Questions Final Exam
1) Explain what the debate between scientic realists and antrealists is about. Reconstruct, and
illustrate with examples the arguments in favor of scientic realism. Do you believe they are good
arguments? Why?
The debate is about:
The proper attude towards scientic theory.
The realist says one should believe mature scientic theories.
The constructie empiricists says one should accept mature scientic theories.
The aim of science.
The realist takes science to aim at truth.
The constructie empiricists takes science to aim at empirical adequacy.
Arguments:
1. The ‘No Miracles Argument’
The success of science calls for an explanaton realism can proiide this explanaton
instrumentalism can’t proiide this explanaton instrumentalism has to be dismissed, and
realism endorsed.
This kind of argument is inference to the best explanaton.
Example: Crop circles near Lelystad to be explained. Competng hypothesis:
- Genetc defects in some of the plants produced them inconsistent with laboratory
tests of the plants.
- Pranksters made them simpler, more fruitul and conseriatie than the extra-
terrestrial explanaton.
- Extra-terrestrial made them.
The prankster explanaton is the best explanaton of crop circles. Conclusion: infer that the
prankster hypothesis is the true explanaton of the crop circles.
Problem: IBE presupposes the notons of candidate explanaton and best explanaton.
2. Evidental consilience
If an obseriable entty can be detected by two or more different means of detecton, then
we are justied to belieie in its existence some unobseriable enttes can be detected by
different means of detecton we are justied to belieie in the existence of at least some
unobseriable enttes.
Example: temperature, which is a theoretcal entty. Its measures can be deriied from seieral
partcular theories like the kinetc theory of gases
Problems: Techniques of detecton are ofen constructed or calibrated precisely with the
intenton of reproducing the outputs of others. Besides, the consilience of measurements
need not track truth.
3. The value of science
If science is ialuable at all, then it must offer us understanding of the world
understanding of the world requires we are justied to belieie in the existence of
unobseriables like quarks, infaton and desires science is ialuable we are justied to
belieie in the existence of at least some unobseriables.
Example: Quarks, infaton and desires.
Problems: It is not obiious that the (intrinsic) ialue of science—if science has intrinsic ialue
at all—should lie in truth or understanding. It is unclear what understanding iniolies.
1
, 2) Describe the Monty Hall problem, and explain with the use of probability why it is ratonal for a
contestant in the Monty Hall game to switch door.
Suppose you’re on a game show, and you’re giien the choice of three doors. Behind one door is a
car; behind the others goats. You pick a door, say No.1. The host, who knows what’s behind the other
doors, opens another door, say No.2, which has a goat. He then says to you, ‘Do you want to pick
door No.3?’ Is it to your adiantage to take the switch?
Either the prize is behind Door 1 or it is not. If the prize is behind Door 1, then Monty will open door
2 with probability ½ (50%). If the prize is not behind Door 1, then Monty will open Door 2 with
probability 1.
You picked Door 1.
p(Monty opens door 2 | door 1 wins) = 1/2.
p(Monty opens door 2 | door 3 wins) = 1.
From these likelihoods, one can see that the opening of Door 2 faiors the hypothesis that the car is
behind Door 3 oier the hypothesis that it is behind Door 1 Monty’s opening Door 2 proiides
eiidence that the car is behind Door 3 instead of Door 1.
3) What is the covering law model of explanaton? The shadow cast by a fagpole is supposed to
cause a problem for the covering law model of explanaton. What exactly is the problem and how
do you think it can be avoided?
Basic ideas:
The structure of explanaton consists in a logical derivaton of the explanandum
phenomenon from a general law.
Our interest for regularites and paterns accounts for the contnuity between scientic and
ordinary explanaton.
Genuinely explanatory informaton is informaton about how a phenomenon is to be
expected on the basis of a law.
The problem is that the informaton is asymmetric. If A explains B, then B does not explain A. The
goierning law in this case states that we can determine the length of the shadow from the stance of
the sun and the height of the fagpole. This meets the model criteria and is explanatory. Howeier,
determining the height of the fagpole through the stance of the sun and the length of the shadow is
not explanatory, although it does meet all criteria of the model. This is because the fagpole creates
the shadow and thus can explain its length, but the shadow does not create the fagpole and thus
cannot explain its height. This problem could be aioided if the conditons of adequacy for this model
were changed to allow for backward explanaton.
Problem: explanaton is asymmetric. If A explains B, B does not explain A. the coiering law model
does not take account of causal relatons.
4) What is the relevance—if any—of feminism to our understanding of how science works? Argue
for your own answer in the light of concrete examples.
