7SSG123_CW1_1619759
7SSG5123 Risk Communication
Examine CAA’s Risk Communication Strategy during the Spring 2010 Volcano Crisis
Due Date: 11th December 2020
1619759
Word Count: 1,993
1
, 7SSG123_CW1_1619759
Eyjafjallajökull, erupted in the Spring of 2010, with the most forceful and worrisome eruption
taking place on April 14th. Although volcanic activity had been occurring for some time, it was
not until this day that the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) had to take action. In the following
days, UK airspace proceeded to shut, bringing with it 8 days of disruption during one of the
busiest holiday periods (Brannigan, 2010; Civil Aviation Authority, 2015). The strategy: Risk
Aversion – disliking or avoiding risk (Donovan, 2013; O’Neill, 2001), on the premise of the
precautionary principle and utilising the protocol in place from the International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO) which prohibited any flights from taking in the presence of volcanic ash
(ICAO, 2009; Civil Aviation Authority, 2015). This paper will delve into the risk
communication strategy delivered by the CAA, during the eruption, assessing the key strengths
and weaknesses, through a comprehensive analysis of the techniques utilized by the CAA. A
review of what is deemed “good” risk communication will be performed, with a comparison
to the strategy utilised by the CAA in 2010. Throughout, the paper, it will be maintained that
given the circumstances of the eruption, the CAA, coherently separated risk assessment from
management, and therefore, delivered a cohesive communication strategy.
Risk Framework:
Academic literature asserts that any “good” risk communication strategy starts from having an
understanding of risk perceptions, as humans are predisposed to dealing with risk information
experientially, rather than rationally (Slovic et al., 2007; Epstein, 1994; Slovic, 1987).The
communication paradigm is littered with a nuanced need to understand the relationship that is
pertinent to successful communication, the mere understanding of differences between ‘lay’
and ‘expert’ opinions (Slovic, 1987; Chakraborty, 2011).Predominantly as the human response
is reliant on the existing knowledge of the risk in question. The psychometric paradigm
endeavours to explain how a risk, does not simple exist “out there”, and therefore, cannot be
seen to be independent from our minds and cultures. As a result, understanding the individual
definition of the risk, and appealing to cultural norms, whilst encompassing the concept that
people view a current risk as “higher”, due to its presence (Renn and Levine, 1991; Lichtenberg
and MacLean, 1991; Slovic, 1993, 1987; National Research Council, 1989). Fischhoff (1995)
asserts that such a strategy would be inclusive of (1) Accurate information for the receiver of
the communication, (2) A proactive approach, (3) All involved parties being frequently briefed,
(4) Well-prepared communication strategy and (4) An understanding of how the risks can be
amplified by the media. This series of stages can be strongly influenced by the role of the
2
7SSG5123 Risk Communication
Examine CAA’s Risk Communication Strategy during the Spring 2010 Volcano Crisis
Due Date: 11th December 2020
1619759
Word Count: 1,993
1
, 7SSG123_CW1_1619759
Eyjafjallajökull, erupted in the Spring of 2010, with the most forceful and worrisome eruption
taking place on April 14th. Although volcanic activity had been occurring for some time, it was
not until this day that the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) had to take action. In the following
days, UK airspace proceeded to shut, bringing with it 8 days of disruption during one of the
busiest holiday periods (Brannigan, 2010; Civil Aviation Authority, 2015). The strategy: Risk
Aversion – disliking or avoiding risk (Donovan, 2013; O’Neill, 2001), on the premise of the
precautionary principle and utilising the protocol in place from the International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO) which prohibited any flights from taking in the presence of volcanic ash
(ICAO, 2009; Civil Aviation Authority, 2015). This paper will delve into the risk
communication strategy delivered by the CAA, during the eruption, assessing the key strengths
and weaknesses, through a comprehensive analysis of the techniques utilized by the CAA. A
review of what is deemed “good” risk communication will be performed, with a comparison
to the strategy utilised by the CAA in 2010. Throughout, the paper, it will be maintained that
given the circumstances of the eruption, the CAA, coherently separated risk assessment from
management, and therefore, delivered a cohesive communication strategy.
Risk Framework:
Academic literature asserts that any “good” risk communication strategy starts from having an
understanding of risk perceptions, as humans are predisposed to dealing with risk information
experientially, rather than rationally (Slovic et al., 2007; Epstein, 1994; Slovic, 1987).The
communication paradigm is littered with a nuanced need to understand the relationship that is
pertinent to successful communication, the mere understanding of differences between ‘lay’
and ‘expert’ opinions (Slovic, 1987; Chakraborty, 2011).Predominantly as the human response
is reliant on the existing knowledge of the risk in question. The psychometric paradigm
endeavours to explain how a risk, does not simple exist “out there”, and therefore, cannot be
seen to be independent from our minds and cultures. As a result, understanding the individual
definition of the risk, and appealing to cultural norms, whilst encompassing the concept that
people view a current risk as “higher”, due to its presence (Renn and Levine, 1991; Lichtenberg
and MacLean, 1991; Slovic, 1993, 1987; National Research Council, 1989). Fischhoff (1995)
asserts that such a strategy would be inclusive of (1) Accurate information for the receiver of
the communication, (2) A proactive approach, (3) All involved parties being frequently briefed,
(4) Well-prepared communication strategy and (4) An understanding of how the risks can be
amplified by the media. This series of stages can be strongly influenced by the role of the
2
