Thom as Hobbes’ Leviathan
(Com plete Notes)
Book I: Chapter s 1-3
Sum m ar y
The first three chapters of Leviathan concern the mechanics of the human mind,
covering the topics of sense, imagination, and the train of thought. Hobbes argues that
our knowledge of the world originates from "external bodies" pressing against our
sensory apparatus. Envisioning the universe as a plenum constituted solely of matter,
Hobbes depicts objects continually bumping against each other and describes the
passage of motion from one material body to the next. This elementary motion of the
universe eventually transfers to the surface of the human body, where nerves and
membranes of the eyes, nose, ears, tongue, and skin are physically moved, in turn
relaying their acquired motions on to the brain. "Sense," then, is the action of external
bodies colliding with our sensitive organs.
Matter cannot move itself, Hobbes declares (in challenge to the philosophy of vitalism,
which maintained that matter was self-motivated). Consequently, "when a thing is in
motion, it will eternally be in motion" unless acted upon by another body. Hobbes
deduces that this continuance of motion is responsible for the transformation of sense
into thoughts or "imagination," for when an external body presses against the human
sense apparatus and sets off a series of new motions, these motions will perpetuate until
they meet a hindrance. The duration of sensory motion after the fact is called "decaying
sense," which becomes Hobbes's definition of imagination. To illustrate, Hobbes
suggests that the persistence of a vision after the eyes have been closed indicates that the
ocular sensory apparatus is still in motion; this motion is no longer immediate
sensation, but imagination. Such imagination, over time, is the same as "memory."
Memory of things sensed from the outside world is defined as "experience," while
sensation of internal movements of the human body is called a "dream" when one is
asleep, or a "vision" or "apparition" when one is awake.
"Understanding" is a particular form of imagination, defined as the idea produced by the
physical sensation of words or visible signs. A complex variety of understanding is the
"train of thoughts" or "mental discourse," in which the succession of one imagination
upon another, one internal sensation provoking the next one, initiates the process of
thinking. There are two possible trains of thoughts: the "unguided" train, in which
mental discourse wanders in no particular direction, as in dreams; and the "regulated"
train, in which the thinker directs mental discourse in a specific direction. By tracing the
transfer of motion from external matter to the human body, Hobbes has deduced a
,mechanism of the human mind—namely, the passage from sense to thought to train of
thoughts—in which sensory experience of the world is funneled into regulated and
directed thinking. Building upon this foundation, Hobbes next considers the logical
developments of directed thought: language, reason, and science.
An alysis
In the manner of a geometrical proof, Hobbes's philosophical method proceeds from
one conclusion to the next in logical succession. As Leviathan consists of an
interconnected series of propositions and ideas, the text appropriately begins with
chapters examining the nature and origin of ideas themselves.
The rest of Hobbes's argument depends upon the conclusions established in these
opening chapters. The propositions about human thought form the first principles for
the geometrical proof that Hobbes is attempting to construct. Hobbes makes his
arguments in a series of steps; the validity of the claim of each step is based upon the
claim made in the previous step. However, the very first principle on which Hobbes
bases his claims regarding the nature of thinking--namely, that the universe is a plenum
filled completely with material bodies--is never articulated in the text.
Hobbes's assertion of a plenum is his response to a years-long philosophical debate
against vacuism, or the theory that the universe is largely devoid of matter. Still, though
Hobbes claims (as we will see in the next section) that philosophical truth must be
deduced from shared definitions, he does not here indicate that his own fundamental
first principle of the plenum is generally accepted or agreed upon; Hobbes acts as his
own arbitrator and judge of first principles. His philosophical project manages to remain
logically consistent only by recursively validating these first principles in later chapters.
To dispute the truth value of Hobbes's unspoken claim that nature is a plenum is not
necessarily to dispute the entire edifice that is Leviathan, for Hobbes argues from
common experience at several points. However, so tightly structured is the text, with
one step leading to the next step, with one layer founding the succeeding layer, that—as
with a house of cards—tearing out the bottom tier would threaten to topple the upper
stories.
Of course, as we will see in the next section, Hobbes is proposing an epistemological
system whose foundations need not be universally true as long as they are
conventionally agreed upon for the sake of attaining civil peace. This factor alone
prevented Hobbes's vacuist contemporaries from dismissing his project on the basis of
its controversial first principles.
