Is substance dualism a convincing account of the mind?
Substance dualists argue that the mind and the body are two distinct substances and that the mind is a
thinking thing that lacks the attributes of physical objects like size, location, and adhering to the laws of
physics. Substance dualism states that the mind is a nonphysical object. Substance dualism is seeking to
solve the problem of the mind and where it is located and prove that the mind and body are separate.
However, substance dualism is an unconvincing account of the mind because it cannot respond to the
objections raised against it such as the problem of other minds, mind body interaction and the
categorical mistake that Descartes makes.
Descartes puts forth the indivisibility argument to try and show that due to the tangible physical nature
of the body and the intangible nature of the mind they must be separate entities. This argument states
that due to Leibniz’s Law:
- If X & Y have the same properties, X is the same as Y
- If X is not the same as Y, X & Y have different properties
The indivisibility argument then uses Leibniz’s law to show that in this argument the body is X and is not
the same as Y the mind, therefore X and Y, the mind and the body are not the same.
- The body is divisible
- The mind is indivisible
- Therefore, the body is not the mind
One strong objection to this is that Descartes has made a category mistake. It is nonsensical to talk
about the mind the way he does. For example, say a tourist goes on a guided tour of oxford university
and is shown all the buildings such as the Bodleian library or offices. If the tourist then asks “where is
oxford university” their question is nonsensical because it seems as though there is something
supervening on the university some other conceptual entity that is not the university. Oxford university
is just all the buildings. The tourist, like Descartes has misunderstood the semantics of the term. This
because oxford university is not a concept. This shows how the mind is not a concept and it is a category
mistake to describe it as that. This objection effectively shows how Descartes logic is flawed and he
cannot prove substance dualism through the indivisibility argument.
Descartes also puts forward the conceivability argument for substance dualism. He tries to show that
the mind and the body are separate entities through it.
1. I can conceive of my mind existing without my body
2. If something is conceivable then it’s possible
3. Therefore, it’s possible for my mind to exist without my body
4. Identity is necessary
5. Therefore, the mind is not the body
It shows that due to premise three, since there is a possible world in which the mind exists without the
body then in all possible worlds the two concepts are distinct. However, this argument fails to prove that
in the actual world the mind and body are separate. What is metaphysically possible is not what is
currently possible and that is more important.
Substance dualists argue that the mind and the body are two distinct substances and that the mind is a
thinking thing that lacks the attributes of physical objects like size, location, and adhering to the laws of
physics. Substance dualism states that the mind is a nonphysical object. Substance dualism is seeking to
solve the problem of the mind and where it is located and prove that the mind and body are separate.
However, substance dualism is an unconvincing account of the mind because it cannot respond to the
objections raised against it such as the problem of other minds, mind body interaction and the
categorical mistake that Descartes makes.
Descartes puts forth the indivisibility argument to try and show that due to the tangible physical nature
of the body and the intangible nature of the mind they must be separate entities. This argument states
that due to Leibniz’s Law:
- If X & Y have the same properties, X is the same as Y
- If X is not the same as Y, X & Y have different properties
The indivisibility argument then uses Leibniz’s law to show that in this argument the body is X and is not
the same as Y the mind, therefore X and Y, the mind and the body are not the same.
- The body is divisible
- The mind is indivisible
- Therefore, the body is not the mind
One strong objection to this is that Descartes has made a category mistake. It is nonsensical to talk
about the mind the way he does. For example, say a tourist goes on a guided tour of oxford university
and is shown all the buildings such as the Bodleian library or offices. If the tourist then asks “where is
oxford university” their question is nonsensical because it seems as though there is something
supervening on the university some other conceptual entity that is not the university. Oxford university
is just all the buildings. The tourist, like Descartes has misunderstood the semantics of the term. This
because oxford university is not a concept. This shows how the mind is not a concept and it is a category
mistake to describe it as that. This objection effectively shows how Descartes logic is flawed and he
cannot prove substance dualism through the indivisibility argument.
Descartes also puts forward the conceivability argument for substance dualism. He tries to show that
the mind and the body are separate entities through it.
1. I can conceive of my mind existing without my body
2. If something is conceivable then it’s possible
3. Therefore, it’s possible for my mind to exist without my body
4. Identity is necessary
5. Therefore, the mind is not the body
It shows that due to premise three, since there is a possible world in which the mind exists without the
body then in all possible worlds the two concepts are distinct. However, this argument fails to prove that
in the actual world the mind and body are separate. What is metaphysically possible is not what is
currently possible and that is more important.
