COHERENCE OF GOD
Intent: The intent of this essay is to convey that the nature of God is coherent because any suggested contradic on in
his a ributes can be rejected, the most damning contradic on is the existence of God as omniscient and our
existence as free beings as it challenges all three of God’s main a ributes; however, it can simply be solved by
posi ng that God in addi on is everlas ng or eternal.
God’s a ributes: In this essay God will be defined as omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient being with the
poten al to be everlas ng or eternal.
Sec on one: God as omnipotent, omnipotence means that God is able to bring about any logical possibility, God is
perfectly powerful – there is nothing in the universe that can surpass God’s power. The paradox of the stone aims to
prove that there are limits to God’s power:
1. P1. Either God can create a stone that he cannot li , or he cannot create a stone that he cannot li .
2. P2. If God can create a stone that he cannot li , then he is not omnipotent (as there is at least one thing he
cannot do which is to li the stone)
3. P3. If God cannot create a stone which he cannot li , then he is not omnipotent (as there is at least one
thing he cannot do, which is to create the stone)
4. C1. Therefore, in any case there is at least one thing God cannot do.
Impact of this cri cism: It would ini ally be appealing as it demonstrates that God is in fact not perfectly powerful
as there is something he can’t do, therefore it is not coherent to describe God as an omnipotent being.
Response: Aquinas argues that a stone that is too heavy for God to li is a logical contradic on, if God is a
perfectly powerful being there is nothing conceivable which is more powerful than God. Mavrodes builds
upon this arguing that the paradox of the stone is self-contradictory, a stone that is too heavy for God to li
is not a logical possibility and thus according to the defini on of omnipotence God does not lack any
possible power. This is a compelling response as it demonstrates that there is nothing more powerful than
God in the universe and thus the concept of God remains coherent.
Sec on two: God as omnibenevolent, omnibenevolence means supremely perfect, God is a perfect being who's will
always aligns with what is morally good. The Euthyphro Dilemma aims to prove that God can either be benevolent
or omnipotent.
Op on 1: God wills what is good because it is good.
- This implies that morality is independent of God/what God wills. From this it follows that God could not make
what is wrong be right (and vice versa).
- This challenges the no on that God is omnipotent - that God could do anything.
Op on 2: What is good is good because God wills it.
- If good is whatever God wills, the content of morality appears arbitrary: there is no reason why God wills as
God does, and there is no criteria for moral goodness. The claim 'good is whatever God wills' doesn't say
anything substan ve about moral goodness- it is a tautology, empty of ethical content.
- If good is whatever God wills, then praising God cannot be an acknowledgement of moral achievement on
God's part, since any exercise of the divine will cons tutes goodness under this op on.
Impact of this cri cism: Unlike the paradox of the stone, the Euthyphro dilemma a acks two aspects of God's
nature. It shows that God can either being omnipotent or omnibenevolent. It is a more significant issue. To say
that God is both omnibenevolent and omnipotent is incoherent.
Response: Swinburne argues that the good is good is a necessary truth, so God wills what is good because it
is good – it cannot be otherwise (God has to power to do all that is logically possible). This is an effec ve
response because it preserves both God’s omnipotence and benevolence whilst cohering to the
independence of morality.
Sec on three: God as omniscient, omniscience means all knowing, God knows all true proposi ons, he knows
everything that can be known. The argument that God’s omniscience is incompa ble with our free will:
1. P1. God is omniscient iff God knows all true proposi ons.
2. P2. There are true proposi ons about the future.
3. P3. God is omniscient iff God knows all true future proposi ons.
, 4. P4. If God knows all true future proposi ons, including those about my future ac ons, then it is impossible
for those proposi ons about my future ac ons to be false.
5. P5. If it is impossible for these proposi ons about my future ac ons to be false, then it is impossible for me
to do otherwise than the ac on specified in those proposi ons, and so I am free.
6. C. Therefore, if God is omniscient, I am not free.
Impact of cri cism: It ques ons all of God's a ribute: If we have free will then God is not omniscient (he does not
know what we will choose) and he is not omnipotent (he does not have the power to determine what we do). And
if we don't have free will then God is not benevolent because if he was he would want our lives to morally
significant and meaningful.
Responses: WE COULD CONCLUDE THAT God is everlas ng: In this scenario, God does not know the future
because knowledge of the future is impossible - it doesn't exist. God is omniscient in that God knows all that
has happened and is happening, but not what comes next (although God can predict).
WE COULD CONCLUDE THAT God is eternal: God exists outside of me, he does not experience me linearly
but instead experiences all of me at once; he has no concept of past, present or future. For him all ac ons
you take is happening simultaneously, he is simply observing your choices and has no influence over what
you choose. ET- simultaneity is a more compelling response because it preserves Gods omniscience by
demonstra ng through God's meless nature he cannot conflict the free will of humans. It also does not
cause any logical contradic ons, aligning with defini ons of omniscience and eternity.
Conclusion: In conclusion the nature of God is coherent, there are no contradic ons in the a ributes of God and in
all cases it can be defended that God is an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient being.
