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Chapter 4 Foreign Policy
Making Foreign Policy
Models of decision making
The foreign policy process is a process of decision-making. A common starting point for
studying the decision-making process is the rational model. In this model, decision makers
set goals, evaluate their relative importance, calculate the costs and benefits of each
possible course of action, then choose the one with the highest benefits and lowest costs.
The choice may be complicated by uncertainty about the costs and benefits of various
actions. In such cases, decision makers must attach probabilities to each possible outcome
of an action Some decision makers are relatively accepting of risk, whereas others are
averse to risk. Governments are made up of individuals, who may rationally pursue their
goals. Yet, the goals of different individuals involved in making a decision may diverge, as
may the goals of different state agencies. The rational model of decision making is
somewhat complicated by uncertainty and the multiple goals of decision makers. Thus,
the rational model may imply that decision making is simpler than is actually the case.
An alternative to the rational model of decision making is the organizational process
model. In this model, foreign policy decision makers generally skip the labor-intensive
process of identifying goals and alternative actions, relying instead for most decisions
on standardized responses or standard operating procedures. Example can be given from
the received and responded letters in US State Department, responds may and may not
reflect the high-level policies by top decision makers, but they are written in the least
controversial manner. The organizational process model implies that much of foreign
policy results from “management by muddling through.”
Another alternative to the rational model is the government bargaining (or bureaucratic
politics) model, in which foreign policy decisions result from the bargaining process
among various government agencies with somewhat divergent interests in the outcome.
Thus, according to the government bargaining model, foreign policy decisions reflect (a
mix of) the interests of state agencies.
Individual decision makers: The study of individual decision making revolves around the
question of rationality. To what extent are national leaders (or citizens) able to make
rational decisions in the national interest—if indeed such an interest can be defined—and
thus to conform to a realist view of IR? Individual rationality is not equivalent to state
rationality: states might filter individuals’ irrational decisions so as to arrive at rational
choices, or states might distort individually rational decisions and end up with irrational
state choices. But realists tend to assume that both states and individuals are rational
and that the goals or interests of states correlate with those of leaders.
The most simplified rational-actor models assume that interests are the same from one actor
to another. And states would all behave similarly to each other. This assumption is at best
a great oversimplification; individual decisions reflect the values and beliefs of the
decision maker.
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Individual decision makers not only have differing values and beliefs, but also have unique
personalities—their personal experiences, intellectual capabilities, and personal styles of
making decisions.
Beyond individual idiosyncrasies in goals or decision-making processes, individual
decision making diverges from the rational model in at least three systematic ways. First,
decision makers suffer from misperceptions and selective perceptions (taking in only
some kinds of information) when they compile information on the likely consequences of
their choices. Decision-making processes must reduce and filter the incoming information
on which a decision is based; the problem is that such filtration often is biased.
Information screens are subconscious filters through which people put the information
coming in about the world around them. Often, they simply ignore any information that
does not fit their expectations. Misperceptions can affect the implementation of policy by
low- level officials as well as its formulation by high-level officials. The officers were
trying to carry out policies established by national leaders, but because of misperceptions,
their actions instead damaged their state’s interests.
Second, the rationality of individual cost-benefit calculations is undermined by emotions
that decision makers feel while thinking about the consequences of their actions—an effect
referred to as affective bias.
Third, cognitive biases are systematic distortions of rational calculations based not on
emotional feelings but simply on the limitations of the human brain in making choices. The
most important of these distortions seems to be the attempt to produce cognitive balance—
or to reduce cognitive dissonance.
One implication of cognitive balance is that decision makers place greater value on goals
that they have put much effort into achieving—the justification of effort.
Decision makers also achieve cognitive balance through wishful thinking—an overestimate
of the probability of a desired outcome. A variation of wishful thinking is to assume that an
event with a low probability of occurring will not occur. This could be a dangerous way to
think about catastrophic events such as accidental nuclear war or a terrorist attack.
Cognitive balance often leads decision makers to maintain a hardened image of an enemy
and to interpret all of the enemy’s actions in a negative light. A decision maker may also
experience psychological projection of his or her own feelings onto another actor.
Another form of cognitive bias, related to cognitive balance, is the use of historical
analogies to structure one’s thinking about a decision. This can be quite useful or quite
misleading, depending on whether the analogy is appropriate. In particular, decision makers
often assume that a solution that worked in the past will work again—without fully
examining how similar the situations really are.
