Lavie (2006): The competitive advantage of interconnected firms: an extension of the resource-based view
Extend RBV by following relational view and social network theories. Takes into account impact of network resources on competitive advantage of firm
Hypothesis and definitions Evidence
Hypothesis Preconditions for competitive advantage:
1= internal rent derived from the focal firm’s own resources will depend on 1= resource heterogeneity (requires that not all firms possess the amount and
positive and negative complementarities with the shared and non-shared kinds of resources),
resources of its alliance partners 2=imperfect mobility (resources that are non-tradable or less valuable to users
2= at the time of alliance formation, the more favourable the contractual other the firm that owns them)
agreement, the smaller the relative scale and scope of resources, the more Impact of resource on its competitive advantage depends on its value + rarity
attenuated the relative opportunistic behaviour, and the stronger the bargaining Reformulation of RBV:
power of the focal firm relative to its alliance partners, the greater the firm’s ex 1)Alliances do not enhance competitive advantage by contributing to resource
ante appropriated relational rent will be heterogeneity. However, pure resource homogeneity is not desirable only for
3) after an alliance is formed, the stronger the relative absorptive capacity, the collusive purposes but not in order to gain complementary resources
more salient the relative opportunistic behaviour, and the stronger the bargaining 2) imperfect mobility: relevant. Under perfect mobility resources can be traded
power of the focal firm relative to its alliance partners, the greater the firm’s ex and accessed without forming alliances. However, condition is weakened as
post appropriated relational rent will be alliances enable the resources that cannot be mobilized to transfer the benefits.
4) The more salient the focal firm’s opportunistic behaviour and the stronger its 3)imperfect imitability (no other firm will be able to obtain the valuable and rare
bargaining power and absorptive capacity, the greater the inbound spill over rent resources of the firm)=will depend less on the nature of resources and more on
the firm will derive from both the shared and non-shared resources of its alliance the nature of relationships between the firm and its partners. Because: causal
partners ambiguity and social complexity become insufficient for preventing imitation by a
5) The stronger the isolating mechanisms used by the focal firm’s alliance partner when that partner acts as a co-opetitor. Reasons: Interfirm alliances
partners, the smaller the inbound spill over rent the firm will derive from the non- provide partners with opportunities to access resource benefits without obtaining
shared resources of its alliance partners the resources themselves. Interacting with the firm, partner become exposed to
6) the more salient the opportunistic behaviour of the focal firm’s alliance the path dependent process of developing proprietary resources (so less causally
partners and the stronger their bargaining power and absorptive capacity, the ambiguous and socially complex). By engaging in proactive learning partners can
greater the firm’s loss of outbound spill over rent derived from both its shared and internalize the resources of the firm.
non-shared resources will be 4)imperfect substitutability (no other firm will be able to offer alternative
Extend RBV by following relational view and social network theories. Takes into account impact of network resources on competitive advantage of firm
Hypothesis and definitions Evidence
Hypothesis Preconditions for competitive advantage:
1= internal rent derived from the focal firm’s own resources will depend on 1= resource heterogeneity (requires that not all firms possess the amount and
positive and negative complementarities with the shared and non-shared kinds of resources),
resources of its alliance partners 2=imperfect mobility (resources that are non-tradable or less valuable to users
2= at the time of alliance formation, the more favourable the contractual other the firm that owns them)
agreement, the smaller the relative scale and scope of resources, the more Impact of resource on its competitive advantage depends on its value + rarity
attenuated the relative opportunistic behaviour, and the stronger the bargaining Reformulation of RBV:
power of the focal firm relative to its alliance partners, the greater the firm’s ex 1)Alliances do not enhance competitive advantage by contributing to resource
ante appropriated relational rent will be heterogeneity. However, pure resource homogeneity is not desirable only for
3) after an alliance is formed, the stronger the relative absorptive capacity, the collusive purposes but not in order to gain complementary resources
more salient the relative opportunistic behaviour, and the stronger the bargaining 2) imperfect mobility: relevant. Under perfect mobility resources can be traded
power of the focal firm relative to its alliance partners, the greater the firm’s ex and accessed without forming alliances. However, condition is weakened as
post appropriated relational rent will be alliances enable the resources that cannot be mobilized to transfer the benefits.
4) The more salient the focal firm’s opportunistic behaviour and the stronger its 3)imperfect imitability (no other firm will be able to obtain the valuable and rare
bargaining power and absorptive capacity, the greater the inbound spill over rent resources of the firm)=will depend less on the nature of resources and more on
the firm will derive from both the shared and non-shared resources of its alliance the nature of relationships between the firm and its partners. Because: causal
partners ambiguity and social complexity become insufficient for preventing imitation by a
5) The stronger the isolating mechanisms used by the focal firm’s alliance partner when that partner acts as a co-opetitor. Reasons: Interfirm alliances
partners, the smaller the inbound spill over rent the firm will derive from the non- provide partners with opportunities to access resource benefits without obtaining
shared resources of its alliance partners the resources themselves. Interacting with the firm, partner become exposed to
6) the more salient the opportunistic behaviour of the focal firm’s alliance the path dependent process of developing proprietary resources (so less causally
partners and the stronger their bargaining power and absorptive capacity, the ambiguous and socially complex). By engaging in proactive learning partners can
greater the firm’s loss of outbound spill over rent derived from both its shared and internalize the resources of the firm.
non-shared resources will be 4)imperfect substitutability (no other firm will be able to offer alternative
