Does the existence of evil disprove the existence of God?
In this essay, I will strongly argue that the problem of evil, which questions whether the belief
that God possesses certain attributes (power, intelligence, goodness, creator) can be
reconciled with the belief that the world contains certain properties (pain, suffering, absence
of justice, death), fails to disprove God's existence. I will discuss and reject both the logical
and evidential versions of the problem, concluding that Plantinga’s revision of the free will
defence successfully proves that it is logically possible for both evil and God to exist, and
that Hick’s soul making theodicy coherently explains why both evil and God can coexist.
The concept of evil can be split into two definitions; whilst moral evil is pain or suffering
which results from the intentional actions of human beings, natural evil is pain or suffering
which is not brought about by any human beings or agency but is the result of natural events
and physical processes. I would argue that whilst it is harder to explain the existence of
natural evil as compared to moral evil, particularly because the free will defence does not
apply to evil not brought about by humans.
The logical problem of evil is a deductive, a priori argument based on the incompatibility of
the existence of evil and the attributes of God. If correct, it proves that it is logically
impossible for God to exist given the existence of evil in the world. Whilst originating with
Epicurus, who argued that ‘God either wishes to take away evils and is unable, or he is able
and unwilling', the problem is furthered by J.L. Mackie in his 'inconsistent triad'. He claims
that believers are committed to holding an inconsistent set of beliefs which cannot be true
simultaneously: that an omnipotent God exists, that an omnibenevolent God exists, and that
evil exists. For Mackie, believers must hold all three to be true but at the same time cannot
hold all three to be true because they are logically contradictory. An omnipotent being is
powerful enough to eliminate evil completely. A supremely good being wants to eliminate evil
completely. An omniscient being knows that evil exists. These properties imply that if God
exists, then God will eliminate evil completely. However, evil does exist in the world.
Therefore a supremely good, omniscient, omnipotent God cannot exist. It could be argued
that Mackie creates a tension between the three beliefs of the ‘triad’ which successfully
undermines belief in God’s existence. Mackie forces believers to recognise a conflict which
disrupts the very foundations of the concept and definition of God, thus making it illogical for
them to make any claims about God’s existence.
However, I would argue that the free will theodicy, with a theodicy being an explanation
which reconciles the existence of (an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent) God with the
existence of evil, can disprove the logical problem of evil. I would contend that a supremely
good, all-powerful and all-knowing God would create people with free will (as only then will
their choices have moral value), even if this leads to (or at least risks) the existence of evil:
evil on this view is the fault of human beings who exercise their free agency in harmful ways.
St Augustine argued that God had created a perfect world, a Garden of Eden, giving some
creatures the good of free will (Satan and humans), but these agents used their free will to
do evil and bring evil into the world through their actions. In this way, he claims that, since
evil is the consequence of a greater good, the existence of God is compatible with the
existence of evil.
In this essay, I will strongly argue that the problem of evil, which questions whether the belief
that God possesses certain attributes (power, intelligence, goodness, creator) can be
reconciled with the belief that the world contains certain properties (pain, suffering, absence
of justice, death), fails to disprove God's existence. I will discuss and reject both the logical
and evidential versions of the problem, concluding that Plantinga’s revision of the free will
defence successfully proves that it is logically possible for both evil and God to exist, and
that Hick’s soul making theodicy coherently explains why both evil and God can coexist.
The concept of evil can be split into two definitions; whilst moral evil is pain or suffering
which results from the intentional actions of human beings, natural evil is pain or suffering
which is not brought about by any human beings or agency but is the result of natural events
and physical processes. I would argue that whilst it is harder to explain the existence of
natural evil as compared to moral evil, particularly because the free will defence does not
apply to evil not brought about by humans.
The logical problem of evil is a deductive, a priori argument based on the incompatibility of
the existence of evil and the attributes of God. If correct, it proves that it is logically
impossible for God to exist given the existence of evil in the world. Whilst originating with
Epicurus, who argued that ‘God either wishes to take away evils and is unable, or he is able
and unwilling', the problem is furthered by J.L. Mackie in his 'inconsistent triad'. He claims
that believers are committed to holding an inconsistent set of beliefs which cannot be true
simultaneously: that an omnipotent God exists, that an omnibenevolent God exists, and that
evil exists. For Mackie, believers must hold all three to be true but at the same time cannot
hold all three to be true because they are logically contradictory. An omnipotent being is
powerful enough to eliminate evil completely. A supremely good being wants to eliminate evil
completely. An omniscient being knows that evil exists. These properties imply that if God
exists, then God will eliminate evil completely. However, evil does exist in the world.
Therefore a supremely good, omniscient, omnipotent God cannot exist. It could be argued
that Mackie creates a tension between the three beliefs of the ‘triad’ which successfully
undermines belief in God’s existence. Mackie forces believers to recognise a conflict which
disrupts the very foundations of the concept and definition of God, thus making it illogical for
them to make any claims about God’s existence.
However, I would argue that the free will theodicy, with a theodicy being an explanation
which reconciles the existence of (an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent) God with the
existence of evil, can disprove the logical problem of evil. I would contend that a supremely
good, all-powerful and all-knowing God would create people with free will (as only then will
their choices have moral value), even if this leads to (or at least risks) the existence of evil:
evil on this view is the fault of human beings who exercise their free agency in harmful ways.
St Augustine argued that God had created a perfect world, a Garden of Eden, giving some
creatures the good of free will (Satan and humans), but these agents used their free will to
do evil and bring evil into the world through their actions. In this way, he claims that, since
evil is the consequence of a greater good, the existence of God is compatible with the
existence of evil.
