PHILOSOPHY EXTRACT ONE: J.L. MACKIE ‘EVIL AND OMNIPOTENCE’
The traditional arguments for the existence of God have been fairly thoroughly criticized by philosophers. But the theologian can,
if he wishes, accept this criticism. He can admit that no rational proof of God’s existence is possible. And he can still retain all that
is essential to his position, by holding that God’s existence is known is some other non-rational way. I think, however, that a more
telling criticism can be made by way of the traditional problem of evil. Here it can be shown, not that religious beliefs lack rational
support, but that they are positively irrational, that the several parts of the essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with
one another, so that the theologian can maintain his position as a whole only by a much more extreme rejection of reason than
in the former case. He must now be prepared to believe, not merely what cannot be proved, but what can be disproved from
other beliefs that he also holds.
A stronger criticism to the existence of God can be made through the traditional problem of evil, rather than traditional arguments
for the existence of God
The problem of evil shows that theological doctrine is irrational as the parts which make up this doctrine are inconsistent with
one another
The problem of evil, in the sense in which I shall be using the phrase, is a problem only for someone who believes that there is a
God who is both omnipotent and wholly good. And it is a logical problem, the problem of clarifying and reconciling a number of
beliefs: it is not a scientific problem that might be solved by further observations, or a practical problem that might be solved by
a decision or an action. These points are obvious; I mention them only because they are sometimes ignored by theologians, who
sometimes parry a statement of the problem with such remarks as ‘Well, can you solve the problem yourself?’ or ‘This is a mystery
which may be revealed to us later’ or ‘Evil is something to be faced and overcome, not to be merely discussed.’
The problem of evil is a logical problem concerning an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God
In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent: God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some
contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true, the third would be false. But at the same
time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and cannot
consistently adhere to all three. (The problem does not arise only for theists, but I shall discuss it in the form in which it presents
itself for ordinary theism.)
Mackie highlights the inconsistent triad, which is at the center of the problem of evil
- God is omnipotent, God is omnibenevolent, evil exists
The three parts of the inconsistent triad are also the three essential parts of most theological positions and theories
However, the contradiction does not arise immediately; to show it we need some additional premises, or perhaps some quasi-
logical rules connecting the terms ‘good’, ‘evil’ and ‘omnipotent’. These additional principles are that good is opposed to evil, in
such a way that a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can, and that there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can
do. From these it follows that a good omnipotent thing eliminates evil completely, and then the propositions that a good
omnipotent thing exists, and that evil exists, are incompatible.
Religion also affirms that good is opposed to evil, which leads to the conclusion that good will eliminate evil. Religion also affirms
that there is no limit to what an omnipotent God can do
- Because God is good and omnipotent, he should be able to eliminate evil completely.
Therefore, the existence of evil and the existence of a good, omnipotent God are incompatible
A. Adequate Solutions
Now once the problem is fully stated it is clear that it can be solved, in the sense that the problem will not arise if one gives up at
least one of the propositions that constitute it. If you are prepared to say that God is not wholly good, or not quite omnipotent,
or that evil does not exist, or that good is not opposed to the kind of evil that exists, or that there are limits to what an omnipotent
thing can do, then the problem of evil will not arise for you.
,There are, then, quite a number of adequate solutions of the problem of evil, and some of these have been adopted, or almost
adopted, by various thinkers. For example, a few have been prepared to deny God’s omnipotence, and rather more have been
prepared to keep the term ‘omnipotence’ but severely to restrict its meaning, recording quite a number of things that an
omnipotent being cannot do. Some have said that evil is an illusion, perhaps because they held that the whole world of temporal,
changing things is an illusion, and that what we call evil belongs only to this world, or perhaps because they held that although
temporal things are much as we see them, those that we call evil are not really evil. Some have said that what we call evil is
merely the privation of good, that evil in a positive sense, evil that would really be opposed to good, does not exist. Many have
agreed with Pope that disorder is harmony not understood, and that partial evil is universal good. Whether any of these views is
true is, or course, another question. But each of them gives an adequate solution of the problem of evil in the sense that if you
accept it this problem does not arise for you, though you may, of course, have other problems to face.
