Supporting Strategy Through Control: A Case Study of
Management Control Systems at Jameda
Research Proposal
Date: 21-04-2025
Research Paper for Pre-MSc A&C Word count: 2,305
, I. Introduction
The rise of digital evaluative health platforms (EHP) has transformed the way of how
individuals’ access, evaluate, and make decisions about healthcare services. Such platforms
are becoming more important as the volume of reviews rises, the sites become more
sophisticated, and patients become more expert consumers. Research by McLennan et al
(2017) shows that there has been an overall increase in the number of ratings on German
Physician rating websites. Both in terms of the number of rated physicians and the average
number of ratings per physician (McLennan et al, 2017). These platforms will become a tool
that patients routinely turn to when faced with an important medical issue. However, the
reliability, impact, and potential biases of these platforms remain subjects of debate (Hotopf,
2013).
Hotopf (2013) explains that a large part of EHPs have the objective to make a profit. The
main business model of these platforms is to attract as many people as possible and sell
subscriptions and promotions to physicians. A Great example of this, is the biggest evaluative
health platform in Germany, Jameda. However there has been growing concerns about how
such business models tend to go out of its way to please its paying physicians and not worry
too much about its users (Hotopf, 2013). Prior research by Armbruster et al (2023) found that
paid member profiles on Jameda seemed to be optimized for decision-making characteristics
of potential patients. Where the effects increased with the increasing pay status. For example,
boosting the profile of a physician or the ability to hide negative ratings (Mulgund et al.,
2020; Han et al., 2024). These results contradict Jameda’s strategy of being a neutral rating
platform, where they state: “We treat all physicians the same,” and “Ratings are not for sale”.
Instead, Jameda is an advertising platform for paying physicians (Armbruster et al., 2023).
Therefore, research show that Jameda fails to achieve and execute their strategy of being a
Management Control Systems at Jameda
Research Proposal
Date: 21-04-2025
Research Paper for Pre-MSc A&C Word count: 2,305
, I. Introduction
The rise of digital evaluative health platforms (EHP) has transformed the way of how
individuals’ access, evaluate, and make decisions about healthcare services. Such platforms
are becoming more important as the volume of reviews rises, the sites become more
sophisticated, and patients become more expert consumers. Research by McLennan et al
(2017) shows that there has been an overall increase in the number of ratings on German
Physician rating websites. Both in terms of the number of rated physicians and the average
number of ratings per physician (McLennan et al, 2017). These platforms will become a tool
that patients routinely turn to when faced with an important medical issue. However, the
reliability, impact, and potential biases of these platforms remain subjects of debate (Hotopf,
2013).
Hotopf (2013) explains that a large part of EHPs have the objective to make a profit. The
main business model of these platforms is to attract as many people as possible and sell
subscriptions and promotions to physicians. A Great example of this, is the biggest evaluative
health platform in Germany, Jameda. However there has been growing concerns about how
such business models tend to go out of its way to please its paying physicians and not worry
too much about its users (Hotopf, 2013). Prior research by Armbruster et al (2023) found that
paid member profiles on Jameda seemed to be optimized for decision-making characteristics
of potential patients. Where the effects increased with the increasing pay status. For example,
boosting the profile of a physician or the ability to hide negative ratings (Mulgund et al.,
2020; Han et al., 2024). These results contradict Jameda’s strategy of being a neutral rating
platform, where they state: “We treat all physicians the same,” and “Ratings are not for sale”.
Instead, Jameda is an advertising platform for paying physicians (Armbruster et al., 2023).
Therefore, research show that Jameda fails to achieve and execute their strategy of being a