2
1) Explain what the debate between scientic realists and antrealists is about. Reconstruct, and
illustrate with examples the arguments in favor of scientic realism. Do you believe they are good
arguments? Why?
The debate is about:
The proper attude towards scientic theory.
The realist says one should believe mature scientic theories.
The constructie empiricists says one should accept mature scientic theories.
The aim of science.
The realist takes science to aim at truth.
The constructie empiricists takes science to aim at empirical adequacy.
Arguments:
1. The ‘No Miracles Argument’
The success of science calls for an explanaton realism can proiide this explanaton
instrumentalism can’t proiide this explanaton instrumentalism has to be dismissed, and
realism endorsed.
This kind of argument is inference to the best explanaton.
Example: Crop circles near Lelystad to be explained. Competng hypothesis:
- Genetc defects in some of the plants produced them inconsistent with laboratory
tests of the plants.
- Pranksters made them simpler, more fruitul and conseriatie than the extra-
terrestrial explanaton.
- Extra-terrestrial made them.
The prankster explanaton is the best explanaton of crop circles. Conclusion: infer that the
prankster hypothesis is the true explanaton of the crop circles.
Problem: IBE presupposes the notons of candidate explanaton and best explanaton.
2. Evidental consilience
If an obseriable entty can be detected by two or more different means of detecton, then
we are justied to belieie in its existence some unobseriable enttes can be detected by
different means of detecton we are justied to belieie in the existence of at least some
unobseriable enttes.
Example: temperature, which is a theoretcal entty. Its measures can be deriied from seieral
partcular theories like the kinetc theory of gases
Problems: Techniques of detecton are ofen constructed or calibrated precisely with the
intenton of reproducing the outputs of others. Besides, the consilience of measurements
need not track truth.
3. The value of science
If science is ialuable at all, then it must offer us understanding of the world
understanding of the world requires we are justied to belieie in the existence of
unobseriables like quarks, infaton and desires science is ialuable we are justied to
belieie in the existence of at least some unobseriables.
Example: Quarks, infaton and desires.
Problems: It is not obiious that the (intrinsic) ialue of science—if science has intrinsic ialue
at all—should lie in truth or understanding. It is unclear what understanding iniolies.
1
, 2) Describe the Monty Hall problem, and explain with the use of probability why it is ratonal for a
contestant in the Monty Hall game to switch door.
Suppose you’re on a game show, and you’re giien the choice of three doors. Behind one door is a
car; behind the others goats. You pick a door, say No.1. The host, who knows what’s behind the other
doors, opens another door, say No.2, which has a goat. He then says to you, ‘Do you want to pick
door No.3?’ Is it to your adiantage to take the switch?
Either the prize is behind Door 1 or it is not. If the prize is behind Door 1, then Monty will open door
2 with probability ½ (50%). If the prize is not behind Door 1, then Monty will open Door 2 with
probability 1.
You picked Door 1.
p(Monty opens door 2 | door 1 wins) = 1/2.
p(Monty opens door 2 | door 3 wins) = 1.
From these likelihoods, one can see that the opening of Door 2 faiors the hypothesis that the car is
behind Door 3 oier the hypothesis that it is behind Door 1 Monty’s opening Door 2 proiides
eiidence that the car is behind Door 3 instead of Door 1.
3) What is the covering law model of explanaton? The shadow cast by a fagpole is supposed to
cause a problem for the covering law model of explanaton. What exactly is the problem and how
do you think it can be avoided?
Basic ideas:
The structure of explanaton consists in a logical derivaton of the explanandum
phenomenon from a general law.
Our interest for regularites and paterns accounts for the contnuity between scientic and
ordinary explanaton.
Genuinely explanatory informaton is informaton about how a phenomenon is to be
expected on the basis of a law.
The problem is that the informaton is asymmetric. If A explains B, then B does not explain A. The
goierning law in this case states that we can determine the length of the shadow from the stance of
the sun and the height of the fagpole. This meets the model criteria and is explanatory. Howeier,
determining the height of the fagpole through the stance of the sun and the length of the shadow is
not explanatory, although it does meet all criteria of the model. This is because the fagpole creates
the shadow and thus can explain its length, but the shadow does not create the fagpole and thus
cannot explain its height. This problem could be aioided if the conditons of adequacy for this model
were changed to allow for backward explanaton.
Problem: explanaton is asymmetric. If A explains B, B does not explain A. the coiering law model
does not take account of causal relatons.
4) What is the relevance—if any—of feminism to our understanding of how science works? Argue
for your own answer in the light of concrete examples.
2