The problem of evil will not arise if one gives up one of the necessary propositions (evil exists, God is omnipotent, God is
omnibenevolent, there are limits to omnipotence, good does not overcome evil)
- Thus, there are many adequate solutions to the problem of evil
Adequate solutions to the problem of evil:
• Deny God’s omnipotence
• Keep the term ‘omnipotence’ but restrict or change its meaning
• Evil is an illusion
• Evil is a privation of good – evil is not opposed to good
‘If you are prepared to say that God is not wholly good’ - Here, Mackie may be alluding to Deism, a view that holds that God does
not interfere with the functioning of the natural world in any way, allowing it to simply un according to the laws of nature that
he configured when he created all things
- Id intervention is integral to the notion of God as good, insofar as a good God would not allow Himself to be a bystander
when it comes to evil, then in the Deist theology, he might be regarded as lacking in omnibenevolence
But often enough these adequate solutions are only almost adopted. The thinkers who restrict God’s power, but keep the term
‘omnipotence’, may reasonably be suspected of thinking, in other contexts, that his power is really unlimited. Those who say that
evil is an illusion may also be thinking, inconsistently, that this illusion is itself an evil. Those who say that ‘evil’ is merely privation
of good may also be thinking, inconsistently, that privation of good is an evil. (The fallacy here is akin to some forms of the
‘naturalistic fallacy’ in ethics, where some think, for example, that ‘good’ is just what contributes to evolutionary progress and
that evolutionary progress is itself good.) If Pope meant what he said in the first line of his couplet, that ‘disorder’ is only harmony
not understood, the ‘partial evil’ of the second line must, for consistency, mean ‘that which, taken in isolation, falsely appears to
be evil’, but it would more naturally mean ‘that which, in isolation, really is evil’. The second line, in fact, hesitates between two
views, that ‘partial evil’ isn’t really evil, since only the universal quality is real, and that ‘partial evil’ is really an evil, but only a
little one.
Often these adequate solutions are not completely adopted, they are only partially adopted
The ‘naturalistic fallacy’ is famous in philosphy for illustrating the gap that exists between an ‘Is’ (a statement of fact) and an
‘ought’ (a statement with moral content).
The fact that harmony and regularity are features of the universe, an assumption is made by Pope that these features
transcend and outshine any apparent sense of ‘discord’ that we detect in the world, simply because, from out limited
perspective, we are unable to appreciate the bigger picture
Mackie additionally demonstrates this this assumption is problematic, as the phrase ‘partial evil’ is ambiguous. It could mean that
any kind of evil is real but insignificant when set against the backdrop of a creation that is emphatically good, pr it could mean
evil is entirely illusory
In addition, therefore, to adequate solutions, we must recognize unsatisfactory inconsistent solutions, in which there is only a
half-hearted or temporary rejection of one of the propositions which together constitute the problem. In these, one of the
constituent propositions is explicitly rejected, but it is covertly re-asserted or assumed elsewhere in the system.
,On top of adequate solutions there are also unsatisfactory inconsistent solutions, in which the adequate solutions are only
partially adopted and thus not adopted properly
These unsatisfactory inconsistent solutions explicitly reject (reject on the outside) one of the assertions, but implicitly assert it
B. Fallacious Solutions
Besides these half-hearted solutions, which explicitly reject but implicitly assert one of the constituent propositions, there are
definitely fallacious solutions which explicitly maintain all of the constituent propositions, but implicitly reject at least one of them
in the course of the argument that explains away the problem of evil.
There are, in fact, many so-called solutions which purport to remove the contradictions without abandoning any of its constituent
propositions. These must be fallacious, as we can see from the very statement of the problem, but it is not so easy to see in each
case precisely where the fallacy lies. I suggest that in all cases the fallacy has the general form suggested above: in order to solve
the problem one (or perhaps more) of its constituent propositions is given up, but in such a way that it appears to have been
retained, and can therefore be asserted without qualifications in other contexts. Sometimes there is a further complication: the
supposed solution moves to and from between say, two of the constituent propositions, at one point asserting the first of these
but covertly abandoning the first. These fallacious solutions often turn upon some equivocation with the words ‘good’ and ‘evil’,
or upon some vagueness about the way in which good and evil are opposed to one another, or about how much is meant by
‘omnipotence’. I propose to examine some of these so-called solutions, and to exhibit their fallacies in detail. Incidentally, I shall
also be considering whether an adequate solution could be reached by a minor modification of one or more of the constituent
propositions, which would, however, still satisfy all the essential requirements of ordinary theism.
