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Game Theory & Behavioral Economics: Solved Practice Problems (Nash & Sequential Games)

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Learn how to solve Game Theory problems with confidence. This guide provides clear, calculated solutions for strategic interactions, moving from basic payoff matrices to complex behavioral models. Ideal for Intermediate Microeconomics students. What’s Inside: - Nash Equilibrium: Finding Pure Strategies and Dominant Strategies in payoff matrices. - Mixed Strategies: Step-by-step calculation of probabilities (e.g., Penalty Kick Game). - Sequential Games: Using Backward Induction to find Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). - Behavioral Econ: Calculations for Loss Aversion (Prospect Theory) and Hyperbolic Discounting (Time Inconsistency).

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Microeconomics Practice Strategic Behavior


Master Strategic Behavior: Solved Problems
Step-by-step solutions based on Varian’s approach.




Problem 1: Nash Equilibrium (Pure Strategies)
Question: Consider the following payoff matrix for two firms deciding whether to Advertise or
Not Advertise.
Firm 2: Adv Firm 2: Not
Firm 1: Adv (10, 5) (15, 0)
Firm 1: Not (6, 8) (10, 2)
Find all Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria. Does either firm have a Dominant Strategy?

Solution
Step 1: Analyze Firm 1’s Best Responses
- If Firm 2 plays Adv, Firm 1 compares 10 vs 6. Best response: Adv.
- If Firm 2 plays Not, Firm 1 compares 15 vs 10. Best response: Adv.
Since Firm 1 plays Adv regardless of Firm 2, Adv is a Dominant Strategy for Firm 1.
Step 2: Analyze Firm 2’s Best Responses
- If Firm 1 plays Adv, Firm 2 compares 5 vs 0. Best response: Adv.
- If Firm 1 plays Not, Firm 2 compares 8 vs 2. Best response: Adv.
Adv is also a Dominant Strategy for Firm 2.
Step 3: Find Equilibrium
Since both play Adv, the intersection is the equilibrium.

Final Answer: The unique Nash Equilibrium is (Adv, Adv). Both firms have a Dominant
Strategy to Advertise.




Problem 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
Question: In a penalty kick game, the Kicker can aim Left or Right. The Goalie can jump
Left or Right.

• If both go the same way (Goalie matches Kicker), Kicker gets 0, Goalie gets 100.

• If they go opposite ways (Goalie fails), Kicker gets 100, Goalie gets 0.

Find the Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium probabilities.

Solution
Step 1: Set up Payoff Matrix
Let p be probability Kicker aims Left. Let q be probability Goalie jumps Left.



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