All of these psychological processes—misperception, affective biases, and cognitive biases
Chapter 4 Foreign Policy
Making Foreign Policy
Models of decision making
The foreign policy process is a process of decision-making. A common starting point for
studying the decision-making process is the rational model. In this model, decision makers
set goals, evaluate their relative importance, calculate the costs and benefits of each
possible course of action, then choose the one with the highest benefits and lowest costs.
The choice may be complicated by uncertainty about the costs and benefits of various
actions. In such cases, decision makers must attach probabilities to each possible outcome
of an action Some decision makers are relatively accepting of risk, whereas others are
averse to risk. Governments are made up of individuals, who may rationally pursue their
goals. Yet, the goals of different individuals involved in making a decision may diverge, as
may the goals of different state agencies. The rational model of decision making is
somewhat complicated by uncertainty and the multiple goals of decision makers. Thus,
the rational model may imply that decision making is simpler than is actually the case.
An alternative to the rational model of decision making is the organizational process
model. In this model, foreign policy decision makers generally skip the labor-intensive
process of identifying goals and alternative actions, relying instead for most decisions
on standardized responses or standard operating procedures. Example can be given from
the received and responded letters in US State Department, responds may and may not
reflect the high-level policies by top decision makers, but they are written in the least
controversial manner. The organizational process model implies that much of foreign
policy results from “management by muddling through.”
Another alternative to the rational model is the government bargaining (or bureaucratic
politics) model, in which foreign policy decisions result from the bargaining process
among various government agencies with somewhat divergent interests in the outcome.
Thus, according to the government bargaining model, foreign policy decisions reflect (a
mix of) the interests of state agencies.
Individual decision makers: The study of individual decision making revolves around the
question of rationality. To what extent are national leaders (or citizens) able to make
rational decisions in the national interest—if indeed such an interest can be defined—and
thus to conform to a realist view of IR? Individual rationality is not equivalent to state
rationality: states might filter individuals’ irrational decisions so as to arrive at rational
choices, or states might distort individually rational decisions and end up with irrational
state choices. But realists tend to assume that both states and individuals are rational
and that the goals or interests of states correlate with those of leaders.
The most simplified rational-actor models assume that interests are the same from one actor
to another. And states would all behave similarly to each other. This assumption is at best
a great oversimplification; individual decisions reflect the values and beliefs of the
decision maker.
, 2
Individual decision makers not only have differing values and beliefs, but also have unique
personalities—their personal experiences, intellectual capabilities, and personal styles of
making decisions.
Beyond individual idiosyncrasies in goals or decision-making processes, individual
decision making diverges from the rational model in at least three systematic ways. First,
decision makers suffer from misperceptions and selective perceptions (taking in only
some kinds of information) when they compile information on the likely consequences of
their choices. Decision-making processes must reduce and filter the incoming information
on which a decision is based; the problem is that such filtration often is biased.
Information screens are subconscious filters through which people put the information
coming in about the world around them. Often, they simply ignore any information that
does not fit their expectations. Misperceptions can affect the implementation of policy by
low- level officials as well as its formulation by high-level officials. The officers were
trying to carry out policies established by national leaders, but because of misperceptions,
their actions instead damaged their state’s interests.
Second, the rationality of individual cost-benefit calculations is undermined by emotions
that decision makers feel while thinking about the consequences of their actions—an effect
referred to as affective bias.
Third, cognitive biases are systematic distortions of rational calculations based not on
emotional feelings but simply on the limitations of the human brain in making choices. The
most important of these distortions seems to be the attempt to produce cognitive balance—
or to reduce cognitive dissonance.
One implication of cognitive balance is that decision makers place greater value on goals
that they have put much effort into achieving—the justification of effort.
Decision makers also achieve cognitive balance through wishful thinking—an overestimate
of the probability of a desired outcome. A variation of wishful thinking is to assume that an
event with a low probability of occurring will not occur. This could be a dangerous way to
think about catastrophic events such as accidental nuclear war or a terrorist attack.
Cognitive balance often leads decision makers to maintain a hardened image of an enemy
and to interpret all of the enemy’s actions in a negative light. A decision maker may also
experience psychological projection of his or her own feelings onto another actor.
Another form of cognitive bias, related to cognitive balance, is the use of historical
analogies to structure one’s thinking about a decision. This can be quite useful or quite
misleading, depending on whether the analogy is appropriate. In particular, decision makers
often assume that a solution that worked in the past will work again—without fully
examining how similar the situations really are.
All of these psychological processes—misperception, affective biases, and cognitive biases