Fallacious solutions are those which claim to remove all the contradictions of the inconsistent triad / problem of evil without
abandoning any of its propositions
- The omnipotence of God, the omnibenevolence of God, and the existence of evil are never denied or given up
1. ‘Good cannot exist without evil’ or ‘Evil is necessary as a counterpart to good.’
It is sometimes suggested that evil is necessary as a counterpart to good, that if there were no evil there could be no good either,
and that this solves the problem of evil. It is true that it points to an answer to the question ‘Why should there be evil?’ But it
does so only by qualifying some of the propositions that constitute the problem
The first fallacious solution is that evil is a necessary counterpart to Good, or that Good cannot exist without the existence of evil
as well
First, it sets a limit to what God can do, saying that God cannot create good without simultaneously creating evil, and this means
either that God is not omnipotent or that there are some limits to what an omnipotent thing can do. It may be replied that these
limits are always presupposed, that omnipotence has never meant the power to do what is logically impossible, and on the
present view the existence of good without evil would be a logical impossibility. This interpretation of omnipotence may, indeed,
be accepted as a modification of our original account which does not reject anything that is essential to theism, and I shall in
general assume it in the subsequent discussion. It is, perhaps, the most common theistic view, but I think that some theists at
least have maintained that God can do what is logically impossible. Many theists, at any rate, have held that logic itself is created
or laid down by God, that logic is the way in which God arbitrarily chooses to think. (This is, of course, parallel to the ethical view
that morally right actions are those which God arbitrarily chooses to command, and the two views encounter similar difficulties.)
And this account of logic is clearly inconsistent with the view that God is bound by logical necessities – unless it is possible for an
omnipotent being to bind himself, an issue which we shall consider later, when we come to the Paradox of Omnipotence. This
solution of the problem of evil cannot, therefore, be consistently adopted along with the view that logic is itself created by God.
Mackie begins his criticisms of this fallacious solution:
The idea that God cannot create good without also creating evil suggests that God is not omnipotent or that there are limits on
what an omnipotent God can do
, - One could argue back that omnipotence has never meant power to do what is logically impossible. However, Mackie
points out that theists have in the past consistently claimed that God can do what is logically impossible (such as the
Trinity?)
But, secondly, this solution denies that evil is opposed to good in our original sense. If good and evil are counterparts, a good
thing will not ‘eliminate evil as far as it can’. Indeed, this view suggests that good and evil are not strictly qualities of things at all.
Perhaps the suggestion is that good and evil are related in much the same way as great and small. Certainly, when the term ‘great’
is used relatively as a condensation of ‘greater than so-and-so’ and ‘small’ is used correspondingly, greatness and smallness are
counterparts and cannot exist without each other. But in this sense greatness is not a quality, not an intrinsic feature of anything;
and it would be absurd to think of a movement in favour of greatness and against smallness in this sense. Such a movement
would be self-defeating, since relative greatness can be promoted only by a simultaneous promotion of relative smallness. I feel
sure that no theists would be content to regard God’s goodness as analogous to this – as if what he supports were not the good
but the better, and as if he had the paradoxical aim that all things should be better than other things.
Mackie draws attention to the fact that if the existence of God necessarily requires the existence of evil, then they must in some
sense be complementary rather than opposing forces, something that does not align with traditional theism, which envisages the
universe as a cosmic battleground between these two potencies, so that good will always ‘eliminate ebil as far as it can’
Therefore, they are relative notions, like the terms ‘great’ and ‘small’.
This point is obscured by the fact that ‘great’ and ‘small’ seem to have an absolute as well as a relative sense. I cannot discuss
here whether there is absolute magnitude or not, but if there is, there could be an absolute sense for ‘great’, it could mean of at
least a certain size, and it would make sense to speak of all things getting bigger, of a universe that was expanding all over, and
therefore it would make sense to speak of promoting greatness. But in this sense great and small are not logically necessary
counterparts: either quality could exist without the other. There would be no logical impossibility in everything’s being small or
in everything’s being great.