,Book I: Chapter s 4 & 5
Sum m ar y
Speech was invented, according to Hobbes, for the purpose of putting mental discourse
into verbal discourse. There are two benefits gained by this transformation of the mental
into the verbal: First, words register a train of thoughts by giving name to the thoughts'
conclusions, which can then be remembered without having to reconstruct the train of
thoughts continually; second, mental discourse can thus be communicated to other
people.
Hobbes identifies four uses of speech:
1) To record knowledge gained of things, which is the acquisition of Arts;
2) To communicate this knowledge to others, which is Counseling or Teaching;
3) To communicate intentions and desires to others and elicit their help; and
4) To entertain ourselves by playing with words.
Hobbes also identifies four abuses of speech:
1) Inconstant signification, in which we carelessly let the meanings of words shift;
2) Metaphorical language, in which we use certain words to mean other words in order
to deceive;
3) Lies; and
4) Language employed to injure other people.
Speech is defined in Hobbes's terms as "consisting of Names or Appellations, and their
Connexion." Truth and falsehood, which cannot exist outside of speech, are consequent
upon the nature of the connection made between names. Truth "consisteth in the right
ordering of names in our affirmations," and thus to speak truly—in other words, to
speak philosophically—one must use the precise and proper meanings of names. But
Hobbes recognizes that we must have some foundational reference for determining
whether a meaning is proper and suggests that, following the geometric method, true
speech begin by gaining general acceptance of the definitions of its terms. He writes, "In
Geometry (which is the onely Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow upon
mankind), men begin at settling the significations of their words; which settling of
significations, they call Definitions; and place them at the beginning of their reckoning."
Hobbes believes that geometry is a venerable model for a philosophical language
because geometry finds its stability in defined terms that everyone has agreed to
recognize; therefore, geometric arguments are indisputable. It follows, then, that once
philosophical definitions, or first principles, are established, true conclusions can be
made by building logically upon prior claims. It is society that determines these first
, principles of philosophical discourse and true speech, but Hobbes is still faced with the
problem of how to achieve social consent for the meanings of words.
Because our experience of the world is mediated by our sensation of it, reality, or
objective nature, does not necessarily provide universally satisfying definitions by itself.
Hobbes writes, "For though the nature of that we conceive, be the same; yet the diversity
of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body, and prejudices of
opinion, gives everything a tincture of our different passions. And therefore in
reasoning, a man must take heed of words; which besides the signification of what we
imagine their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of
the speaker."
Hobbes suggests that the observation of nature and the sensation of the material world
is always affected by the individual character of the observer, and therefore experience
of natural phenomena and the perception of reality do not constitute an adequate basis
upon which to ground philosophically true conclusions to a train of thought.
As long as there persist differences in experience, which in turn correspond to
differences in meaning, true certainty cannot be achieved. We cannot simply turn to
nature as a basis of truth, for objective nature—nature in itself—is inaccessible to us,
always filtered through a screen of subjectivity. Thus, Hobbes decides, there must be
some governing body, unanimously recognized, appointed to settle the definitions of
words and first principles: "But no one mans Reason, nor the Reason of any one number
of men, makes the certaintie; no more than an account is therefore well cast up, because
a great many men have unanimously approved it. And therefore, as when there is a
controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason,
the Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their
controversy must either come to blows, or be undecided, for want of a right Reason
constituted by Nature; and so it is also in all debates of what kind soever."
Hobbes points out that there is no "right Reason constituted by Nature," again noting
the ineffectiveness of employing nature as the foundation of knowledge. He also points
out that the judge who will settle definitions—the definitions upon which everyone
agrees to agree—is appointed by the participants "by their own accord." It is this judge
(eventually revealed as "the sovereign" in Chapter 18) who then becomes the needed
foundation of all knowledge.
Thus, definitions are agreed upon because they are determined by a judge whose
decisions everyone has agreed to uphold. With this method for securing the foundation
of truth, Hobbes then elaborates his complete program for a reform of philosophy and
the institution of a science that will provide secure knowledge and put an end to
disagreement and social discord.
