PHILOSOPHY YEAR TWO ESSAY PLANS
DUALIST ACCOUNT OF MENTAL STATES
Introduc on: Dualism is the philosophical theory that both mental states and physical states exist, in this essay three
forms of dualism will be discussed.
Thesis: Ul mately it will be argued that a dualist account of mental states can be successfully defended, whilst both
substance and property dualism fail to provide a convincing account of mental states due to the empirical
impossibility of a causally potent immaterial substance, epiphenomenalism is able to overcome this by arguing that
the mind is a by-product of the physical with no causal powers.
ARGUMENT ONE: SUBSTANCE DUALISM: THE INDIVISIBILITY ARGUMENT: This argument a empts to
prove the existence of the mind through Leibniz’ law.
P1: The mind is indivisible by its very nature.
P2: The body is divisible by its very nature.
P3: Two things are if they simultaneously share exactly the same proper es (Leibniz's Law).
C1: My mind has property my body does not have, namely, being indivisible.
C2: Therefore, the mind and body are not iden cal - they are two different things; therefore, dualism is
true.
Is this an effec ve argument: At surface level this argument appears to show no signs of fault, the conclusion is
logically derived for its premises and we are led to believed that the premises are also true. The mind simply cannot
be the same as the body according to Leibniz’s law.
Cri cism: The misapplica on of Leibniz’s law: Leibniz’s law is only effec ve when two things are dis nctly different
however the mind is divisible in some sense and the body is also indivisible to a certain extent. The mind can be
divided into memories, percep ons, emo ons (mul ple personality disorder) and the body is not infinitely divisible,
at an atomic level things cannot be divided. This is an effec ve cri cism at it shows that Leibniz’s law is not proof of
the existence of the mind, it also shows that premises 1 and 2 are false making the argument unsound.
Is there a poten al response: Descartes may push back arguing that the mental is not spa ally divisible whilst the
body is, showing that there is a dis nct difference between the two. However, this is not convincing enough to
support Descartes’ account of mental states.
ARGUMENT TWO: PROPERTY DUALISM: THE P-ZOMBIES ARGUMENT: This argument aims to prove that
there is a dis nc on between physicality and qualita ve experience.
P1: If phenomenal proper es were iden cal to physical proper es of the human body, then it would be
metaphysically impossible for those physical proper es to exist without phenomenal proper es also
exis ng.
P2: A philosophical zombie (which lacks phenomenal proper es) is conceivable.
P3: What is conceivable is metaphysically possible
C1: Therefore, a philosophical zombie is (metaphysically) possible.
P4: If a philosophical zombie is possible then phenomenal proper es are possibly dis nct from physical
proper es
C2: If phenomenal proper es are possibly dis nct from physical proper es, then phenomenal proper es
cannot be iden cal to physical proper es.
Is this an effec ve argument: It is able to prove that qualita ve experience cannot be conflated with physical
proper es otherwise it would be impossible for a p-zombie to exist.
Cri cism: The logical impossibility of p-zombies: the concept of a p-zombie is contradictory, if a p-zombie is
physically iden cal to a human then it would be impossible for it to lack qualita ve experience, if you’ve conceived of
a p-zombie you are conceiving of something that isn’t a p-zombie. This is an effec ve argument as it shows that p2
is false rendering the subsequent premises as false as well, the argument is no longer sound.
Is there a poten al response: Chalmers argues that the zombie aspect takes away from the true nature of the
argument which is to say that there is a disparity between the physical and non-physical. It is completely logical to
conceive of the physical and the non-physical. However, this response does not address the issue that a p-zombie
simply cannot be conceived of, making it ineffec ve at defending the property dualist account.
ARGUMENT THREE: PROPERTY DUALISM: THE MARY ARGUMENT: This argument aims to prove that
there are physical and non-physical facts.
P1: Mary knows all the physical facts about human colour vision before her release.
, P2: Mary learns a new fact about human colour vision on her release (a phenomenal fact).
C1: Therefore, there are non-physical facts about human colour vision.
P3: Non-physical facts are facts about non-physical phenomenal proper es.
C2: Therefore, there are non-physical proper es.
C3: Therefore, physicalism is false.
Is this an effec ve argument: Demonstrates its intended purpose, the dis nc on between physical and non-physical
facts, if the Mary argument is correct in arguing that Mary has developed addi onal proposi onal knowledge, then
there must be subjec ve qualita ve experience separate to physical brain states.
Cri cism: The empirical problem: If the Mary argument is correct it would suggest that the mind has causal potency,
this would mean that the mind is crea ng new energy that causes physical changes. The law of the conserva on of
energy states that no new energy can be created or destroyed, property dualism is posi ng the existence of a
property that goes against the laws of physics. This is an effec ve cri cism as it shows the low likelihood of
property dualism being the correct account of mental states.
Is there a poten al response: There is no effec ve response, we would have to turn to epiphenomenalism for a
convincing account of mental states.
ARGUMENT FOUR: EPIPHEMOMENALIST DUALISM:
A form of dualism, mental events are caused by physical events, mental events are casually impotent.
They are (merely) epiphenomenal. For epiphenomenalist the mind is like the steam that comes out of a
train, the steam is a byproduct of the train - however it cannot power the train. This is an improvement
from the previous as it adheres to causal closure, it allows for mul ple realisability and is compa ble
with property dualism if it were to accept that the mind has no casual power.
Conclusion: Therefore, epiphenomenalism is the most promising form of dualism, allowing for the existence of the
physical and physical without logical contradic ons or the rejec on physical laws.
