Sir Douglas Haig remains the most controversial figure in the literature of the British army in
World War I. Some considered him callous, bungling, stupid, an intriguer, and a falsifier of
documents. To others, he was the embodiment of the British nation during World War I,
sternly following an undeviating course to victory on the Western Front. Others again have
seen Haig as limited by the ideas and army structure of the late Victorian period and
uncomfortable with the developing technology of World War I. The last view seems the most
accurate.
Haig’s previous battle experience in the mobile, colonial wars of the Sudan and South Africa
did not prepare him well for the static nature of war on the Western Front. Neither did his
Staff College training in the late nineteenth century. Taken together, these combined to
produce a fixed image of war in Haig’s mind. He conceived of battle as a structured, three-
stage affair: first, the preparation, wearing down, and drawing in of enemy reserves; second,
the rapid and decisive offensive; and third, exploitation. Essentially, Haig did not change his
mind about this structure throughout World War I. He continued, therefore, to think of war as
relatively simple, human-cantered, dependent on morale, and requiring the determination of a
commander to persist until victory.
In addition, Haig was a cavalryman, and he always optimistically anticipated breakthroughs
(the decisive offensive), followed by cavalry exploitation. Hence at the Battle of the Somme,
on July 1, 1916, Haig forced his army commanders to deepen their objectives, and he also
wanted a short hurricane bombardment, followed by a rush through. The result was a mixed
plan of lengthy bombardment and deep objectives that did not succeed. The same process
occurred at Passchendaele on July 31, 1917, when Haig appointed an offensive-minded
general (Sir Hubert Gough) to command, and pressed him to plan a decisive breakthrough,
rather than a step-by-step advance.
Thus Haig’s major offensives at the Somme and Passchendaele commenced with artillery
preparations, followed by breakthrough attempts. But these failed, and so did not produce
cavalry exploitation. When the breakthroughs failed, both battles turned into protracted efforts
to wear down the enemy, resulting in the costly attrition warfare of 1916 and 1917. Larger
casualties were sustained on the British attacking side than on the German defensive side.
Haig has been criticized for this basic strategy; however, this attrition did eventually take its
toll on the German army and undoubtedly contributed to victory in 1918.
Haig has also been criticized for his ignorance of conditions at the front. His distant but
powerful personality (and the possibility of dismissal) tended to intimidate liaison officers,
World War I. Some considered him callous, bungling, stupid, an intriguer, and a falsifier of
documents. To others, he was the embodiment of the British nation during World War I,
sternly following an undeviating course to victory on the Western Front. Others again have
seen Haig as limited by the ideas and army structure of the late Victorian period and
uncomfortable with the developing technology of World War I. The last view seems the most
accurate.
Haig’s previous battle experience in the mobile, colonial wars of the Sudan and South Africa
did not prepare him well for the static nature of war on the Western Front. Neither did his
Staff College training in the late nineteenth century. Taken together, these combined to
produce a fixed image of war in Haig’s mind. He conceived of battle as a structured, three-
stage affair: first, the preparation, wearing down, and drawing in of enemy reserves; second,
the rapid and decisive offensive; and third, exploitation. Essentially, Haig did not change his
mind about this structure throughout World War I. He continued, therefore, to think of war as
relatively simple, human-cantered, dependent on morale, and requiring the determination of a
commander to persist until victory.
In addition, Haig was a cavalryman, and he always optimistically anticipated breakthroughs
(the decisive offensive), followed by cavalry exploitation. Hence at the Battle of the Somme,
on July 1, 1916, Haig forced his army commanders to deepen their objectives, and he also
wanted a short hurricane bombardment, followed by a rush through. The result was a mixed
plan of lengthy bombardment and deep objectives that did not succeed. The same process
occurred at Passchendaele on July 31, 1917, when Haig appointed an offensive-minded
general (Sir Hubert Gough) to command, and pressed him to plan a decisive breakthrough,
rather than a step-by-step advance.
Thus Haig’s major offensives at the Somme and Passchendaele commenced with artillery
preparations, followed by breakthrough attempts. But these failed, and so did not produce
cavalry exploitation. When the breakthroughs failed, both battles turned into protracted efforts
to wear down the enemy, resulting in the costly attrition warfare of 1916 and 1917. Larger
casualties were sustained on the British attacking side than on the German defensive side.
Haig has been criticized for this basic strategy; however, this attrition did eventually take its
toll on the German army and undoubtedly contributed to victory in 1918.
Haig has also been criticized for his ignorance of conditions at the front. His distant but
powerful personality (and the possibility of dismissal) tended to intimidate liaison officers,
