University of Cambridge
Law Tripos 2018-2019 – International Law
STATEHOOD
General Reading:
- Brownlie, Chapters 4, 5 and 6; or Shaw, Chapters 5 and 9
- Harris, Chapter 4 (make sure to read the relevant passages of cases not excerpted in Harris)
- J Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd ed, OUP, 2006), Chapters 1, 2 and 3 (for more de-
tailed analysis of the topics covered in the lectures)
Further reading on specific topics is suggested below in the relevant sections of the handout.
1 Statehood is a fundamental structural concept in international law, which is predominantly made by
States and for States – the protagonists in our decentralised legal system.
E.g.: the illustrative lists of rights and duties of States provided by the Draft Declaration on Rights
and Duties of States (1949) and in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States (UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (1970))
2 But note that States are not the only category of subjects of international law – there are also interna-
tional organizations and individuals:
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion (1949):
‘The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of
their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community… In the opinion of the Court,
the [United Nations] was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, func-
tions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of in-
ternational personality and the capacity to operate upon an international plane...’
I. The Criteria for Statehood in International Law
3 The traditional starting point for analysis has been Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the
Rights and Duties of States:
The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications:
a) a permanent population;
b) a defined territory;
c) government; and
d) capacity to enter into relations with the other States.
4 The Montevideo list has been criticised for its circularity: how can one ascertain that a State has the ‘ca -
pacity to enter into relations with other States’? Hence the convenience of unpacking it (on which, see J
Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law) into:
(i) Territorial community under government;
(ii) Independence;
(iii) Inexistence of legal obstacles to statehood.
5 The first requirement – territorial community under government:
1
Law Tripos 2018-2019 – International Law
STATEHOOD
General Reading:
- Brownlie, Chapters 4, 5 and 6; or Shaw, Chapters 5 and 9
- Harris, Chapter 4 (make sure to read the relevant passages of cases not excerpted in Harris)
- J Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd ed, OUP, 2006), Chapters 1, 2 and 3 (for more de-
tailed analysis of the topics covered in the lectures)
Further reading on specific topics is suggested below in the relevant sections of the handout.
1 Statehood is a fundamental structural concept in international law, which is predominantly made by
States and for States – the protagonists in our decentralised legal system.
E.g.: the illustrative lists of rights and duties of States provided by the Draft Declaration on Rights
and Duties of States (1949) and in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States (UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (1970))
2 But note that States are not the only category of subjects of international law – there are also interna-
tional organizations and individuals:
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion (1949):
‘The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of
their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community… In the opinion of the Court,
the [United Nations] was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, func-
tions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of in-
ternational personality and the capacity to operate upon an international plane...’
I. The Criteria for Statehood in International Law
3 The traditional starting point for analysis has been Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the
Rights and Duties of States:
The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications:
a) a permanent population;
b) a defined territory;
c) government; and
d) capacity to enter into relations with the other States.
4 The Montevideo list has been criticised for its circularity: how can one ascertain that a State has the ‘ca -
pacity to enter into relations with other States’? Hence the convenience of unpacking it (on which, see J
Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law) into:
(i) Territorial community under government;
(ii) Independence;
(iii) Inexistence of legal obstacles to statehood.
5 The first requirement – territorial community under government:
1
