Preparation Lecture 3
Alcalá-López (2018). Building blocks of social cognition: Mirror, mentalize, share?
Staring points in social neuroscience – dual process theories of human social cognition
Two main theoretical frameworks explain how an adequate understanding of others’ behavior may be
achieved.
1. The theory theory (TT) -> individuals draw on a collection of abstract principles about human
behavior, acquired through life experience, that allows to interpret and predict the mental states
and behavioral patterns of others. Such inferences based on abstract emulation enable predictions
about what individuals are thinking about others, despite the fact that their mental states can never
be directly observed or explicitly confirmed.
2. The simulation theory (ST) -> humans impersonate others and automatically imitate their mental
states. The aim is to understand what oneself would experience in the other’s place. The ST
framework rejects the need to assemble abstract models to emulate other’s behavior – as proposed
by the TT – since humans have their own inner experience.
Theory theory – conceptual emulation of other’s mental states
There are two important concepts:
1. Theory of mind (ToM)-> the awareness that humans and non-human primates may have of
other’s mental stages.
2. Mentalizing -> the ability of belief attribution in humans and to include spontaneous and non-
inferential capacities. This was introduced because the term “theory” could lead to the
misunderstanding that ToM is a fully developed theoretical account about the behavior and
experience of others.
Behavioral experiments -> showed that apes could not only infer the goals and intentions of others’
(external) actions, but also behaved in alignment with their (internal) mental states that were
incongruent with the external reality (e.g., false beliefs). Nevertheless, different species of non-human
primates show different degrees of sophistication in their mentalizing abilities.
Experimental paradigms -> found that ToM emerges around the age of 4 years. However, several
recent studies found children younger than 2 years of age already behaving according to others’ false
beliefs.
Many authors -> have argued that the diversity in children’s mentalizing skills across studies may be
driven by preceding differences in the maturation of domain-general cognitive abilities including
linguistic and executive performance. A study showed that variations in executive skills predicted
differences in ToM abilities starting from the emergence of adulthood through the lifespan. These
aspects together lend support for the possibility that the maturation of general, basic cognitive abilities
likely scaffolds the development of complex mentalizing skills.
Age and ToM -> a study reported a decline in ToM abilities which is congruent with a neuroimaging
study in which older participants performed worse compared with young participants even when
explicitly prompted to infer the mental states of others.
1
, These authors found that such social-cognitive deficit in normal aging was associated with decreased
neural activity of the dorsal mPFC during mental tasks. Authors of other studies suggest that ToM
may be a domain-specific process, which declines with age disregarding perceptual or linguistic
capacities.
Brain imaging literature -> a set of brain regions including the mPFC and posterior cingulate (PCC)
cortices, as well as the bilateral temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), robustly increase in neural activity
when participants undergo perspective-taking tasks probing ToM performance. An identical set of
brain regions is also known for its activity during the retrieval of autobiographical memory, spatial
navigation from a first-person perspective, or prospection into the future.
- This set of regions was found to decrease in neural activity during many other tasks and was
therefore called the default mode network (DMN) -> mostly active during idling minds sets.
There is considerable overlap between the neural correlates of the DMN, particularly active at
resting baseline, and those brain locations exhibiting increased activity during ToM tasks.
Simulation theory – limitation of others’ mental states
Some authors have denied that a mechanism dedicated to abstract emulation is a necessary condition
to grasp and represent others’ subjective experience. The ST account proposes that individuals
automatically mimic or intuitively impersonate in a covert fashion the behavior of others, even when
simply observing them. ST proposes that this reinstantiation of observed behavior provides access to
the internal mental state of the other, thus enabling action understanding. An author proposed that
witnessing others’ social-affective behavior inevitably triggers one’s own internal representation of that
same behavior.
Affectivity -> simpler forms of affective sharing were suggested to precede the onset of full-fledged
empathy capacities in infants. Mimicry and emotional contagion are already present in newborns,
before the onset of ToM. A tendency to automatically reproduce the externally visible manifestation
of internal affective stages (e.g., mimicry) has been suggested as a possible low-level mechanism,
elaborated on by more complex forms of empathy.
Emotional contagion -> this is a proto-form of empathy. An individual synchronizes with and
converges to others’ affective mental states. In contrast to full-fledged empathy, emotional contagion
occurs without awareness of the observing individual, and has been identified in other species. Such
proto-form of empathy can turn out to be fundamental for social interactions.
Simulation mechanisms -> these are independent from affective states and have been suggested to
underlie other types of social behavior. The term herding refers to the behavior of an individual when
he/she imitates or mirrors a group, as opposed to acting independently. This typically occurs
automatically and without awareness, and does not necessarily involve understanding the mirrored
behavior. Studies have shown that the more uncertain a participant’s preference is, the more they adapt
to those of others. Other authors conclude that learning about others’ attitudes requires sophisticated
forms of mentalizing.
