Chapter 22 – The Wartime Economy and Work of Speer
The mobilisation of the German economy for war
3rd Sep 1939: Decree for the Conversion of the Whole German Economy onto a War
Footing
German economy did not reach a full state of mobilisation until 1942
1939-41: Germany experienced shortages in weapons equipment ---> did not affect
early victories, which were achieved quickly with Blitzkrieg tactics
Post-1941, Operation Barbarossa and war in the Mediterranean stretched German
resources and shortages began to hinder the war effort
Hitler had not anticipated war would begin in 1939
He thought France and Britain would accept the German invasion of Poland, and that
war would not begin until he launched Operation Barbarossa in 1941
Luftwaffe expansion due to be completed in 1942, and the build-up of the navy to be
completed in 1944-45
The early outbreak of war disrupted the plans formulated under the Four-Year Plan to
develop Germany’s productive potential
Structural weaknesses of German armaments = different armed forces branches
required specialised equipment, which was costly and required highly skilled labour +
made standardisation impossible to achieve
Sep 1939 – Jan 1941: labour force in armaments production grew from 21% to 55%
BUT, supply of weapons increased slowly
Production problems = a political problem
Goering (in charge of Four-Year Plan) lacked the technical and economic knowledge
needed to do his job
He had poor relations with military leaders and the leaders of banks and large
companies, and he was occupied with securing his own wealth
He could not provide centralised coordination of the economy
Albert Speer – appointed Armaments Minister in 1942 – described Goering’s tenure as
‘an era of incompetence, arrogance and egotism’
The work of Albert Speer
Feb 1942: Speer replaced Fritz Todt as Armaments Minister
Speer had full executive powers to establish a Central Planning Agency and was able to
coordinate and control the whole production process without military interference and
full cooperation of large companies
The mobilisation of the German economy for war
3rd Sep 1939: Decree for the Conversion of the Whole German Economy onto a War
Footing
German economy did not reach a full state of mobilisation until 1942
1939-41: Germany experienced shortages in weapons equipment ---> did not affect
early victories, which were achieved quickly with Blitzkrieg tactics
Post-1941, Operation Barbarossa and war in the Mediterranean stretched German
resources and shortages began to hinder the war effort
Hitler had not anticipated war would begin in 1939
He thought France and Britain would accept the German invasion of Poland, and that
war would not begin until he launched Operation Barbarossa in 1941
Luftwaffe expansion due to be completed in 1942, and the build-up of the navy to be
completed in 1944-45
The early outbreak of war disrupted the plans formulated under the Four-Year Plan to
develop Germany’s productive potential
Structural weaknesses of German armaments = different armed forces branches
required specialised equipment, which was costly and required highly skilled labour +
made standardisation impossible to achieve
Sep 1939 – Jan 1941: labour force in armaments production grew from 21% to 55%
BUT, supply of weapons increased slowly
Production problems = a political problem
Goering (in charge of Four-Year Plan) lacked the technical and economic knowledge
needed to do his job
He had poor relations with military leaders and the leaders of banks and large
companies, and he was occupied with securing his own wealth
He could not provide centralised coordination of the economy
Albert Speer – appointed Armaments Minister in 1942 – described Goering’s tenure as
‘an era of incompetence, arrogance and egotism’
The work of Albert Speer
Feb 1942: Speer replaced Fritz Todt as Armaments Minister
Speer had full executive powers to establish a Central Planning Agency and was able to
coordinate and control the whole production process without military interference and
full cooperation of large companies