Neither in the absolute nor in the relative sense, then, of ‘great’ and ‘small’ do these terms provide an analogy of the sort that
would be needed to support this solution of the problem of evil. In neither case are greatness and smallness both necessary
counterparts and mutually opposed forces or possible objects for support or attack
If good and evil can be thought of in an absolutist sense, problems still arise for this solution
In terms of ‘great’ for example, one might envisage the universe continuing to expand as a result of the Big Bang up to a point of
maximal greatness. Similarly, one can think of the world as one in which good continues to grow (perhaps as an expansion of the
kingdom of God) until a state of absolute goodness reigns everywhere
- But this would then mean that neither goodness nor greatness actually require evil or smallness in order for them to
be good or great, which therefore defeats the whole point of this theodicy
It may be replied that good and evil are necessary counterparts in the same way as any quality and its logical opposite: redness
can occur, it is suggested, only if non-redness also occurs. But unless evil is merely the privation of good, they are not logical
opposites, and some further argument would be needed to show that they are counterparts in the same way as genuine logical
opposites. Let us assume that this could be given. There is still doubt of the correctness of the metaphysical principle that a quality
must have a real opposite: I suggest that it is not really impossible that everything should be, say red, that the truth is merely that
if everything were red we should not notice redness, and so we should have no word ‘red’; we observe and give names to qualities
only if they have real opposites. If so, the principle that a term must have an opposite would belong only to our language or to
our thought and would not be an ontological principle, and, correspondingly, the rule that good cannot exist without evil would
not state a logical necessity of a sort that God would just have to put up with. God might have made everything good, though we
should not have noticed it if he had.
Goodness and evil are not logical opposites, meaning that one can exist without the other
Good and evil are not ‘necessary counterparts’. They are not logical opposites like redness and non-redness
- But suppose, for the sake of the argument, that they could be thought of as such. Even so, they would, for Mackie, only
be logical opposites in a linguistic, rather than metaphysical sense. This is because there is no logical impossibility in
everything being red (or good, or evil), though if this were the case, we would then not notice, as we only assign words
The traditional arguments for the existence of God have been fairly thoroughly criticized by philosophers. But the theologian can,
if he wishes, accept this criticism. He can admit that no rational proof of God’s existence is possible. And he can still retain all that
is essential to his position, by holding that God’s existence is known is some other non-rational way. I think, however, that a more
telling criticism can be made by way of the traditional problem of evil. Here it can be shown, not that religious beliefs lack rational
support, but that they are positively irrational, that the several parts of the essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with
one another, so that the theologian can maintain his position as a whole only by a much more extreme rejection of reason than
in the former case. He must now be prepared to believe, not merely what cannot be proved, but what can be disproved from
other beliefs that he also holds.
A stronger criticism to the existence of God can be made through the traditional problem of evil, rather than traditional arguments
for the existence of God
The problem of evil shows that theological doctrine is irrational as the parts which make up this doctrine are inconsistent with
one another
The problem of evil, in the sense in which I shall be using the phrase, is a problem only for someone who believes that there is a
God who is both omnipotent and wholly good. And it is a logical problem, the problem of clarifying and reconciling a number of
beliefs: it is not a scientific problem that might be solved by further observations, or a practical problem that might be solved by
a decision or an action. These points are obvious; I mention them only because they are sometimes ignored by theologians, who
sometimes parry a statement of the problem with such remarks as ‘Well, can you solve the problem yourself?’ or ‘This is a mystery
which may be revealed to us later’ or ‘Evil is something to be faced and overcome, not to be merely discussed.’
The problem of evil is a logical problem concerning an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God
In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent: God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some
contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true, the third would be false. But at the same
time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and cannot
consistently adhere to all three. (The problem does not arise only for theists, but I shall discuss it in the form in which it presents
itself for ordinary theism.)
