Searle Summary: ‘Minds, Brains and Science’
Chapter 1:
(The Mind-Body Problem)
“Explain how Searle argues that ‘naïve mentalism’ and ‘naïve physicalism’ are perfectly
consistent with each other”
Background:
Acknowledges the MB Problem is the largest one faced
His approach is ‘biological naturalism’
The MB Problem persists bc we contnne to approach the problem with 17 th C vocab
Most solntons have involved the denial/ downgrading of the statns of mental enttes
Becanse it seems impossible to accommodate 4 key concepts: consciousness, intentonnaitt,
qunain nnd mentna cnusnton, into a snccessfnl scientic concepton of the world
Searle’s Argument:
1. Mental phenomena are caused by physical phenomena i.e. mental events are cansed by brain
processes
2. Thns, mental phenomena are features of the brain
3. To reconcile (1) and (2), Searle employs a common physical distncton between macro + micro
propertes
4. Micro-partcles have featnres at the level of molecnles and atoms e.g. water is H 2O
5. Macro-partcles global/ snrface featnres of systems e.g. liqnidity of water
6. Liqnidity of water is explained by the natnre of the interactons between H 2O partcles
7. Similarly, mental phenomena (macro level) are cansed by brain processes (micro level) and
realised in a biological brain composed of nenrons
8. So, naïve mentalism and naïve physicalism are consistent with each other mental states are
featnres of the brain that have 2 levels of descripton:
(1) Higher Level, Mental Descriptons conscions, intentonal, snbjectve (qnalia) states
(2) Lower Level, Physical Descriptons nenral networks, synapses, bio-chemical processes
Chapter 2:
(Can Computers think?)
“Explain how Searle atempts to refute the view that digital computers think”
Summary of Searle’s Argument:
The prevailing view “any physical system…that had the right programme with the right inpnts
and ontpnts wonld have a mind in exactly the same sense that yon and I have minds”
Searle REJECTS this view
Operatons of a compnter can be speciied pnrely formally or syntactcally BUT there’s more to
having a mind than formal or syntactcal processing
Mental content has certain featnres e.g. intentionality –meaningfnl and abont something, so
mental states possess semantcs as well as syntax (compnters don’t have semantcs)
Chapter 1:
(The Mind-Body Problem)
“Explain how Searle argues that ‘naïve mentalism’ and ‘naïve physicalism’ are perfectly
consistent with each other”
Background:
Acknowledges the MB Problem is the largest one faced
His approach is ‘biological naturalism’
The MB Problem persists bc we contnne to approach the problem with 17 th C vocab
Most solntons have involved the denial/ downgrading of the statns of mental enttes
Becanse it seems impossible to accommodate 4 key concepts: consciousness, intentonnaitt,
qunain nnd mentna cnusnton, into a snccessfnl scientic concepton of the world
Searle’s Argument:
1. Mental phenomena are caused by physical phenomena i.e. mental events are cansed by brain
processes
2. Thns, mental phenomena are features of the brain
3. To reconcile (1) and (2), Searle employs a common physical distncton between macro + micro
propertes
4. Micro-partcles have featnres at the level of molecnles and atoms e.g. water is H 2O
5. Macro-partcles global/ snrface featnres of systems e.g. liqnidity of water
6. Liqnidity of water is explained by the natnre of the interactons between H 2O partcles
7. Similarly, mental phenomena (macro level) are cansed by brain processes (micro level) and
realised in a biological brain composed of nenrons
8. So, naïve mentalism and naïve physicalism are consistent with each other mental states are
featnres of the brain that have 2 levels of descripton:
(1) Higher Level, Mental Descriptons conscions, intentonal, snbjectve (qnalia) states
(2) Lower Level, Physical Descriptons nenral networks, synapses, bio-chemical processes
Chapter 2:
(Can Computers think?)
“Explain how Searle atempts to refute the view that digital computers think”
Summary of Searle’s Argument:
The prevailing view “any physical system…that had the right programme with the right inpnts
and ontpnts wonld have a mind in exactly the same sense that yon and I have minds”
Searle REJECTS this view
Operatons of a compnter can be speciied pnrely formally or syntactcally BUT there’s more to
having a mind than formal or syntactcal processing
Mental content has certain featnres e.g. intentionality –meaningfnl and abont something, so
mental states possess semantcs as well as syntax (compnters don’t have semantcs)
