions – hitherto,
individuals are free to engage in self-regarding acts irrespective of their improperness,
however, a societal interference may be imposed, provided it is compatible with utility,
when other-regarding actions harm the ‘rights-based interests’ of others.
Mill commences the chapter by claiming that in return for the valuable general security with
society provides, individuals have a duty to obey the rules of other-regarding conduct. Mill,
however, argues for this on a utilitarian basis, and does not advocate for a social contract.
These rules, or conditions that society was allowed to impose upon the individual, include:
not injuring the interests of another – “certain interests, which either by express legal
provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights”, bearing one’s share
of the “labours and sacrifices incurred for defending society or its members from injury and
molestation”, and ensuring that one refrains from hurting others even if not to the full
extent of violating their constituted rights, as this may be punished by opinion, though not
the law. Mill, therefore, has differentiated between acts subject to the rules of law, and
those subject to the rule of opinion: acts that violate one’s constituted [legally protected]
rights ‘ are subject to the former, and those that do not, are subject to the latter.
Society, therefore, had jurisdiction over any part of one’s conduct which prejudicially
affected the interests of others, yet Mill reaffirmed that if an action was self-regarding, the
individual enjoyed ‘perfect freedom’, and total ‘free choice’, from all forms of coercion -
that is, from the rules of law and opinions (legal and social measures).
Perhaps in response to the communitarian viewpoint, Mill then declares that his doctrine
doesn’t espouse “selfish indifference”, where it is assumed that humans have no business
with each other’s conduct in life, or where they do not care for the well-being of another.
His doctrine, instead, propounds “disinterested benevolence”, where one, through
“disinterested exertion” promotes the good of others – which is necessary to the self-
development and character formation that his overall project addresses - through
encouragement, yet not compulsion. Mill’s ‘disinterested’ exertion, therefore, propounds
persuasion, but not coercion.
It is here where Mill distinguishes artificial and natural penalties; artificial penalties are
deliberately inflicted on the individual due to his “moral vices” that subject others to harm,
