FIRST PUBLISH OCTOBER 2024
ENGR-482 exam 2 Study Guide with
Complete Solutions
people involved in challenger disaster - Ans:✔✔-Roger Boisjoly- Enginer at thiokol
Robert Lund- VP engineer at Thiokol
Jerald Mason- Senior VP at Thiokol who pressured to launch
NASA-Marshall
Rogers commission
decisions of Challenger - Ans:✔✔--Boisjoly voiced concerns anout o-ring issues
-Thiokol managers responsible for the go/no-go decision initially offered a no-launch recognition in
response to Boisjoly's objections, but reversed this decision after NASA-marshall administrators reacted
negatively
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-Despite being told to "put on his management hat" Roger Boisjoly maintained his view that it was
unsafe to launch Challenger in such cold conditions
-Roger Boisjol testified about the questionable process that led up to the decision to launch Challenger
Technical issues with Challenger - Ans:✔✔--Thiokol engineers in Utah were beginning to realize that O-
ring blowby leakage was adversely affected by temperature, and that low temp launches could introduce
risk that were yet not well understood
-The ambient temp at the Florida launch site on the morning of launch was 36 degrees Farenheit, well
below previous experiences, and with heavy ice buildup on the launch vehicle and tower
-hot gases generated by the combustion of solid rocket fuel in the booster found a pathway through the
joint that is sealed by 2 o-rings and filled with sealing putting
People of Columbia disaster - Ans:✔✔-Rodney Rocha- NASA engineer who had concerns with foam
Linda Ham - NASA senior manager who OK'ed launchColumbia accident investigation BOARD, admiral
HAL Gehman
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FIRST PUBLISH OCTOBER 2024
Decisions in Columbia Disaster - Ans:✔✔--management denied several requests by different engineering
groups for clearer photos of foam impact on shuttle wing
-although foam strikes were below performance specifications of the shuttle, management convinced
themselves that past successes were an indication that a known defect would not cause problems,
instead of deciding the issue on the basis of testing and sound engineering analysis
Organizational factors that contributed to the loss of the Columbia: - Ans:✔✔-1. characterization of the
shuttle as an operational, rather than developmental program
2. schedule pressures
3. organizational barriers preventing effective comm of safety info
4. constrained financial and personnel resources
Technical Issues: - Ans:✔✔-1. impact of a briefcase-sized piece of foam that destroyed the wing leading
edge and the main spar in the left wing
2. defects resulting from a non-optimal design, because the bipod structure and foam application
processes were designed separately
3. hot gases entering a breach in the wing leading edge and destroying the structural integrity of the
wing
Groupthink - Ans:✔✔-situation in which groups come to agreement at the expense of critical thinking
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