Mackie highlights the inconsistent triad, which is at the center of the problem of evil
- God is omnipotent, God is omnibenevolent, evil exists
The three parts of the inconsistent triad are also the three essential parts of most theological positions and theories
However, the contradiction does not arise immediately; to show it we need some additional premises, or perhaps some quasi-
logical rules connecting the terms ‘good’, ‘evil’ and ‘omnipotent’. These additional principles are that good is opposed to evil, in
such a way that a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can, and that there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can
do. From these it follows that a good omnipotent thing eliminates evil completely, and then the propositions that a good
omnipotent thing exists, and that evil exists, are incompatible.
Religion also affirms that good is opposed to evil, which leads to the conclusion that good will eliminate evil. Religion also affirms
that there is no limit to what an omnipotent God can do
- Because God is good and omnipotent, he should be able to eliminate evil completely.
Therefore, the existence of evil and the existence of a good, omnipotent God are incompatible
A. Adequate Solutions
Now once the problem is fully stated it is clear that it can be solved, in the sense that the problem will not arise if one gives up at
least one of the propositions that constitute it. If you are prepared to say that God is not wholly good, or not quite omnipotent,
or that evil does not exist, or that good is not opposed to the kind of evil that exists, or that there are limits to what an omnipotent
thing can do, then the problem of evil will not arise for you.
,There are, then, quite a number of adequate solutions of the problem of evil, and some of these have been adopted, or almost
adopted, by various thinkers. For example, a few have been prepared to deny God’s omnipotence, and rather more have been
prepared to keep the term ‘omnipotence’ but severely to restrict its meaning, recording quite a number of things that an
omnipotent being cannot do. Some have said that evil is an illusion, perhaps because they held that the whole world of temporal,
changing things is an illusion, and that what we call evil belongs only to this world, or perhaps because they held that although
temporal things are much as we see them, those that we call evil are not really evil. Some have said that what we call evil is
merely the privation of good, that evil in a positive sense, evil that would really be opposed to good, does not exist. Many have
agreed with Pope that disorder is harmony not understood, and that partial evil is universal good. Whether any of these views is
true is, or course, another question. But each of them gives an adequate solution of the problem of evil in the sense that if you
accept it this problem does not arise for you, though you may, of course, have other problems to face.
The problem of evil will not arise if one gives up one of the necessary propositions (evil exists, God is omnipotent, God is
omnibenevolent, there are limits to omnipotence, good does not overcome evil)
- Thus, there are many adequate solutions to the problem of evil
Adequate solutions to the problem of evil:
• Deny God’s omnipotence
• Keep the term ‘omnipotence’ but restrict or change its meaning
• Evil is an illusion
• Evil is a privation of good – evil is not opposed to good
‘If you are prepared to say that God is not wholly good’ - Here, Mackie may be alluding to Deism, a view that holds that God does
not interfere with the functioning of the natural world in any way, allowing it to simply un according to the laws of nature that
he configured when he created all things
- Id intervention is integral to the notion of God as good, insofar as a good God would not allow Himself to be a bystander
when it comes to evil, then in the Deist theology, he might be regarded as lacking in omnibenevolence
But often enough these adequate solutions are only almost adopted. The thinkers who restrict God’s power, but keep the term
‘omnipotence’, may reasonably be suspected of thinking, in other contexts, that his power is really unlimited. Those who say that
evil is an illusion may also be thinking, inconsistently, that this illusion is itself an evil. Those who say that ‘evil’ is merely privation
of good may also be thinking, inconsistently, that privation of good is an evil. (The fallacy here is akin to some forms of the
‘naturalistic fallacy’ in ethics, where some think, for example, that ‘good’ is just what contributes to evolutionary progress and
that evolutionary progress is itself good.) If Pope meant what he said in the first line of his couplet, that ‘disorder’ is only harmony
not understood, the ‘partial evil’ of the second line must, for consistency, mean ‘that which, taken in isolation, falsely appears to
be evil’, but it would more naturally mean ‘that which, in isolation, really is evil’. The second line, in fact, hesitates between two
views, that ‘partial evil’ isn’t really evil, since only the universal quality is real, and that ‘partial evil’ is really an evil, but only a
little one.
Often these adequate solutions are not completely adopted, they are only partially adopted
The ‘naturalistic fallacy’ is famous in philosphy for illustrating the gap that exists between an ‘Is’ (a statement of fact) and an
‘ought’ (a statement with moral content).
