Rheology: Concepts, Methods, and Applications
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, INTRODUCTION. 21 Note. — At this standpoint tlie finite
implies that whatever is in itself, or according to its conception, has
an existence or manifestation different from what it is for itself. For
example the abstract separateness of nature is in itself space, but
for itself time. Here, two things are to be observed, (1) that because
the truth is the idea, when any object or phase is apprehended only
as it is in itself or in conception, it is not as yet apprehended in its
truth, and yet (2) that, whatever exists as conception or in itself, at
the same time exists, and this existence is a peculiar form of the
object, as e.g. space. The separation of existencein-itself or implicit
existence from existence-for-itself or explicit existence is a
characteristic of the finite, and constitutes its appearance or merely
external reality. An example of this is to hand in the separation of
the natural will from formal right. The understanding adheres tc
mere implicit existence, and in accordance with this position calls
freedom a capacity, since it is at this point only a possibility. But the
understanding regards this phase as absolute and perennial, and
considers the relation of the will to what it wills or reality as an
application to a given material, which does not belong to the
essence of freedom. In this way the understanding occupies itself
with mere abstractions, and not with the idea and truth. Addition. —
The wiU, which is will only according to the conception, is free
implicitly, but is at the same time not free. To be truly free, it must
have a truly fixed content ; then it is explicitly free, has freedom for
its object, and is freedom. What is at first merely in conception, i.e.,
implicit, is only direct and natural,. We are familiar with this in
pictorial thought also. The child is implicitly a man, at first has
reason implicitly, and is at first the possibility of reason and freedom.
He is thus free merely according to the conception. That which is
only implicit does not yet exist in actuality. A man, who is implicitly
rational, must create himself by working
, 22 THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIGHT. through and out of himself
and by reconstructing himself within himself, hef ore he can become
also explicitly rational. 11, The will, which is at first only implicitly
free, is the direct or natural will. The distinctive phases, which the
self-determining conception sets up in the will, appear in the direct
will, as a directly present content. They are impulses, appetites,
inclinations, by which the will finds itself determined by nature. Now
this content, with all its attendant phases, proceeds from the
rationality of the will, and is therefore implicitly rational ; but let
loose in its immediate directness it has not as yet the form of
rationahty. The content is indeed for me and my own, but the form
and the content are yet different. The will is thus in itself finite.
Note. — Empirical psychology enumerates and describes these
impulses and inclinations, and the wants which are based upon
them. It takes, or imagines that it takes this material from
experience, and then seeks to classify it in the usual way. It will be
stated below, what the objective side of impulse is, and what
impulse is in its truth, apart from the form of irrationality which it
has as an impulse, and also what shape it assumes when it reaches
existence. Addition. — Impulse, appetite, inclination are possessed
by the animal also, but it has not will ; it must obey impulse, if there
is no external obstacle. Man, however, is the completely
undetermined, and stands above impulse, and may fix and set it up
as his. Impulse is in nature, but it depends on my will whether I
establish it in the I. Nor can the will be unconditionally called to this
action by the fact that the impulse lies in nature. 12. The system of
this content, as it occurs directly in the will, exists only as a
multitude or multiplicity of impulses, every one of which is mine in a
general way along with others, but is at the same time universal and
undetermined, having many objects and ways of satisfaction. The
will, by giving itself in this two-fold indefiniteness the
4th edition - eBook PDF install download
https://ebookluna.com/download/rheology-ebook-pdf/
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,Discovering Diverse Content Through
Random Scribd Documents
, INTRODUCTION. 21 Note. — At this standpoint tlie finite
implies that whatever is in itself, or according to its conception, has
an existence or manifestation different from what it is for itself. For
example the abstract separateness of nature is in itself space, but
for itself time. Here, two things are to be observed, (1) that because
the truth is the idea, when any object or phase is apprehended only
as it is in itself or in conception, it is not as yet apprehended in its
truth, and yet (2) that, whatever exists as conception or in itself, at
the same time exists, and this existence is a peculiar form of the
object, as e.g. space. The separation of existencein-itself or implicit
existence from existence-for-itself or explicit existence is a
characteristic of the finite, and constitutes its appearance or merely
external reality. An example of this is to hand in the separation of
the natural will from formal right. The understanding adheres tc
mere implicit existence, and in accordance with this position calls
freedom a capacity, since it is at this point only a possibility. But the
understanding regards this phase as absolute and perennial, and
considers the relation of the will to what it wills or reality as an
application to a given material, which does not belong to the
essence of freedom. In this way the understanding occupies itself
with mere abstractions, and not with the idea and truth. Addition. —
The wiU, which is will only according to the conception, is free
implicitly, but is at the same time not free. To be truly free, it must
have a truly fixed content ; then it is explicitly free, has freedom for
its object, and is freedom. What is at first merely in conception, i.e.,
implicit, is only direct and natural,. We are familiar with this in
pictorial thought also. The child is implicitly a man, at first has
reason implicitly, and is at first the possibility of reason and freedom.
He is thus free merely according to the conception. That which is
only implicit does not yet exist in actuality. A man, who is implicitly
rational, must create himself by working
, 22 THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIGHT. through and out of himself
and by reconstructing himself within himself, hef ore he can become
also explicitly rational. 11, The will, which is at first only implicitly
free, is the direct or natural will. The distinctive phases, which the
self-determining conception sets up in the will, appear in the direct
will, as a directly present content. They are impulses, appetites,
inclinations, by which the will finds itself determined by nature. Now
this content, with all its attendant phases, proceeds from the
rationality of the will, and is therefore implicitly rational ; but let
loose in its immediate directness it has not as yet the form of
rationahty. The content is indeed for me and my own, but the form
and the content are yet different. The will is thus in itself finite.
Note. — Empirical psychology enumerates and describes these
impulses and inclinations, and the wants which are based upon
them. It takes, or imagines that it takes this material from
experience, and then seeks to classify it in the usual way. It will be
stated below, what the objective side of impulse is, and what
impulse is in its truth, apart from the form of irrationality which it
has as an impulse, and also what shape it assumes when it reaches
existence. Addition. — Impulse, appetite, inclination are possessed
by the animal also, but it has not will ; it must obey impulse, if there
is no external obstacle. Man, however, is the completely
undetermined, and stands above impulse, and may fix and set it up
as his. Impulse is in nature, but it depends on my will whether I
establish it in the I. Nor can the will be unconditionally called to this
action by the fact that the impulse lies in nature. 12. The system of
this content, as it occurs directly in the will, exists only as a
multitude or multiplicity of impulses, every one of which is mine in a
general way along with others, but is at the same time universal and
undetermined, having many objects and ways of satisfaction. The
will, by giving itself in this two-fold indefiniteness the
