Russia and Balkan States
Following the end of the Balkan wars in the 1990s, periods of stability allowed
several of the nations of Southeast Europe to pursue reforms, incorporate
Western values, and join the European Union (EU) and NATO. Recently,
however, the Western Balkans have experienced various degrees of political
instability involving elements of nationalist politics, stagnating economies,
public frustration over corruption, ethnic tensions, and violence. Although some
of the tension has receded, many observers remain concerned that the region's
stability could unravel again. For some, at the core of this uncertainty lies
Russia, which could provoke such a turn of events.
The Balkans' Uneasy Relations with Russia
The unsettled nature of the Balkans has given Moscow a geopolitical
opportunity to aggressively exploit and a chance to reassert itself as a significant
influence in the region. Russia considers much of the Balkans an area of
historical linkages, whether through ethnic connections to Slavic populations or
through its perceived role as protector of Orthodox Christians. During the
Communist years, the Soviet Union exerted significant regional influence,
despite Russia's tensions with Yugoslavia. After the Soviet collapse, Russia's
political and economic influence waned but did not disappear. Beyond historical
and religious ties, Russia's influence today generally is grounded in popular
support (which remains high), the large number of Russians who live or
vacation in the region, its financial support, and its energy monopoly.
Perhaps believing it had caught the West off guard in Ukraine, sensing a
vacuum left by a distracted EU and a largely absent United States, and
determined to oppose EU and NATO expansion, Russia has increased its
diplomatic and intelligence presence in the Balkans; expanded its use of soft
power; offered economic and financial opportunities, particularly by proposing
to build new energy infrastructure; and apparently pursued widespread
disinformation and fake news campaigns often designed to destabilize parts of
the region. Some observers, however, see Moscow's role as limited to being a
"spoiler" or counterweight to the West, seeking to discredit the EU and the
United States while offering the region little in the way of closer ties. Russia has
had opportunities to create mischief and appears capable of stirring political
unrest and ethnic tension in the Balkans. Nevertheless, Moscow's efforts to
diminish Balkan resilience and blunt the region's Western drift have failed to
1
, gain significant traction in some countries, such as Croatia, Kosovo, and Bosnia
(outside the Republika Srpska, Bosnia's autonomous Serbian entity) and have
faltered in others despite some initial gains. In an unsuccessful attempt to derail
Montenegro's NATO membership, Russia may have resorted to more extreme,
dangerous methods, allegedly supporting an October 2016 attempted coup
against the government, reportedly with the assistance of intelligence agents
operating in Serbia. In Macedonia, Moscow continues to support political
leaders who oppose Podgorica's attempts to join NATO and who initially
refused to surrender control of the government after the 2016 national elections,
leading to political and ethnic unrest. Serbia is arguably Russia's most important
regional partner. Moscow has gone to great lengths to preserve its relationship
with Belgrade through the use of soft power and economic support. But even in
Serbia, successive governments have deepened their relations with the EU while
persuading Moscow that Serbia has little interest in severing ties with Russia or
joining NATO. Russia has had success in the Republika Srpska, where it has
emboldened Bosnian Serbs to preserve or even strengthen their autonomy from
the central government in Sarajevo.
The Security Dimension
Moscow has been partially successful in promoting a pro-Russian, anti-Western
narrative at the expense of the EU and United States. It has had less success,
however, in its security relations with the Balkans. The Russian military appears
to have little or no relationship with the militaries of Albania, Croatia, and
Montenegro (all NATO members); the Bosniak-Croat entity in Bosnia; or the
Kosovo Security Force (a small, lightly armed, national guard). It has had only
marginal success with Macedonia. The one exception is, again, Serbia. Despite
Serbia's 2007 declaration of military neutrality, the long-established Serbian-
Russian military relationship flourishes, with Russia supplying Serbia with
combat equipment, including a recent transfer of MiG aircraft and tanks.
Serbian military forces have trained extensively with Russian forces, including
four joint exercises in 2016 and 2017. Russia also operates a reported
Humanitarian Training Center established in 2012 in the city of Niš. The United
States and NATO have expressed concern that this could become a subtly
disguised military and intelligence operation established to spy on U.S., EU,
and NATO interests in the Balkans.
