LCR4802
Assessment 1
Semester 2 2025
Due September 2025
, LCR4802
Assessment 1
Semester 2 2025
Due September 2025
Scenario Response: Dr Rammage and John Doe on Table Mountain
(a) Statutory Grounds of Justification
If Dr Rammage were to inject John Doe with insulin and administer fluids and
electrolytes intravenously without his consent, she could potentially rely on statutory
grounds under the National Health Act 61 of 2003 (“NHA”) to justify her actions in the
face of a civil claim for assault or iniuria.
Ordinarily, section 7(1) of the NHA requires that healthcare services may only be
provided with the informed consent of the patient.¹ However, the same section carves
out exceptions, most pertinently section 7(1)(f), which permits treatment without consent
where:
• any delay might result in the death of the user or cause irreversible damage to
their health; and
• the user has not refused the service expressly, impliedly, or through conduct.²
In this case, John Doe is unconscious and thus unable to provide or withhold consent.
The clinical signs observed—severe dehydration, rapid and deep breathing, fruity
breath, and a diabetic bracelet—strongly suggest diabetic ketoacidosis, a life-
threatening emergency that requires urgent treatment. Delay in treatment could lead to
coma, irreversible organ damage, or death. Consequently, Dr Rammage’s intervention
would fall squarely within the statutory exception, thereby rendering her conduct lawful.
Assessment 1
Semester 2 2025
Due September 2025
, LCR4802
Assessment 1
Semester 2 2025
Due September 2025
Scenario Response: Dr Rammage and John Doe on Table Mountain
(a) Statutory Grounds of Justification
If Dr Rammage were to inject John Doe with insulin and administer fluids and
electrolytes intravenously without his consent, she could potentially rely on statutory
grounds under the National Health Act 61 of 2003 (“NHA”) to justify her actions in the
face of a civil claim for assault or iniuria.
Ordinarily, section 7(1) of the NHA requires that healthcare services may only be
provided with the informed consent of the patient.¹ However, the same section carves
out exceptions, most pertinently section 7(1)(f), which permits treatment without consent
where:
• any delay might result in the death of the user or cause irreversible damage to
their health; and
• the user has not refused the service expressly, impliedly, or through conduct.²
In this case, John Doe is unconscious and thus unable to provide or withhold consent.
The clinical signs observed—severe dehydration, rapid and deep breathing, fruity
breath, and a diabetic bracelet—strongly suggest diabetic ketoacidosis, a life-
threatening emergency that requires urgent treatment. Delay in treatment could lead to
coma, irreversible organ damage, or death. Consequently, Dr Rammage’s intervention
would fall squarely within the statutory exception, thereby rendering her conduct lawful.
