💡
Week 3
Date @20/01/2025 → 24/01/2025
courses 💡 Consciousness, free will and real-world-behaviour
Week 3:
Crisis of consciousness science: we need to choose either illusionism or computationalism
Table of contents
Hoorcollege 1: 20-01-25
1. Short summary week 1
1. Hard problem
2. Problems of implementationalsim
2. This lecture
3. Thought experiments
1. Your consciousness
2. TE1: Radical functionalism
3. TE2: Connected functionalism
4. TE3: Biological connectivity
5. The functionalist challenge
6. TE4: Radical implementationism
7. Basic argument
4. Alternatives to realism
1. Failure of realist theories
2. Illusionism
3. Non-computationalism
5. Implications for consciousness science
1. Practical problem
2. TE: Ideal experiment
3. Consciousness science
Hoorcollege 2: 22-01-25
1. Consequences for consciousness science
1. Major aim
2. Theory making
3. Conclusion
Week 3 1
, 2. Broader implications
1. Responsibility
2. What has moral value?
3. Determisme vs Free will
3. Empirical way forward
1. Ideal experiment
2. Computational vs non-computational
3. Super-Turing test
Practice questions
Hoorcollege 1: 20-01-25
1. Short summary week 1
1. Hard problem
Consciousness is not an algorithm
hard problem of consciousness
chinese room
All behavior is caused by an algorithm
⇒ Consciousness is epiphenomenal with regards to behavior
Which would be the end of the (scientific) world…… (see quote Fodor)
2. Problems of implementationalsim
Implementation and function can overlap (how you define output)
If it differs
consciousness will follow implementation
behavior will follow the function
⇒ consciousness is epiphenomenal with regards to behavior
No way to falsify in behavioral studies
2. This lecture
Functionalist theories follow same critique as implementationalist theories:
A: F1 creates consciousness
B: F2 creates cognition and behavior
Week 3 2
, ⇒ Consciousness is epiphenomenal with regards to cognition and behavior
General problem for realist theories:
claim: X + cognition/behavior (c/b) function = consciousness
X: some variable/ingredient of consciousness
c/b is completely determined by c/b function
⇒ Vary X and keep c/b function constant: all c/b evidence will falsify the claim
This is not applicable to non-computationalist theories (non-realism)
3. Thought experiments
1. Your consciousness
There is not just one consciousness (everybody has consciousness that differs)
We only have access to our own consciousness: scientific theories must predict your consciousness
because we only have direct access to our consciousness (to check): scientific theories must predict your
consciousness
2. TE1: Radical functionalism
Fvis: function for visual experience
Radical functionalism: fvis exists, so you have visual experiences
Experiment:
unconscious processing occurs in your brain
before the NCC is reached, signals are sent to external computer
Fvis is executed in the computer
Radical functionalism expects: you have normal visual experiences
Week 3 3
Week 3
Date @20/01/2025 → 24/01/2025
courses 💡 Consciousness, free will and real-world-behaviour
Week 3:
Crisis of consciousness science: we need to choose either illusionism or computationalism
Table of contents
Hoorcollege 1: 20-01-25
1. Short summary week 1
1. Hard problem
2. Problems of implementationalsim
2. This lecture
3. Thought experiments
1. Your consciousness
2. TE1: Radical functionalism
3. TE2: Connected functionalism
4. TE3: Biological connectivity
5. The functionalist challenge
6. TE4: Radical implementationism
7. Basic argument
4. Alternatives to realism
1. Failure of realist theories
2. Illusionism
3. Non-computationalism
5. Implications for consciousness science
1. Practical problem
2. TE: Ideal experiment
3. Consciousness science
Hoorcollege 2: 22-01-25
1. Consequences for consciousness science
1. Major aim
2. Theory making
3. Conclusion
Week 3 1
, 2. Broader implications
1. Responsibility
2. What has moral value?
3. Determisme vs Free will
3. Empirical way forward
1. Ideal experiment
2. Computational vs non-computational
3. Super-Turing test
Practice questions
Hoorcollege 1: 20-01-25
1. Short summary week 1
1. Hard problem
Consciousness is not an algorithm
hard problem of consciousness
chinese room
All behavior is caused by an algorithm
⇒ Consciousness is epiphenomenal with regards to behavior
Which would be the end of the (scientific) world…… (see quote Fodor)
2. Problems of implementationalsim
Implementation and function can overlap (how you define output)
If it differs
consciousness will follow implementation
behavior will follow the function
⇒ consciousness is epiphenomenal with regards to behavior
No way to falsify in behavioral studies
2. This lecture
Functionalist theories follow same critique as implementationalist theories:
A: F1 creates consciousness
B: F2 creates cognition and behavior
Week 3 2
, ⇒ Consciousness is epiphenomenal with regards to cognition and behavior
General problem for realist theories:
claim: X + cognition/behavior (c/b) function = consciousness
X: some variable/ingredient of consciousness
c/b is completely determined by c/b function
⇒ Vary X and keep c/b function constant: all c/b evidence will falsify the claim
This is not applicable to non-computationalist theories (non-realism)
3. Thought experiments
1. Your consciousness
There is not just one consciousness (everybody has consciousness that differs)
We only have access to our own consciousness: scientific theories must predict your consciousness
because we only have direct access to our consciousness (to check): scientific theories must predict your
consciousness
2. TE1: Radical functionalism
Fvis: function for visual experience
Radical functionalism: fvis exists, so you have visual experiences
Experiment:
unconscious processing occurs in your brain
before the NCC is reached, signals are sent to external computer
Fvis is executed in the computer
Radical functionalism expects: you have normal visual experiences
Week 3 3
