Week 1
Lecture: Empire in Eurasia: Russian imperial ambitions and the uses of the past
Cultural history is not primarily concerned with political, economic or military history. It,
instead, has a focus on culture, representation and discourse, with internal diversity
within the subject.
Anatomy of Empire: what are its distinguishing features?
The most common feature of empire is its ability to expand, and therefore the landmass
an empire holds. Therefore, there are spatial inequalities between the center and the
periphery.
Where are we? The Eurasian land mass
An important feature that describes the Eurasian land mass are biomes. A biome is the
largest geographic unit of life forms. The major biomes of Eurasia are: (1) the tundra,
mostly located north of the Arctic Circle, where vegetation consists mostly of lichen; (2)
the forest belt, which mostly occupies most of the northern half of Eurasia, between the
Arctic Circle, and consists of mostly Taiga, pine and spruce forests in the north, a mixed
forest, in the central area of Russia, around Moscow and places at similar latitude, and
the wooded steppe, a traditional area; and (3) the steppe, a vast plain stretching from
Hungary to Mongolia, with few trees but plentiful grass and bush. Historically speaking,
there is a tension between the people of the forest and the steppe: Russian people were
from the forest and concurred the people from the steppe. Those battles are collective
known as the ‘Tatar yoke’ (1237-1480). One of those battles, the Battle of Kulikovo
(1380), could be seen as a turning point, considering it began to shake oX the Tatar yoke
by Muscovy. It meant the end of the Mongolian reign of the steppe. Therefore, the
question remains what makes people ‘Russian’. The answer to that in simple: Russian
culture remained close with the wealth of the forest. Only when they began to feel
emancipated from total subordination to nature, could they fantasize about being
master of their own fate. Alongside the forests, rivers as the Dnieper and the Volga (and
their trade in forest products) also remained important from the nineth century
onwards.
The ‘forest and the ax’ in Russian culture
Russian land was as big as an ax could reach. The forest greeted the Russian at his birth
and attended him through all the stages of his life. In the nineteenth century, the idea
that the forest could be lost expanded; therefore, there came another resurgence of
forest importance in literature, poetry and general art.
Crafting an imperial culture
The rulers of Russia, mainly Prince Vladimir (980-1015), converted and adopted
Christian Orthodoxy – the variant developed following the split between Byzantium and
Rome – as a state religion after rejecting other religions. Judaism was rejected ‘as the
religion on a defeated people who had lost their state (to the Romans)’ and Islam was
rejected due to its prohibition on alcohol. As the chronicle explains: “drink is the joy of
the Russian people.”
,Source work: The Tale of the White Cowl
The Tale of the White Cowl serves as the cornerstone of Russian medieval ideology. It
originated in the late fifteenth century in Novgorod, with the goal of defending the
sovereignty of the Novgorodian church from encroachment by the Grand Duchy of
Muscovy. The story serves as a suitable founding myth to be the ‘new Rome’, since
there could ‘never be another Rome’ after the fall of the First (Rome) and Second Rome
(Byzantium). A key concept is the translation imperii (‘transfer of rule’): the idea that an
empire can be transferred metahistorically from place to place, with each inheriting the
mantle of the previous. It is therefore used to articulate ideology and justify imperial
ambitions.
The reign of Ivan IV
Ivan IV remains important to study; he is regarded as ‘one of the three advisors of Putin’,
alongside Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. Ivan IV is also known as Ivan the
Terrible (or Awe-Inspiring). He was the Grand Prince of Moscow from 1533 and the first
to be proclaimed Tsar (coming from Ceasar, another reference to the continuation of
the Third Rome) of Russia, from 1547. His reign saw the construction of a centrally
administered Russian state and the creation of an empire that included non-Slav
people. His reign marked by prolonged and largely unsuccessful wars against Sweden
and Poland.
After the death of his wife and advisors, Ivan became paranoid and suspicious, setting
him on his violent campaign, filled with terror. This state policy became known as
oprichnina, implemented between 1565 and 1572, including mass repression of the
boyars (Russian aristocracy), with public executions and confiscation of their land and
property. Ivan IV personally murdered, tortured and raped on mass scale; evidence for
his excesses include his own ‘Confession’.
