Rational rents: a supernormal profit jointly generated in an exchange relationship that cannot be generated by
either firm in isolation and can only be created through the joint idiosyncratic contributions of the specific
alliance partners. Relationships with other firms (e.g., suppliers) can, similar to internal resources, give firms
competitive advantages at the product market. The relational view postulates that resources do not necessarily
need to be “in-house” to give a firm competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998).
4 ways to create relational rents:
1) the greater alliance partners’ investment in relation-specific assets.
2) the greater the alliance partners’ investment in inter-firm knowledge-sharing routines
3) the greater the proportion is of synergy-sensitive resources owned by alliance partners
4) the greater the alliance partners’ ability is to align transactions with the governance structures in
discriminating way
ARTICLE 1 PRESURE OR PAMPER:
This study focuses on power and trust as key mechanisms that can be used by firms to improve their resource
position by acquiring better supplier resources than competitors.
Social exchange theory refers to a situation in which the actions of one individual provide the rewards or
punishments for the actions of another individual (and vice versa) in repeated interactions (Muthusamy &
White, 2005)
Findings:
Power: We found that coercive power does not significantly affect supplier resource allocation. However,
coercive power did have a significant effect on physical resources for buyers accounting for a large share in the
supplier’s turnover. Reward power was found to positively relate to supplier allocation of physical and
innovation resources. The effect of reward power on supplier resource allocation did not significantly differ
between the small share and large share group.
Trust: Goodwill trust was found to have no significant effect on supplier resource allocation in the full sample.
However, goodwill trust does have a significant effect on physical resources and innovation resources when the
buyer accounts for a large share in the supplier’s turnover. Competence trust was found to positively relate to
supplier allocation of physical and innovation resources. The multigroup analysis showed that the effects of
competence trust on supplier resource allocation are significantly higher for firms that account for only a small
share in the supplier’s turnover.
1) Coercive tactics do not necessarily affect supplier resource allocation negatively and goodwill trust does not
inherently affect supplier resource allocation positively
2) The dependence of a supplier on the buying firm—in terms of share in turnover—affects the relationship
between the trust dimensions and supplier resource allocation more than it does the power dimensions
3) Goodwill trust only affects supplier resource allocation when the buyer has a large share in the supplier’s
turn- over, while competence trust is more effective if buyers account for a small share in the supplier’s
turnover.
The key managerial take-away was the realization that suppliers are shared with competitors and that, to truly
gain strategic advantages, SCM practices should aim at increasing the performance of this supplier relative to
the performance of this supplier to competitors. For the retailer the realization that the reward power can be
used as alternative to coercive tactics can make the subtle difference in the resource allocation behavior of the
supplier.
ARTICLE 2 POWER REGIMES (COX):
Main conclusion: Without being aware of the power regimes in a supply chain, it is difficult to see how a
supply chain can be managed effectively
either firm in isolation and can only be created through the joint idiosyncratic contributions of the specific
alliance partners. Relationships with other firms (e.g., suppliers) can, similar to internal resources, give firms
competitive advantages at the product market. The relational view postulates that resources do not necessarily
need to be “in-house” to give a firm competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998).
4 ways to create relational rents:
1) the greater alliance partners’ investment in relation-specific assets.
2) the greater the alliance partners’ investment in inter-firm knowledge-sharing routines
3) the greater the proportion is of synergy-sensitive resources owned by alliance partners
4) the greater the alliance partners’ ability is to align transactions with the governance structures in
discriminating way
ARTICLE 1 PRESURE OR PAMPER:
This study focuses on power and trust as key mechanisms that can be used by firms to improve their resource
position by acquiring better supplier resources than competitors.
Social exchange theory refers to a situation in which the actions of one individual provide the rewards or
punishments for the actions of another individual (and vice versa) in repeated interactions (Muthusamy &
White, 2005)
Findings:
Power: We found that coercive power does not significantly affect supplier resource allocation. However,
coercive power did have a significant effect on physical resources for buyers accounting for a large share in the
supplier’s turnover. Reward power was found to positively relate to supplier allocation of physical and
innovation resources. The effect of reward power on supplier resource allocation did not significantly differ
between the small share and large share group.
Trust: Goodwill trust was found to have no significant effect on supplier resource allocation in the full sample.
However, goodwill trust does have a significant effect on physical resources and innovation resources when the
buyer accounts for a large share in the supplier’s turnover. Competence trust was found to positively relate to
supplier allocation of physical and innovation resources. The multigroup analysis showed that the effects of
competence trust on supplier resource allocation are significantly higher for firms that account for only a small
share in the supplier’s turnover.
1) Coercive tactics do not necessarily affect supplier resource allocation negatively and goodwill trust does not
inherently affect supplier resource allocation positively
2) The dependence of a supplier on the buying firm—in terms of share in turnover—affects the relationship
between the trust dimensions and supplier resource allocation more than it does the power dimensions
3) Goodwill trust only affects supplier resource allocation when the buyer has a large share in the supplier’s
turn- over, while competence trust is more effective if buyers account for a small share in the supplier’s
turnover.
The key managerial take-away was the realization that suppliers are shared with competitors and that, to truly
gain strategic advantages, SCM practices should aim at increasing the performance of this supplier relative to
the performance of this supplier to competitors. For the retailer the realization that the reward power can be
used as alternative to coercive tactics can make the subtle difference in the resource allocation behavior of the
supplier.
ARTICLE 2 POWER REGIMES (COX):
Main conclusion: Without being aware of the power regimes in a supply chain, it is difficult to see how a
supply chain can be managed effectively
