For any world in which a small number of
people lead high quality lives, is there always
a better world in which a large number lead
low quality lives?
Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion raises a population ethics problem, which states that a world in
which a large number lead low quality lives is better than a world in which a small number of
people lead high quality lives. In this essay, I will attempt to challenge this Repugnant Conclusion.
First, I will outline the Repugnant Conclusion. Next, I will attempt to argue against the Repugnant
Conclusion by adopting Average Utilitarianism. Then, after finding criticisms with Average
Utilitarianism, I will endeavor to amend it by including a threshold to determine which worlds are
desirable and worth living, in order to prevent us from reaching a Z-like world. I shall then consider
potential criticisms of using a threshold before dismissing these.
Here, I will outline the Repugnant Conclusion, before putting forward potential arguments to solve
it. The Repugnant Conclusion can be outlined as the following:
“For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there
must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would
be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth living.” (Parfit 1984:388).
This can be explained via diagrams, such as the figure 1:
Fig 1
A B C Z
, It is worth noting here that the Repugnant Conclusion uses total utilitarianism, which is defined as
the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth living. In figure 1, world A depicts a small
population, such as one million, that has a very high level of utility. World B has a larger population
and a lower level of utility than A. According to total utilitarianism (which I will refer to as TU),
world B is better than world A, as world B has a greater amount of total utility than world A. The
same conclusions can be made when comparing world B to C, for the same reasons. This will
continue for worlds D, E F, and so on. Eventually, we get to world Z. World Z has a large population,
let us say of 100 million, and the level of utility is just above the threshold of a life worth living. The
total utility of world Z is greater than that of world A, and so according to TU, world Z is better than
world A. Our intuition, however, states otherwise. World A should be better than world Z, because
the lives lived in world A are of higher quality than in world Z, due to the higher level of utility. This
leads us to the Repugnant Conclusion (Parfit 1984:384-389).
I will now attempt to solve the Repugnant Conclusion, by discussing utility. First, I shall consider
Average Utilitarianism as a potential solution. Average Utilitarianism (AU) takes the total utility and
divides it by the population, to find the average utility of each person (Sikora 1975:409). If we apply
this to the diagram above, it is clear that the average utility of world A is higher than that of world
Z. Therefore, if we replace TU with AU, we can initially claim that the Repugnant Conclusion is false.
However, I will now put forward a counterargument to using AU.
Sikora provides an example that criticizes AU. In a given world, the destruction of the world is going
to happen. According to Sikora, AU would be concerned with the suffering of people who exist at
the time the world was destroyed and lost their lives; yet it may not be concerned about the loss of
future generations. If future generations would have been happier that the people already existing,
then AU would be concerned about future generations. If future generations had been less happy
than existing people, then AU would not be concerned about future generations, as they would be
seen as only pulling down the average level of utility (Sikora 1975:410). The diagrams below can
illustrate this.
people lead high quality lives, is there always
a better world in which a large number lead
low quality lives?
Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion raises a population ethics problem, which states that a world in
which a large number lead low quality lives is better than a world in which a small number of
people lead high quality lives. In this essay, I will attempt to challenge this Repugnant Conclusion.
First, I will outline the Repugnant Conclusion. Next, I will attempt to argue against the Repugnant
Conclusion by adopting Average Utilitarianism. Then, after finding criticisms with Average
Utilitarianism, I will endeavor to amend it by including a threshold to determine which worlds are
desirable and worth living, in order to prevent us from reaching a Z-like world. I shall then consider
potential criticisms of using a threshold before dismissing these.
Here, I will outline the Repugnant Conclusion, before putting forward potential arguments to solve
it. The Repugnant Conclusion can be outlined as the following:
“For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there
must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would
be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth living.” (Parfit 1984:388).
This can be explained via diagrams, such as the figure 1:
Fig 1
A B C Z
, It is worth noting here that the Repugnant Conclusion uses total utilitarianism, which is defined as
the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth living. In figure 1, world A depicts a small
population, such as one million, that has a very high level of utility. World B has a larger population
and a lower level of utility than A. According to total utilitarianism (which I will refer to as TU),
world B is better than world A, as world B has a greater amount of total utility than world A. The
same conclusions can be made when comparing world B to C, for the same reasons. This will
continue for worlds D, E F, and so on. Eventually, we get to world Z. World Z has a large population,
let us say of 100 million, and the level of utility is just above the threshold of a life worth living. The
total utility of world Z is greater than that of world A, and so according to TU, world Z is better than
world A. Our intuition, however, states otherwise. World A should be better than world Z, because
the lives lived in world A are of higher quality than in world Z, due to the higher level of utility. This
leads us to the Repugnant Conclusion (Parfit 1984:384-389).
I will now attempt to solve the Repugnant Conclusion, by discussing utility. First, I shall consider
Average Utilitarianism as a potential solution. Average Utilitarianism (AU) takes the total utility and
divides it by the population, to find the average utility of each person (Sikora 1975:409). If we apply
this to the diagram above, it is clear that the average utility of world A is higher than that of world
Z. Therefore, if we replace TU with AU, we can initially claim that the Repugnant Conclusion is false.
However, I will now put forward a counterargument to using AU.
Sikora provides an example that criticizes AU. In a given world, the destruction of the world is going
to happen. According to Sikora, AU would be concerned with the suffering of people who exist at
the time the world was destroyed and lost their lives; yet it may not be concerned about the loss of
future generations. If future generations would have been happier that the people already existing,
then AU would be concerned about future generations. If future generations had been less happy
than existing people, then AU would not be concerned about future generations, as they would be
seen as only pulling down the average level of utility (Sikora 1975:410). The diagrams below can
illustrate this.