Intent: The intent of this essay is to convey that the nature of God is coherent because any suggested contradic on in
his a ributes can be rejected, the most damning contradic on is the existence of God as omniscient and our
existence as free beings as it challenges all three of God’s main a ributes; however, it can simply be solved by
posi ng that God in addi on is everlas ng or eternal.
God’s a ributes: In this essay God will be defined as omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient being with the
poten al to be everlas ng or eternal.
Sec on one: God as omnipotent, omnipotence means that God is able to bring about any logical possibility, God is
perfectly powerful – there is nothing in the universe that can surpass God’s power. The paradox of the stone aims to
prove that there are limits to God’s power:
1. P1. Either God can create a stone that he cannot li , or he cannot create a stone that he cannot li .
2. P2. If God can create a stone that he cannot li , then he is not omnipotent (as there is at least one thing he
cannot do which is to li the stone)
3. P3. If God cannot create a stone which he cannot li , then he is not omnipotent (as there is at least one
thing he cannot do, which is to create the stone)
4. C1. Therefore, in any case there is at least one thing God cannot do.
Impact of this cri cism: It would ini ally be appealing as it demonstrates that God is in fact not perfectly powerful
as there is something he can’t do, therefore it is not coherent to describe God as an omnipotent being.
Response: Aquinas argues that a stone that is too heavy for God to li is a logical contradic on, if God is a
perfectly powerful being there is nothing conceivable which is more powerful than God. Mavrodes builds
upon this arguing that the paradox of the stone is self-contradictory, a stone that is too heavy for God to li
is not a logical possibility and thus according to the defini on of omnipotence God does not lack any
possible power. This is a compelling response as it demonstrates that there is nothing more powerful than
God in the universe and thus the concept of God remains coherent.
Sec on two: God as omnibenevolent, omnibenevolence means supremely perfect, God is a perfect being who's will
always aligns with what is morally good. The Euthyphro Dilemma aims to prove that God can either be benevolent
or omnipotent.
Op on 1: God wills what is good because it is good.
- This implies that morality is independent of God/what God wills. From this it follows that God could not make
what is wrong be right (and vice versa).
- This challenges the no on that God is omnipotent - that God could do anything.
Op on 2: What is good is good because God wills it.
- If good is whatever God wills, the content of morality appears arbitrary: there is no reason why God wills as
God does, and there is no criteria for moral goodness. The claim 'good is whatever God wills' doesn't say
anything substan ve about moral goodness- it is a tautology, empty of ethical content.
- If good is whatever God wills, then praising God cannot be an acknowledgement of moral achievement on
God's part, since any exercise of the divine will cons tutes goodness under this op on.
Impact of this cri cism: Unlike the paradox of the stone, the Euthyphro dilemma a acks two aspects of God's
nature. It shows that God can either being omnipotent or omnibenevolent. It is a more significant issue. To say
that God is both omnibenevolent and omnipotent is incoherent.
Response: Swinburne argues that the good is good is a necessary truth, so God wills what is good because it
is good – it cannot be otherwise (God has to power to do all that is logically possible). This is an effec ve
response because it preserves both God’s omnipotence and benevolence whilst cohering to the
independence of morality.
Sec on three: God as omniscient, omniscience means all knowing, God knows all true proposi ons, he knows
everything that can be known. The argument that God’s omniscience is incompa ble with our free will:
1. P1. God is omniscient iff God knows all true proposi ons.
2. P2. There are true proposi ons about the future.
3. P3. God is omniscient iff God knows all true future proposi ons.
, 4. P4. If God knows all true future proposi ons, including those about my future ac ons, then it is impossible
for those proposi ons about my future ac ons to be false.
5. P5. If it is impossible for these proposi ons about my future ac ons to be false, then it is impossible for me
to do otherwise than the ac on specified in those proposi ons, and so I am free.
6. C. Therefore, if God is omniscient, I am not free.
Impact of cri cism: It ques ons all of God's a ribute: If we have free will then God is not omniscient (he does not
know what we will choose) and he is not omnipotent (he does not have the power to determine what we do). And
if we don't have free will then God is not benevolent because if he was he would want our lives to morally
significant and meaningful.
Responses: WE COULD CONCLUDE THAT God is everlas ng: In this scenario, God does not know the future
because knowledge of the future is impossible - it doesn't exist. God is omniscient in that God knows all that
has happened and is happening, but not what comes next (although God can predict).
WE COULD CONCLUDE THAT God is eternal: God exists outside of me, he does not experience me linearly
but instead experiences all of me at once; he has no concept of past, present or future. For him all ac ons
you take is happening simultaneously, he is simply observing your choices and has no influence over what
you choose. ET- simultaneity is a more compelling response because it preserves Gods omniscience by
demonstra ng through God's meless nature he cannot conflict the free will of humans. It also does not
cause any logical contradic ons, aligning with defini ons of omniscience and eternity.
Conclusion: In conclusion the nature of God is coherent, there are no contradic ons in the a ributes of God and in
all cases it can be defended that God is an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient being.