The fact that harmony and regularity are features of the universe, an assumption is made by Pope that these features
transcend and outshine any apparent sense of ‘discord’ that we detect in the world, simply because, from out limited
perspective, we are unable to appreciate the bigger picture
Mackie additionally demonstrates this this assumption is problematic, as the phrase ‘partial evil’ is ambiguous. It could mean that
any kind of evil is real but insignificant when set against the backdrop of a creation that is emphatically good, pr it could mean
evil is entirely illusory
In addition, therefore, to adequate solutions, we must recognize unsatisfactory inconsistent solutions, in which there is only a
half-hearted or temporary rejection of one of the propositions which together constitute the problem. In these, one of the
constituent propositions is explicitly rejected, but it is covertly re-asserted or assumed elsewhere in the system.
,On top of adequate solutions there are also unsatisfactory inconsistent solutions, in which the adequate solutions are only
partially adopted and thus not adopted properly
These unsatisfactory inconsistent solutions explicitly reject (reject on the outside) one of the assertions, but implicitly assert it
B. Fallacious Solutions
Besides these half-hearted solutions, which explicitly reject but implicitly assert one of the constituent propositions, there are
definitely fallacious solutions which explicitly maintain all of the constituent propositions, but implicitly reject at least one of them
in the course of the argument that explains away the problem of evil.
There are, in fact, many so-called solutions which purport to remove the contradictions without abandoning any of its constituent
propositions. These must be fallacious, as we can see from the very statement of the problem, but it is not so easy to see in each
case precisely where the fallacy lies. I suggest that in all cases the fallacy has the general form suggested above: in order to solve
the problem one (or perhaps more) of its constituent propositions is given up, but in such a way that it appears to have been
retained, and can therefore be asserted without qualifications in other contexts. Sometimes there is a further complication: the
supposed solution moves to and from between say, two of the constituent propositions, at one point asserting the first of these
but covertly abandoning the first. These fallacious solutions often turn upon some equivocation with the words ‘good’ and ‘evil’,
or upon some vagueness about the way in which good and evil are opposed to one another, or about how much is meant by
‘omnipotence’. I propose to examine some of these so-called solutions, and to exhibit their fallacies in detail. Incidentally, I shall
also be considering whether an adequate solution could be reached by a minor modification of one or more of the constituent
propositions, which would, however, still satisfy all the essential requirements of ordinary theism.
Fallacious solutions are those which claim to remove all the contradictions of the inconsistent triad / problem of evil without
abandoning any of its propositions
- The omnipotence of God, the omnibenevolence of God, and the existence of evil are never denied or given up
1. ‘Good cannot exist without evil’ or ‘Evil is necessary as a counterpart to good.’
It is sometimes suggested that evil is necessary as a counterpart to good, that if there were no evil there could be no good either,
and that this solves the problem of evil. It is true that it points to an answer to the question ‘Why should there be evil?’ But it
does so only by qualifying some of the propositions that constitute the problem
The first fallacious solution is that evil is a necessary counterpart to Good, or that Good cannot exist without the existence of evil
as well
First, it sets a limit to what God can do, saying that God cannot create good without simultaneously creating evil, and this means
either that God is not omnipotent or that there are some limits to what an omnipotent thing can do. It may be replied that these
limits are always presupposed, that omnipotence has never meant the power to do what is logically impossible, and on the
present view the existence of good without evil would be a logical impossibility. This interpretation of omnipotence may, indeed,
be accepted as a modification of our original account which does not reject anything that is essential to theism, and I shall in
general assume it in the subsequent discussion. It is, perhaps, the most common theistic view, but I think that some theists at
least have maintained that God can do what is logically impossible. Many theists, at any rate, have held that logic itself is created
or laid down by God, that logic is the way in which God arbitrarily chooses to think. (This is, of course, parallel to the ethical view
that morally right actions are those which God arbitrarily chooses to command, and the two views encounter similar difficulties.)
And this account of logic is clearly inconsistent with the view that God is bound by logical necessities – unless it is possible for an
omnipotent being to bind himself, an issue which we shall consider later, when we come to the Paradox of Omnipotence. This
solution of the problem of evil cannot, therefore, be consistently adopted along with the view that logic is itself created by God.