The ‘greatness’ and likeliness of Ivan IV could be seen in the 1552 painting, ‘Blessed Be
the Host of The King of Heaven’. The iconography is religious, with approval of the divine.
Another celebration of the victory against the Khazans was the St. Basil’s Cathedral in
Moscow, Russia. It was also heavily described in chronicles in the rise of the Russian
land up until that point.
The historical features of the reign of Ivan IV are as follows: (a) centralization: Ivan aimed
to consolidate power under his direct control, diminishing the influence of the boyars
and other traditional elites; (b) use of terror: the oprichnina demonstrated the
willingness of Ivan IV to use extreme violence to enforce his will and eliminate perceived
opposition; (c) imperial ambitions: Ivan adopted the title of Tsar and sought to establish
Russia as a major power, often by force; (d) religious justification: Ivan presented
himself as a divinely ordained ruler, which was used to legitimize his absolute power,
and took on religious roles to further this image; (e) experimentation with power: Ivan
explored diXerent ways to understand and manifest his imperial power, such as creating
a state with the oprichnina from 1562-72; (f) territorial expansion and devastating
internal policies: ideal of a strong state combined with actions that undermined it.
,Legacy and reception of Ivan IV: Repin, Stalin, Putin
Repin painted ‘Ivan the Terrible and His Son Ivan on November 16, 1581’, inspired by the
assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881. Ivan had a bad temper and punished people
harshly. In 1581, his son Ivan Ivanovich died after a fight with his father. Some records
say Ivan the Terrible hit his son in anger, which caused his death. Other historians think
the son may have died from illness or another cause. The story became a myth because
of the famous painting Ivan the Terrible and His Son Ivan by Ilya Repin. The painting
shows Ivan holding his dying son, looking shocked and full of regret. It is very emotional
and memorable. Zhdanov paints another image of Ivan, and described his rule as
‘progressive, as he administered a blow to feudal reaction, facilitated the acceleration
of the historical process, and transformed Russia into a strong centralized Great Power’.
He notes a diXerence between recognizing the progressiveness of one historical
phenomenon and endorsing it. Stalin, thereafter, greenlit a lavish, three-part movie of
Ivan the Terrible, with new interpretations of the ‘progressive Ivan’. Given the war during
1944, the year this movie released, the reemergence of Ivan the Terrible could be seen
as great importance. It should be seen as ‘filming against’ the known narratives of Ivan.
In the Putin era, Ivan the Great once again served of great importance. In 2016, a
monument of Ivan was erected in Oryol, and in 2025, a nine-meter-tall statue was
inaugurated on ‘National Unity Day’ by an ultra-nationalist governor. Such positive
notions of Ivan IV should be seen as reemergence of Russian national identity, including
the icon of Orthodox Christianity – the cross. Therefore, political violence could be seen
as a part of Russia.
Recap and questions
The animating myths of Russian monarchy from the fifteenth to the late nineteenth
century associated the ruler and the elite with foreign images of political power. From
the formation of the monarchy in the fifteenth century, when Tsar Ivan III rejected the
oXer of the title of king from the Holy Roman Emperor, Russian monarchs understood
sovereignty in terms of empire. The word ‘empire’ carried several interrelated though
distinct connotations. First, empire signified imperial dominion or supreme power
unencumbered by other authority. Second, it implied imperial expansion, extensive
conquests, encompassing non-Russian lands. Third, it referred to the Christian empire,
the heritage of the Byzantine emperor as the defender of Orthodoxy. These meanings
were conflated and served to reinforce each other. The expansion of empire confirmed
the image of supreme power and justified the unlimited authority of the Russian
emperors.
Literature
Sunderland, Introduction: Steppe Building
This article by Sunderland discusses the centuries-long colonization of the southern
grasslands, known as the steppes. For a thousand years, the "forest peoples" (the
ancestors of modern Russians and Ukrainians) moved south to farm, trade, and build
forts, eventually changing the landscape entirely. What was once an open grassland
used by nomadic horsemen was transformed into agricultural fields and settled towns.