DUALIST ACCOUNT OF MENTAL STATES
Introduc on: Dualism is the philosophical theory that both mental states and physical states exist, in this essay three
forms of dualism will be discussed.
Thesis: Ul mately it will be argued that a dualist account of mental states can be successfully defended, whilst both
substance and property dualism fail to provide a convincing account of mental states due to the empirical
impossibility of a causally potent immaterial substance, epiphenomenalism is able to overcome this by arguing that
the mind is a by-product of the physical with no causal powers.
ARGUMENT ONE: SUBSTANCE DUALISM: THE INDIVISIBILITY ARGUMENT: This argument a empts to
prove the existence of the mind through Leibniz’ law.
P1: The mind is indivisible by its very nature.
P2: The body is divisible by its very nature.
P3: Two things are if they simultaneously share exactly the same proper es (Leibniz's Law).
C1: My mind has property my body does not have, namely, being indivisible.
C2: Therefore, the mind and body are not iden cal - they are two different things; therefore, dualism is
true.
Is this an effec ve argument: At surface level this argument appears to show no signs of fault, the conclusion is
logically derived for its premises and we are led to believed that the premises are also true. The mind simply cannot
be the same as the body according to Leibniz’s law.
Cri cism: The misapplica on of Leibniz’s law: Leibniz’s law is only effec ve when two things are dis nctly different
however the mind is divisible in some sense and the body is also indivisible to a certain extent. The mind can be
divided into memories, percep ons, emo ons (mul ple personality disorder) and the body is not infinitely divisible,
at an atomic level things cannot be divided. This is an effec ve cri cism at it shows that Leibniz’s law is not proof of
the existence of the mind, it also shows that premises 1 and 2 are false making the argument unsound.
Is there a poten al response: Descartes may push back arguing that the mental is not spa ally divisible whilst the
body is, showing that there is a dis nct difference between the two. However, this is not convincing enough to
support Descartes’ account of mental states.
ARGUMENT TWO: PROPERTY DUALISM: THE P-ZOMBIES ARGUMENT: This argument aims to prove that
there is a dis nc on between physicality and qualita ve experience.
P1: If phenomenal proper es were iden cal to physical proper es of the human body, then it would be
metaphysically impossible for those physical proper es to exist without phenomenal proper es also
exis ng.
P2: A philosophical zombie (which lacks phenomenal proper es) is conceivable.
P3: What is conceivable is metaphysically possible
C1: Therefore, a philosophical zombie is (metaphysically) possible.
P4: If a philosophical zombie is possible then phenomenal proper es are possibly dis nct from physical
proper es
C2: If phenomenal proper es are possibly dis nct from physical proper es, then phenomenal proper es
cannot be iden cal to physical proper es.
Is this an effec ve argument: It is able to prove that qualita ve experience cannot be conflated with physical
proper es otherwise it would be impossible for a p-zombie to exist.
Cri cism: The logical impossibility of p-zombies: the concept of a p-zombie is contradictory, if a p-zombie is
physically iden cal to a human then it would be impossible for it to lack qualita ve experience, if you’ve conceived of
a p-zombie you are conceiving of something that isn’t a p-zombie. This is an effec ve argument as it shows that p2
is false rendering the subsequent premises as false as well, the argument is no longer sound.
Is there a poten al response: Chalmers argues that the zombie aspect takes away from the true nature of the
argument which is to say that there is a disparity between the physical and non-physical. It is completely logical to
conceive of the physical and the non-physical. However, this response does not address the issue that a p-zombie
simply cannot be conceived of, making it ineffec ve at defending the property dualist account.
ARGUMENT THREE: PROPERTY DUALISM: THE MARY ARGUMENT: This argument aims to prove that
there are physical and non-physical facts.
P1: Mary knows all the physical facts about human colour vision before her release.
, P2: Mary learns a new fact about human colour vision on her release (a phenomenal fact).
C1: Therefore, there are non-physical facts about human colour vision.
P3: Non-physical facts are facts about non-physical phenomenal proper es.
C2: Therefore, there are non-physical proper es.
C3: Therefore, physicalism is false.
Is this an effec ve argument: Demonstrates its intended purpose, the dis nc on between physical and non-physical
facts, if the Mary argument is correct in arguing that Mary has developed addi onal proposi onal knowledge, then
there must be subjec ve qualita ve experience separate to physical brain states.
Cri cism: The empirical problem: If the Mary argument is correct it would suggest that the mind has causal potency,
this would mean that the mind is crea ng new energy that causes physical changes. The law of the conserva on of
energy states that no new energy can be created or destroyed, property dualism is posi ng the existence of a
property that goes against the laws of physics. This is an effec ve cri cism as it shows the low likelihood of
property dualism being the correct account of mental states.
Is there a poten al response: There is no effec ve response, we would have to turn to epiphenomenalism for a
convincing account of mental states.
ARGUMENT FOUR: EPIPHEMOMENALIST DUALISM:
A form of dualism, mental events are caused by physical events, mental events are casually impotent.
They are (merely) epiphenomenal. For epiphenomenalist the mind is like the steam that comes out of a
train, the steam is a byproduct of the train - however it cannot power the train. This is an improvement
from the previous as it adheres to causal closure, it allows for mul ple realisability and is compa ble
with property dualism if it were to accept that the mind has no casual power.
Conclusion: Therefore, epiphenomenalism is the most promising form of dualism, allowing for the existence of the
physical and physical without logical contradic ons or the rejec on physical laws.