Mackie begins his criticisms of this fallacious solution:
The idea that God cannot create good without also creating evil suggests that God is not omnipotent or that there are limits on
what an omnipotent God can do
, - One could argue back that omnipotence has never meant power to do what is logically impossible. However, Mackie
points out that theists have in the past consistently claimed that God can do what is logically impossible (such as the
Trinity?)
But, secondly, this solution denies that evil is opposed to good in our original sense. If good and evil are counterparts, a good
thing will not ‘eliminate evil as far as it can’. Indeed, this view suggests that good and evil are not strictly qualities of things at all.
Perhaps the suggestion is that good and evil are related in much the same way as great and small. Certainly, when the term ‘great’
is used relatively as a condensation of ‘greater than so-and-so’ and ‘small’ is used correspondingly, greatness and smallness are
counterparts and cannot exist without each other. But in this sense greatness is not a quality, not an intrinsic feature of anything;
and it would be absurd to think of a movement in favour of greatness and against smallness in this sense. Such a movement
would be self-defeating, since relative greatness can be promoted only by a simultaneous promotion of relative smallness. I feel
sure that no theists would be content to regard God’s goodness as analogous to this – as if what he supports were not the good
but the better, and as if he had the paradoxical aim that all things should be better than other things.
Mackie draws attention to the fact that if the existence of God necessarily requires the existence of evil, then they must in some
sense be complementary rather than opposing forces, something that does not align with traditional theism, which envisages the
universe as a cosmic battleground between these two potencies, so that good will always ‘eliminate ebil as far as it can’
Therefore, they are relative notions, like the terms ‘great’ and ‘small’.
This point is obscured by the fact that ‘great’ and ‘small’ seem to have an absolute as well as a relative sense. I cannot discuss
here whether there is absolute magnitude or not, but if there is, there could be an absolute sense for ‘great’, it could mean of at
least a certain size, and it would make sense to speak of all things getting bigger, of a universe that was expanding all over, and
therefore it would make sense to speak of promoting greatness. But in this sense great and small are not logically necessary
counterparts: either quality could exist without the other. There would be no logical impossibility in everything’s being small or
in everything’s being great.
Neither in the absolute nor in the relative sense, then, of ‘great’ and ‘small’ do these terms provide an analogy of the sort that
would be needed to support this solution of the problem of evil. In neither case are greatness and smallness both necessary
counterparts and mutually opposed forces or possible objects for support or attack
If good and evil can be thought of in an absolutist sense, problems still arise for this solution
In terms of ‘great’ for example, one might envisage the universe continuing to expand as a result of the Big Bang up to a point of
maximal greatness. Similarly, one can think of the world as one in which good continues to grow (perhaps as an expansion of the
kingdom of God) until a state of absolute goodness reigns everywhere
- But this would then mean that neither goodness nor greatness actually require evil or smallness in order for them to
be good or great, which therefore defeats the whole point of this theodicy
It may be replied that good and evil are necessary counterparts in the same way as any quality and its logical opposite: redness
can occur, it is suggested, only if non-redness also occurs. But unless evil is merely the privation of good, they are not logical
opposites, and some further argument would be needed to show that they are counterparts in the same way as genuine logical
opposites. Let us assume that this could be given. There is still doubt of the correctness of the metaphysical principle that a quality
must have a real opposite: I suggest that it is not really impossible that everything should be, say red, that the truth is merely that
if everything were red we should not notice redness, and so we should have no word ‘red’; we observe and give names to qualities
only if they have real opposites. If so, the principle that a term must have an opposite would belong only to our language or to
our thought and would not be an ontological principle, and, correspondingly, the rule that good cannot exist without evil would
not state a logical necessity of a sort that God would just have to put up with. God might have made everything good, though we
should not have noticed it if he had.
Goodness and evil are not logical opposites, meaning that one can exist without the other
Good and evil are not ‘necessary counterparts’. They are not logical opposites like redness and non-redness
- But suppose, for the sake of the argument, that they could be thought of as such. Even so, they would, for Mackie, only
be logical opposites in a linguistic, rather than metaphysical sense. This is because there is no logical impossibility in
everything being red (or good, or evil), though if this were the case, we would then not notice, as we only assign words
