‘Eisenhower’s foreign policy in Europe differed significantly from his foreign policy elsewhere in the
world’. Assess the validity of this view.
PLAN
1. Yes – much more intervention elsewhere, whereas action within Europe was avoided.
- US intervention within Vietnam, South Korea and Taiwan. Ground troops, artillery, weapons
supplied – definite US presence.
- Hungarian call for help to bolster Nagy’s endeavour to revert to capitalism and exit the
Warsaw Pact essentially ignored by Eisenhower.
-Domino theory; dominoes had set in Europe already.
This leads on to the next point....
2. Yes – it had to differ, as the consequences were wildly different. If Eisenhower was to achieve
his aims, he had to modify his policy.
- South East Asian countries such as Vietnam were relatively poor with impoverished people
and diminished economies, meaning the likelihood of establishing a strong nuclear weapons
arsenal comparable to the USSR, capable of threatening the autonomy and authority of the US
was unlikely, allowing US presence without drastic consequences.
- Alleviating the conflict in Hungary would have irrevocably lead to dire ramifications, as the
withstanding of the ‘Iron Curtain’ made the Eastern Bloc countries inaccessible. Similarly it was
surrounded by satellite states, meaning any ideological and governmental success would be
transitory and vulnerable to future usurpation by Moscow.
- possibility of MAD or nuclear armament was a lot higher and more menacing, forcing
Eisenhower to be more hesitant and cautious.
- Eisenhower had to assess the realistic probability of long-lasting Capitalist success before
intervention
3. Yes – feels as though attitude was impulsive elsewhere as America could make gains and avoid
a ‘hot war’.
- Japan is a prime example of the gains America could make; galvanised economy, secured
trade links, alliance, protected Capitalist interests etc.
- Vietnam and South Korea both proxy wars
- Iran – 40% of the oil fields, allegiance. Helped achieve his aim of getting more oil.
- Taiwan, US naval base
4. No – his aims were the same everywhere.
- containment of communism, getting out of Korea, more oil, avoid over-spending etc, roll-back
- if his aims were the same, it meant his overall policy was the same.
-However the obvious limitation to this-
5. Conclusion – arguably his actual foreign policy was universal, however the execution of said
policy was what differed, as it was essential to adapt the approach to avoid further acrimony/
to make solid and satisfactory gains, adding to the US sphere of influence. Japan is prime
example of necessity of more intervention in Asia, as the economy/trade/alliance provided a
stronghold for US presence, ultimately deterring communism.
world’. Assess the validity of this view.
PLAN
1. Yes – much more intervention elsewhere, whereas action within Europe was avoided.
- US intervention within Vietnam, South Korea and Taiwan. Ground troops, artillery, weapons
supplied – definite US presence.
- Hungarian call for help to bolster Nagy’s endeavour to revert to capitalism and exit the
Warsaw Pact essentially ignored by Eisenhower.
-Domino theory; dominoes had set in Europe already.
This leads on to the next point....
2. Yes – it had to differ, as the consequences were wildly different. If Eisenhower was to achieve
his aims, he had to modify his policy.
- South East Asian countries such as Vietnam were relatively poor with impoverished people
and diminished economies, meaning the likelihood of establishing a strong nuclear weapons
arsenal comparable to the USSR, capable of threatening the autonomy and authority of the US
was unlikely, allowing US presence without drastic consequences.
- Alleviating the conflict in Hungary would have irrevocably lead to dire ramifications, as the
withstanding of the ‘Iron Curtain’ made the Eastern Bloc countries inaccessible. Similarly it was
surrounded by satellite states, meaning any ideological and governmental success would be
transitory and vulnerable to future usurpation by Moscow.
- possibility of MAD or nuclear armament was a lot higher and more menacing, forcing
Eisenhower to be more hesitant and cautious.
- Eisenhower had to assess the realistic probability of long-lasting Capitalist success before
intervention
3. Yes – feels as though attitude was impulsive elsewhere as America could make gains and avoid
a ‘hot war’.
- Japan is a prime example of the gains America could make; galvanised economy, secured
trade links, alliance, protected Capitalist interests etc.
- Vietnam and South Korea both proxy wars
- Iran – 40% of the oil fields, allegiance. Helped achieve his aim of getting more oil.
- Taiwan, US naval base
4. No – his aims were the same everywhere.
- containment of communism, getting out of Korea, more oil, avoid over-spending etc, roll-back
- if his aims were the same, it meant his overall policy was the same.
-However the obvious limitation to this-
5. Conclusion – arguably his actual foreign policy was universal, however the execution of said
policy was what differed, as it was essential to adapt the approach to avoid further acrimony/
to make solid and satisfactory gains, adding to the US sphere of influence. Japan is prime
example of necessity of more intervention in Asia, as the economy/trade/alliance provided a
stronghold for US presence, ultimately deterring communism.