Belgrade has been under constant political pressure from Moscow to keep
Serbia out of NATO and other Western institutions. Nevertheless, Serbia is far
2
Following the end of the Balkan wars in the 1990s, periods of stability allowed
several of the nations of Southeast Europe to pursue reforms, incorporate
Western values, and join the European Union (EU) and NATO. Recently,
however, the Western Balkans have experienced various degrees of political
instability involving elements of nationalist politics, stagnating economies,
public frustration over corruption, ethnic tensions, and violence. Although some
of the tension has receded, many observers remain concerned that the region's
stability could unravel again. For some, at the core of this uncertainty lies
Russia, which could provoke such a turn of events.
The Balkans' Uneasy Relations with Russia
The unsettled nature of the Balkans has given Moscow a geopolitical
opportunity to aggressively exploit and a chance to reassert itself as a significant
influence in the region. Russia considers much of the Balkans an area of
historical linkages, whether through ethnic connections to Slavic populations or
through its perceived role as protector of Orthodox Christians. During the
Communist years, the Soviet Union exerted significant regional influence,
despite Russia's tensions with Yugoslavia. After the Soviet collapse, Russia's
political and economic influence waned but did not disappear. Beyond historical
and religious ties, Russia's influence today generally is grounded in popular
support (which remains high), the large number of Russians who live or
vacation in the region, its financial support, and its energy monopoly.
Perhaps believing it had caught the West off guard in Ukraine, sensing a
vacuum left by a distracted EU and a largely absent United States, and
determined to oppose EU and NATO expansion, Russia has increased its
diplomatic and intelligence presence in the Balkans; expanded its use of soft
power; offered economic and financial opportunities, particularly by proposing
to build new energy infrastructure; and apparently pursued widespread
disinformation and fake news campaigns often designed to destabilize parts of
the region. Some observers, however, see Moscow's role as limited to being a
"spoiler" or counterweight to the West, seeking to discredit the EU and the
United States while offering the region little in the way of closer ties. Russia has
had opportunities to create mischief and appears capable of stirring political
unrest and ethnic tension in the Balkans. Nevertheless, Moscow's efforts to
diminish Balkan resilience and blunt the region's Western drift have failed to
1
, gain significant traction in some countries, such as Croatia, Kosovo, and Bosnia
(outside the Republika Srpska, Bosnia's autonomous Serbian entity) and have
faltered in others despite some initial gains. In an unsuccessful attempt to derail
Montenegro's NATO membership, Russia may have resorted to more extreme,
dangerous methods, allegedly supporting an October 2016 attempted coup
against the government, reportedly with the assistance of intelligence agents
operating in Serbia. In Macedonia, Moscow continues to support political
leaders who oppose Podgorica's attempts to join NATO and who initially
refused to surrender control of the government after the 2016 national elections,
leading to political and ethnic unrest. Serbia is arguably Russia's most important
regional partner. Moscow has gone to great lengths to preserve its relationship
with Belgrade through the use of soft power and economic support. But even in
Serbia, successive governments have deepened their relations with the EU while
persuading Moscow that Serbia has little interest in severing ties with Russia or
joining NATO. Russia has had success in the Republika Srpska, where it has
emboldened Bosnian Serbs to preserve or even strengthen their autonomy from
the central government in Sarajevo.
The Security Dimension
Moscow has been partially successful in promoting a pro-Russian, anti-Western
narrative at the expense of the EU and United States. It has had less success,
however, in its security relations with the Balkans. The Russian military appears
to have little or no relationship with the militaries of Albania, Croatia, and
Montenegro (all NATO members); the Bosniak-Croat entity in Bosnia; or the
Kosovo Security Force (a small, lightly armed, national guard). It has had only
marginal success with Macedonia. The one exception is, again, Serbia. Despite
Serbia's 2007 declaration of military neutrality, the long-established Serbian-
Russian military relationship flourishes, with Russia supplying Serbia with
combat equipment, including a recent transfer of MiG aircraft and tanks.
Serbian military forces have trained extensively with Russian forces, including
four joint exercises in 2016 and 2017. Russia also operates a reported
Humanitarian Training Center established in 2012 in the city of Niš. The United
States and NATO have expressed concern that this could become a subtly
disguised military and intelligence operation established to spy on U.S., EU,
and NATO interests in the Balkans.
Belgrade has been under constant political pressure from Moscow to keep
Serbia out of NATO and other Western institutions. Nevertheless, Serbia is far
2