(Com plete Notes)
Book I: Chapter s 1-3
Sum m ar y
The first three chapters of Leviathan concern the mechanics of the human mind,
covering the topics of sense, imagination, and the train of thought. Hobbes argues that
our knowledge of the world originates from "external bodies" pressing against our
sensory apparatus. Envisioning the universe as a plenum constituted solely of matter,
Hobbes depicts objects continually bumping against each other and describes the
passage of motion from one material body to the next. This elementary motion of the
universe eventually transfers to the surface of the human body, where nerves and
membranes of the eyes, nose, ears, tongue, and skin are physically moved, in turn
relaying their acquired motions on to the brain. "Sense," then, is the action of external
bodies colliding with our sensitive organs.
Matter cannot move itself, Hobbes declares (in challenge to the philosophy of vitalism,
which maintained that matter was self-motivated). Consequently, "when a thing is in
motion, it will eternally be in motion" unless acted upon by another body. Hobbes
deduces that this continuance of motion is responsible for the transformation of sense
into thoughts or "imagination," for when an external body presses against the human
sense apparatus and sets off a series of new motions, these motions will perpetuate until
they meet a hindrance. The duration of sensory motion after the fact is called "decaying
sense," which becomes Hobbes's definition of imagination. To illustrate, Hobbes
suggests that the persistence of a vision after the eyes have been closed indicates that the
ocular sensory apparatus is still in motion; this motion is no longer immediate
sensation, but imagination. Such imagination, over time, is the same as "memory."
Memory of things sensed from the outside world is defined as "experience," while
sensation of internal movements of the human body is called a "dream" when one is
asleep, or a "vision" or "apparition" when one is awake.
"Understanding" is a particular form of imagination, defined as the idea produced by the
physical sensation of words or visible signs. A complex variety of understanding is the
"train of thoughts" or "mental discourse," in which the succession of one imagination
upon another, one internal sensation provoking the next one, initiates the process of
thinking. There are two possible trains of thoughts: the "unguided" train, in which
mental discourse wanders in no particular direction, as in dreams; and the "regulated"
train, in which the thinker directs mental discourse in a specific direction. By tracing the
transfer of motion from external matter to the human body, Hobbes has deduced a
,mechanism of the human mind—namely, the passage from sense to thought to train of
thoughts—in which sensory experience of the world is funneled into regulated and
directed thinking. Building upon this foundation, Hobbes next considers the logical
developments of directed thought: language, reason, and science.
An alysis
In the manner of a geometrical proof, Hobbes's philosophical method proceeds from
one conclusion to the next in logical succession. As Leviathan consists of an
interconnected series of propositions and ideas, the text appropriately begins with
chapters examining the nature and origin of ideas themselves.
The rest of Hobbes's argument depends upon the conclusions established in these
opening chapters. The propositions about human thought form the first principles for
the geometrical proof that Hobbes is attempting to construct. Hobbes makes his
arguments in a series of steps; the validity of the claim of each step is based upon the
claim made in the previous step. However, the very first principle on which Hobbes
bases his claims regarding the nature of thinking--namely, that the universe is a plenum
filled completely with material bodies--is never articulated in the text.
Hobbes's assertion of a plenum is his response to a years-long philosophical debate
against vacuism, or the theory that the universe is largely devoid of matter. Still, though
Hobbes claims (as we will see in the next section) that philosophical truth must be
deduced from shared definitions, he does not here indicate that his own fundamental
first principle of the plenum is generally accepted or agreed upon; Hobbes acts as his
own arbitrator and judge of first principles. His philosophical project manages to remain
logically consistent only by recursively validating these first principles in later chapters.
To dispute the truth value of Hobbes's unspoken claim that nature is a plenum is not
necessarily to dispute the entire edifice that is Leviathan, for Hobbes argues from
common experience at several points. However, so tightly structured is the text, with
one step leading to the next step, with one layer founding the succeeding layer, that—as
with a house of cards—tearing out the bottom tier would threaten to topple the upper
stories.
Of course, as we will see in the next section, Hobbes is proposing an epistemological
system whose foundations need not be universally true as long as they are
conventionally agreed upon for the sake of attaining civil peace. This factor alone
prevented Hobbes's vacuist contemporaries from dismissing his project on the basis of
its controversial first principles.