The author argues that this process should be viewed as a form of Russian imperialism,
even though many Russian historians prefer to call it "resettlement" or "internal
colonization". The colonization of the steppe was both a physical occupation and an
, imaginary one. It involved a diverse group of people, including peasants, soldiers, and
bureaucrats, but it also involved "inventing" the region in the minds of Russia's rulers. As
the Russian state grew stronger, its "guns, germs, and steel" allowed it to overtake and
eclipse the nomadic societies that had lived there for centuries. Interestingly, the
Russian government often treated its own Russian peasants with the same
"paternalism" and control as the non-Russian "aliens" they were conquering. This led to
a "complicated kind of imperialism" where state building and nation building were
almost impossible to separate.
Wortman, Introduction: Scenarios of Power
Richard Wortman introduces the idea that ceremonies and symbolic displays were a
central mechanism of Russian autocracy. He calls these staged performances
"scenarios of power," where each monarch acted as a "mythic hero" to justify their
unlimited authority. By lifting the monarch into a realm of the "sublime," these
ceremonies made it clear that the tsar was not subject to everyday human judgment.
Wortman argues that Russian monarchs relied on foreign symbols of power—borrowing
from Byzantium, Germany, or France—to set themselves above their subjects. The
article describes a shift between two major types of myths: the "European myth" and
the "National myth". Starting with Peter the Great, rulers followed the European myth,
presenting themselves as Western-style heroes who were bringing "civilization" to
Russia from the outside. However, after the assassination of Alexander II, later tsars like
Alexander III adopted a National myth, which emphasized the spiritual bond between
the tsar and the Russian people. These later rulers tried to show that their power came
from Russian traditions and the Orthodox Church. Regardless of the specific myth, the
primary goal was always to prevent the sharing of power, as any limit on the tsar’s
authority was seen as a path to "anarchy".
Kollmann, The Cap of Monomakh
Nancy Shields Kollmann explores the history and mythology of the Cap of Monomakh,
the most famous crown of the Russian tsars. To most Russians, the cap is a symbol of a
legendary link between Russia, ancient Rome, and Byzantium. According to a 16th-
century myth, the crown was a gift from a Byzantine emperor to a prince of Kiev, proving
that Moscow was the rightful heir to the Christian empire. However, the sources reveal
that this story is a historical "fabrication". In reality, the cap was likely a gift from the
Mongol Golden Horde in the 14th century and was originally a "fancy" Central Asian
skullcap. The article explains how the Russian authorities physically transformed the
object to hide its Eastern origins and make it look more "Russian" and "Christian". They
added sable fur, precious gems, and a pearl-tipped cross to the top of the golden
Mongol filigree. This was done because, by the late 15th century, Russian leaders
wanted to emphasize their Christian heritage rather than their past associations with
the Mongols. Despite its true origins, the Cap of Monomakh remained a "touchstone" of
legitimacy and holiness for centuries, and its shape was even imitated by later rulers
like Peter the Great. Today, it remains so powerful that a replica was even given to
President Vladimir Putin, showing its lasting evocative power.
Lecture: Empire in Eurasia: Russian imperial ambitions and the uses of the past
Cultural history is not primarily concerned with political, economic or military history. It,
instead, has a focus on culture, representation and discourse, with internal diversity
within the subject.
Anatomy of Empire: what are its distinguishing features?
The most common feature of empire is its ability to expand, and therefore the landmass
an empire holds. Therefore, there are spatial inequalities between the center and the
periphery.