2
Alcalá-López (2018). Building blocks of social cognition: Mirror, mentalize, share?
Staring points in social neuroscience – dual process theories of human social cognition
Two main theoretical frameworks explain how an adequate understanding of others’ behavior may be
achieved.
1. The theory theory (TT) -> individuals draw on a collection of abstract principles about human
behavior, acquired through life experience, that allows to interpret and predict the mental states
and behavioral patterns of others. Such inferences based on abstract emulation enable predictions
about what individuals are thinking about others, despite the fact that their mental states can never
be directly observed or explicitly confirmed.
2. The simulation theory (ST) -> humans impersonate others and automatically imitate their mental
states. The aim is to understand what oneself would experience in the other’s place. The ST
framework rejects the need to assemble abstract models to emulate other’s behavior – as proposed
by the TT – since humans have their own inner experience.
Theory theory – conceptual emulation of other’s mental states
There are two important concepts:
1. Theory of mind (ToM)-> the awareness that humans and non-human primates may have of
other’s mental stages.
2. Mentalizing -> the ability of belief attribution in humans and to include spontaneous and non-
inferential capacities. This was introduced because the term “theory” could lead to the
misunderstanding that ToM is a fully developed theoretical account about the behavior and
experience of others.
Behavioral experiments -> showed that apes could not only infer the goals and intentions of others’
(external) actions, but also behaved in alignment with their (internal) mental states that were
incongruent with the external reality (e.g., false beliefs). Nevertheless, different species of non-human
primates show different degrees of sophistication in their mentalizing abilities.
Experimental paradigms -> found that ToM emerges around the age of 4 years. However, several
recent studies found children younger than 2 years of age already behaving according to others’ false
beliefs.
Many authors -> have argued that the diversity in children’s mentalizing skills across studies may be
driven by preceding differences in the maturation of domain-general cognitive abilities including
linguistic and executive performance. A study showed that variations in executive skills predicted
differences in ToM abilities starting from the emergence of adulthood through the lifespan. These
aspects together lend support for the possibility that the maturation of general, basic cognitive abilities
likely scaffolds the development of complex mentalizing skills.
Age and ToM -> a study reported a decline in ToM abilities which is congruent with a neuroimaging
study in which older participants performed worse compared with young participants even when
explicitly prompted to infer the mental states of others.
1
, These authors found that such social-cognitive deficit in normal aging was associated with decreased
neural activity of the dorsal mPFC during mental tasks. Authors of other studies suggest that ToM
may be a domain-specific process, which declines with age disregarding perceptual or linguistic
capacities.
Brain imaging literature -> a set of brain regions including the mPFC and posterior cingulate (PCC)
cortices, as well as the bilateral temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), robustly increase in neural activity
when participants undergo perspective-taking tasks probing ToM performance. An identical set of
brain regions is also known for its activity during the retrieval of autobiographical memory, spatial
navigation from a first-person perspective, or prospection into the future.
- This set of regions was found to decrease in neural activity during many other tasks and was
therefore called the default mode network (DMN) -> mostly active during idling minds sets.
There is considerable overlap between the neural correlates of the DMN, particularly active at
resting baseline, and those brain locations exhibiting increased activity during ToM tasks.
Simulation theory – limitation of others’ mental states
Some authors have denied that a mechanism dedicated to abstract emulation is a necessary condition
to grasp and represent others’ subjective experience. The ST account proposes that individuals
automatically mimic or intuitively impersonate in a covert fashion the behavior of others, even when
simply observing them. ST proposes that this reinstantiation of observed behavior provides access to
the internal mental state of the other, thus enabling action understanding. An author proposed that
witnessing others’ social-affective behavior inevitably triggers one’s own internal representation of that
same behavior.
Affectivity -> simpler forms of affective sharing were suggested to precede the onset of full-fledged
empathy capacities in infants. Mimicry and emotional contagion are already present in newborns,
before the onset of ToM. A tendency to automatically reproduce the externally visible manifestation
of internal affective stages (e.g., mimicry) has been suggested as a possible low-level mechanism,
elaborated on by more complex forms of empathy.
Emotional contagion -> this is a proto-form of empathy. An individual synchronizes with and
converges to others’ affective mental states. In contrast to full-fledged empathy, emotional contagion
occurs without awareness of the observing individual, and has been identified in other species. Such
proto-form of empathy can turn out to be fundamental for social interactions.
Simulation mechanisms -> these are independent from affective states and have been suggested to
underlie other types of social behavior. The term herding refers to the behavior of an individual when
he/she imitates or mirrors a group, as opposed to acting independently. This typically occurs
automatically and without awareness, and does not necessarily involve understanding the mirrored
behavior. Studies have shown that the more uncertain a participant’s preference is, the more they adapt
to those of others. Other authors conclude that learning about others’ attitudes requires sophisticated
forms of mentalizing.
2
