Intro
Statute a fundamental source of law. Hence a large number of case heard by the court involve the
meaning of words in a statute or delegated legislation. Although Parliament make law, the court have to
apply it. Tindal CJ in the Sussex Peerage Claim expressed the approach that “the only rule for the
construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intent of the
Parliament which passes the Act”.
Problems
Where the meaning of the statue is uncertain, it is difficult to ascertain Parliament’s intention. The
difficulties to interpreted the words because of imperfect means of communication. As explained by
Francis Bennion there are a number of features of statutes that make interpretation difficult.
There may be ambiguity means words have more than one meaning and it may not be clear which
meaning should use. This may lead different judges interpret the word differently. For example, the word
marriage couple can be interpret as legally registered or ceremonial function. In Allen, the defendant
married a woman while his first wife was still alive. Statute stated “whosoever being married, shall marry
any other person during the lifetime of his spouse shall commit an offence”. The court use golden rule
of narrow approach to decides that marry could also mean go through the ceremony of marriage to find
that defendant guilty and not necessary to be legally registered.
A board term may have been use which is not clear. In Brock v DPP (1993), the QBD decided that type in
the Dangerous Dog Act 1991 had a wider meaning than bread. It could cover dogs which were not
pedigree, pit bull, terriers but has a substantial number of characteristics of such dog.
New development can lead to words not covering present-day situations because of advancement in
technology and medical discoveries. For example in the case of Royal Collage of Nursing v DHSS where
interpreting the statute of Abortion Act 1967 which stated it is an offence for anyone committing or
performing an abortion unless it is performed by a registered medical practitioner. The purpose of the
statute is to control alley abortion. Overtime, today abortion can be performed through a drug induced
process. The question is whether the medical practitioner can it be a nurse or remain as doctor? Lord
Diplock in majority judgement used mischief and purposive approach to hold that the procedure by nurse
was lawful under the statute. Another example in exp Quintavalle where interpreting the statute of
Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act 1990, when parliament pass the statute, they only knew of 2 ways
to create embryos which is fertilisation and in-vitro(test tube). Today we have Cell Nuclear Replacement
(CNR) means cloning creates. Question is where the CNR is fall under the statute because when parliament
issue the statute there is no CRA technology? Lord Bingham applied three guidance on factor to consider
if a particular development falls within Parliament’s intention which gave by Lord Wilberforce dissenting
judgement in Royal College of Nursing v DHSS. First is that same genus of facts; an embryo created by CNR
is the same as those created in vitro. Second is there was nothing in the wording of the statute that was
restrictive. Third is embryo by CNR is not different in kind and dimension than the one envisaged by the
statute. The statute passed to regulate creation of embryos so it didn’t matter which method was used to
create it.
They could be problem arise by ellipsis means when the draftsmen refrains using certain words that they
regard as implied automatically.
There may also inadequate use of words such a drafting error or omission or printing error.
Approaches & Rules & Aids