“Consciousness can be fully understood by material interactions.”
A materialist approach to the mind-body problem would put forward this idea
that consciousness can be fully explained by the physical. This view is held by
the likes of Gilbert Ryle and Dawkins, whose idea that the soul is nothing
more than a metaphorical concept can be supported by Skinner’s
behaviourism, revealing that mental activity and behaviour are the same.
However, Piaget’s cognitivism begs to differ and presents a substance dualist
approach similar to that of Plato and Descartes to prove that consciousness
cannot be fully explained by material interactions. Aristotle seeks a middle
way through his property dualism to reach the most successful conclusion
which shows that consciousness can be explained by material interactions to
some extent - but not fully.
Gilbert Ryle asserts that our problems when analysing consciousness stem
from thinking of the mind as something that is either physical or non-physical.
In searching for this idea of a ‘soul’, we are assuming there is something more
than what the body is - a physical concept - and committing a category error.
He compares it to a parent visiting a university for their child, having been
around every section of the premises, just to ask ‘where is the actual
university?’. Asking where the soul is is overcomplicating the issue of
consciousness which can be explained by physical terms. The science behind
this is supported by Skinner’s behaviourist theory. He argues that mental
activity cannot be explained by behaviour as this becomes a circular
argument. Saying ‘I am crying because I am sad’ does not give the recipient
any information as ‘sad’ is not an explanation. Instead, we need an external
stimuli. Saying ‘I am crying because I watched a sad film’ makes more
coherent sense; it gives a real reason for the action rather than explaining
behaviour through behaviour. This argument does have strength as Ryle is
valid to question why a soul is necessary when a lot of what the mind does
can be explained physically, as Skinner points out. However, surely saying ‘I
am crying because I feel sad’ does give us some information. We could be
crying because we feel sad, happy, or frustrated. Therefore whilst the
argument adheres to Occham’s razor, this is perhaps a weakness as it
oversimplifies our consciousness as something that can be fully explained by
material interactions.
Cognitivist Piaget would argue that mental activity can be explained by
behaviour as it is a separate field of study altogether. In separating the two his
argument aligns with Plato’s substance dualism which separates the mind and
A materialist approach to the mind-body problem would put forward this idea
that consciousness can be fully explained by the physical. This view is held by
the likes of Gilbert Ryle and Dawkins, whose idea that the soul is nothing
more than a metaphorical concept can be supported by Skinner’s
behaviourism, revealing that mental activity and behaviour are the same.
However, Piaget’s cognitivism begs to differ and presents a substance dualist
approach similar to that of Plato and Descartes to prove that consciousness
cannot be fully explained by material interactions. Aristotle seeks a middle
way through his property dualism to reach the most successful conclusion
which shows that consciousness can be explained by material interactions to
some extent - but not fully.
Gilbert Ryle asserts that our problems when analysing consciousness stem
from thinking of the mind as something that is either physical or non-physical.
In searching for this idea of a ‘soul’, we are assuming there is something more
than what the body is - a physical concept - and committing a category error.
He compares it to a parent visiting a university for their child, having been
around every section of the premises, just to ask ‘where is the actual
university?’. Asking where the soul is is overcomplicating the issue of
consciousness which can be explained by physical terms. The science behind
this is supported by Skinner’s behaviourist theory. He argues that mental
activity cannot be explained by behaviour as this becomes a circular
argument. Saying ‘I am crying because I am sad’ does not give the recipient
any information as ‘sad’ is not an explanation. Instead, we need an external
stimuli. Saying ‘I am crying because I watched a sad film’ makes more
coherent sense; it gives a real reason for the action rather than explaining
behaviour through behaviour. This argument does have strength as Ryle is
valid to question why a soul is necessary when a lot of what the mind does
can be explained physically, as Skinner points out. However, surely saying ‘I
am crying because I feel sad’ does give us some information. We could be
crying because we feel sad, happy, or frustrated. Therefore whilst the
argument adheres to Occham’s razor, this is perhaps a weakness as it
oversimplifies our consciousness as something that can be fully explained by
material interactions.
Cognitivist Piaget would argue that mental activity can be explained by
behaviour as it is a separate field of study altogether. In separating the two his
argument aligns with Plato’s substance dualism which separates the mind and
