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SolutionManual v
GameTheory:AnIntroduction
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Steve Tadelis
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ABSTRACT This Slution Manual is incomplete. It will be updated every 2-3 weeks to
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add the solutions to problems as they become available. A complete version is
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vexpected by March 15, 2013.
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Contents
I Rational Decision Making
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1 The Single-Person Decision Problem
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2 Introducing Uncertainty and Time
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II Static Games of Complete Information
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3 Preliminaries 45
4 Rationality and Common Knowledge
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5 Pinning Down Beliefs: Nash Equilibrium
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6 Mixed Strategies
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Contents 1
III Dynamic Games of Complete Information v v v v 113
7 Preliminaries 115
8 Credibility and Sequential Rationality
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9 Multi-Stage Games v 163
10 Repeated Games v 179
11 Strategic Bargaining
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IV Static Games of Incomplete Information
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12 Bayesian Games
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13 Auctions and Competitive Bidding
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14 Mechanism Design v 221
V Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information v v v v 222
15 Sequential Rationality with Incomplete Information
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16 Signaling Games v 231
17 Building a Reputation
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18 Information Transmission and Cheap Talk v v v v 243
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