,Book I: Chapter s 4 & 5
Sum m ar y
Speech was invented, according to Hobbes, for the purpose of putting mental discourse
into verbal discourse. There are two benefits gained by this transformation of the mental
into the verbal: First, words register a train of thoughts by giving name to the thoughts'
conclusions, which can then be remembered without having to reconstruct the train of
thoughts continually; second, mental discourse can thus be communicated to other
people.
Hobbes identifies four uses of speech:
1) To record knowledge gained of things, which is the acquisition of Arts;
2) To communicate this knowledge to others, which is Counseling or Teaching;
3) To communicate intentions and desires to others and elicit their help; and
4) To entertain ourselves by playing with words.
Hobbes also identifies four abuses of speech:
1) Inconstant signification, in which we carelessly let the meanings of words shift;
2) Metaphorical language, in which we use certain words to mean other words in order
to deceive;
3) Lies; and
4) Language employed to injure other people.
Speech is defined in Hobbes's terms as "consisting of Names or Appellations, and their
Connexion." Truth and falsehood, which cannot exist outside of speech, are consequent
upon the nature of the connection made between names. Truth "consisteth in the right
ordering of names in our affirmations," and thus to speak truly—in other words, to
speak philosophically—one must use the precise and proper meanings of names. But
Hobbes recognizes that we must have some foundational reference for determining
whether a meaning is proper and suggests that, following the geometric method, true
speech begin by gaining general acceptance of the definitions of its terms. He writes, "In
Geometry (which is the onely Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow upon
mankind), men begin at settling the significations of their words; which settling of
significations, they call Definitions; and place them at the beginning of their reckoning."
Hobbes believes that geometry is a venerable model for a philosophical language
because geometry finds its stability in defined terms that everyone has agreed to
recognize; therefore, geometric arguments are indisputable. It follows, then, that once
philosophical definitions, or first principles, are established, true conclusions can be
made by building logically upon prior claims. It is society that determines these first
, principles of philosophical discourse and true speech, but Hobbes is still faced with the
problem of how to achieve social consent for the meanings of words.
Because our experience of the world is mediated by our sensation of it, reality, or
objective nature, does not necessarily provide universally satisfying definitions by itself.
Hobbes writes, "For though the nature of that we conceive, be the same; yet the diversity
of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body, and prejudices of
opinion, gives everything a tincture of our different passions. And therefore in
reasoning, a man must take heed of words; which besides the signification of what we
imagine their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of
the speaker."
Hobbes suggests that the observation of nature and the sensation of the material world
is always affected by the individual character of the observer, and therefore experience
of natural phenomena and the perception of reality do not constitute an adequate basis
upon which to ground philosophically true conclusions to a train of thought.
As long as there persist differences in experience, which in turn correspond to
differences in meaning, true certainty cannot be achieved. We cannot simply turn to
nature as a basis of truth, for objective nature—nature in itself—is inaccessible to us,
always filtered through a screen of subjectivity. Thus, Hobbes decides, there must be
some governing body, unanimously recognized, appointed to settle the definitions of
words and first principles: "But no one mans Reason, nor the Reason of any one number
of men, makes the certaintie; no more than an account is therefore well cast up, because
a great many men have unanimously approved it. And therefore, as when there is a
controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason,
the Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their
controversy must either come to blows, or be undecided, for want of a right Reason
constituted by Nature; and so it is also in all debates of what kind soever."
Hobbes points out that there is no "right Reason constituted by Nature," again noting
the ineffectiveness of employing nature as the foundation of knowledge. He also points
out that the judge who will settle definitions—the definitions upon which everyone
agrees to agree—is appointed by the participants "by their own accord." It is this judge
(eventually revealed as "the sovereign" in Chapter 18) who then becomes the needed
foundation of all knowledge.
Thus, definitions are agreed upon because they are determined by a judge whose
decisions everyone has agreed to uphold. With this method for securing the foundation
of truth, Hobbes then elaborates his complete program for a reform of philosophy and
the institution of a science that will provide secure knowledge and put an end to
disagreement and social discord.
