PVL3703
Assignment 1 Semester 2 2025
Unique #
Due Date: August 2025
Detailed solutions, explanations, workings
and references.
+27 81 278 3372
, 3 ANSWERS PROVIDED
In the law of delict, conduct refers to a voluntary human act or omission. For conduct
to be actionable, it must be voluntary, meaning the actor must be in control of their
bodily movements through the exercise of will.1 If a person acts involuntarily, such as
during sleepwalking or a blackout, they may raise the defence of automatism,
arguing that their actions do not meet the legal requirement of conduct.2
In this matter, Tumelo suffers from insomnia and has a known history of
sleepwalking, for which his doctor prescribed medication. On the relevant day,
Tumelo failed to take his medication and, while sleepwalking, stabbed Mandla under
the mistaken belief that he was being attacked. The issue is whether Tumelo’s
conduct can be regarded as voluntary for delictual liability purposes.
Generally, conditions such as sleep, unconsciousness, and sleepwalking may render
a person incapable of voluntary conduct.3 However, the law also recognises that a
person cannot escape liability if they intentionally or negligently place themselves in
such a state. This principle is known as actio libera in causa, meaning a person
cannot rely on automatism if they are culpable for creating the state in which they
acted mechanically.4
In Victor v Minister of Justice, the court held that a person who knowingly suffered
epileptic seizures and still chose to drive a vehicle could not escape liability, as a
reasonable person would have foreseen the risk of harm.5 Similarly, in S v Du
Plessis, the accused was found not guilty as he blacked out involuntarily due to low
blood pressure without prior warning.6
Unlike in Du Plessis, Tumelo’s failure to take his prescribed medication makes his
case more akin to the Victor scenario. His prior knowledge of his sleepwalking
condition and prescribed treatment imposes a duty of care. By failing to take his
medication, he acted negligently and created the circumstances in which he later
1
Neethling J & Potgieter JM, Law of Delict, 8th ed (2020) 34.
2
Ibid 35.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid 38.
5
Victor v Minister of Justice 1943 TPD 77.
6
S v Du Plessis 1981 (3) SA 382 (A).
Varsity Cube 2025 +27 81 278 3372
Assignment 1 Semester 2 2025
Unique #
Due Date: August 2025
Detailed solutions, explanations, workings
and references.
+27 81 278 3372
, 3 ANSWERS PROVIDED
In the law of delict, conduct refers to a voluntary human act or omission. For conduct
to be actionable, it must be voluntary, meaning the actor must be in control of their
bodily movements through the exercise of will.1 If a person acts involuntarily, such as
during sleepwalking or a blackout, they may raise the defence of automatism,
arguing that their actions do not meet the legal requirement of conduct.2
In this matter, Tumelo suffers from insomnia and has a known history of
sleepwalking, for which his doctor prescribed medication. On the relevant day,
Tumelo failed to take his medication and, while sleepwalking, stabbed Mandla under
the mistaken belief that he was being attacked. The issue is whether Tumelo’s
conduct can be regarded as voluntary for delictual liability purposes.
Generally, conditions such as sleep, unconsciousness, and sleepwalking may render
a person incapable of voluntary conduct.3 However, the law also recognises that a
person cannot escape liability if they intentionally or negligently place themselves in
such a state. This principle is known as actio libera in causa, meaning a person
cannot rely on automatism if they are culpable for creating the state in which they
acted mechanically.4
In Victor v Minister of Justice, the court held that a person who knowingly suffered
epileptic seizures and still chose to drive a vehicle could not escape liability, as a
reasonable person would have foreseen the risk of harm.5 Similarly, in S v Du
Plessis, the accused was found not guilty as he blacked out involuntarily due to low
blood pressure without prior warning.6
Unlike in Du Plessis, Tumelo’s failure to take his prescribed medication makes his
case more akin to the Victor scenario. His prior knowledge of his sleepwalking
condition and prescribed treatment imposes a duty of care. By failing to take his
medication, he acted negligently and created the circumstances in which he later
1
Neethling J & Potgieter JM, Law of Delict, 8th ed (2020) 34.
2
Ibid 35.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid 38.
5
Victor v Minister of Justice 1943 TPD 77.
6
S v Du Plessis 1981 (3) SA 382 (A).
Varsity Cube 2025 +27 81 278 3372