Where are we? The Eurasian land mass
An important feature that describes the Eurasian land mass are biomes. A biome is the
largest geographic unit of life forms. The major biomes of Eurasia are: (1) the tundra,
mostly located north of the Arctic Circle, where vegetation consists mostly of lichen; (2)
the forest belt, which mostly occupies most of the northern half of Eurasia, between the
Arctic Circle, and consists of mostly Taiga, pine and spruce forests in the north, a mixed
forest, in the central area of Russia, around Moscow and places at similar latitude, and
the wooded steppe, a traditional area; and (3) the steppe, a vast plain stretching from
Hungary to Mongolia, with few trees but plentiful grass and bush. Historically speaking,
there is a tension between the people of the forest and the steppe: Russian people were
from the forest and concurred the people from the steppe. Those battles are collective
known as the ‘Tatar yoke’ (1237-1480). One of those battles, the Battle of Kulikovo
(1380), could be seen as a turning point, considering it began to shake oX the Tatar yoke
by Muscovy. It meant the end of the Mongolian reign of the steppe. Therefore, the
question remains what makes people ‘Russian’. The answer to that in simple: Russian
culture remained close with the wealth of the forest. Only when they began to feel
emancipated from total subordination to nature, could they fantasize about being
master of their own fate. Alongside the forests, rivers as the Dnieper and the Volga (and
their trade in forest products) also remained important from the nineth century
onwards.
The ‘forest and the ax’ in Russian culture
Russian land was as big as an ax could reach. The forest greeted the Russian at his birth
and attended him through all the stages of his life. In the nineteenth century, the idea
that the forest could be lost expanded; therefore, there came another resurgence of
forest importance in literature, poetry and general art.
Crafting an imperial culture
The rulers of Russia, mainly Prince Vladimir (980-1015), converted and adopted
Christian Orthodoxy – the variant developed following the split between Byzantium and
Rome – as a state religion after rejecting other religions. Judaism was rejected ‘as the
religion on a defeated people who had lost their state (to the Romans)’ and Islam was
rejected due to its prohibition on alcohol. As the chronicle explains: “drink is the joy of
the Russian people.”
,Source work: The Tale of the White Cowl
The Tale of the White Cowl serves as the cornerstone of Russian medieval ideology. It
originated in the late fifteenth century in Novgorod, with the goal of defending the
sovereignty of the Novgorodian church from encroachment by the Grand Duchy of
Muscovy. The story serves as a suitable founding myth to be the ‘new Rome’, since
there could ‘never be another Rome’ after the fall of the First (Rome) and Second Rome
(Byzantium). A key concept is the translation imperii (‘transfer of rule’): the idea that an
empire can be transferred metahistorically from place to place, with each inheriting the
mantle of the previous. It is therefore used to articulate ideology and justify imperial
ambitions.
The reign of Ivan IV
Ivan IV remains important to study; he is regarded as ‘one of the three advisors of Putin’,
alongside Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. Ivan IV is also known as Ivan the
Terrible (or Awe-Inspiring). He was the Grand Prince of Moscow from 1533 and the first
to be proclaimed Tsar (coming from Ceasar, another reference to the continuation of
the Third Rome) of Russia, from 1547. His reign saw the construction of a centrally
administered Russian state and the creation of an empire that included non-Slav
people. His reign marked by prolonged and largely unsuccessful wars against Sweden
and Poland.
After the death of his wife and advisors, Ivan became paranoid and suspicious, setting
him on his violent campaign, filled with terror. This state policy became known as
oprichnina, implemented between 1565 and 1572, including mass repression of the
boyars (Russian aristocracy), with public executions and confiscation of their land and
property. Ivan IV personally murdered, tortured and raped on mass scale; evidence for
his excesses include his own ‘Confession’.
The ‘greatness’ and likeliness of Ivan IV could be seen in the 1552 painting, ‘Blessed Be
the Host of The King of Heaven’. The iconography is religious, with approval of the divine.
Another celebration of the victory against the Khazans was the St. Basil’s Cathedral in
Moscow, Russia. It was also heavily described in chronicles in the rise of the Russian
land up until that point.
The historical features of the reign of Ivan IV are as follows: (a) centralization: Ivan aimed
to consolidate power under his direct control, diminishing the influence of the boyars
and other traditional elites; (b) use of terror: the oprichnina demonstrated the
willingness of Ivan IV to use extreme violence to enforce his will and eliminate perceived
opposition; (c) imperial ambitions: Ivan adopted the title of Tsar and sought to establish
Russia as a major power, often by force; (d) religious justification: Ivan presented
himself as a divinely ordained ruler, which was used to legitimize his absolute power,
and took on religious roles to further this image; (e) experimentation with power: Ivan
explored diXerent ways to understand and manifest his imperial power, such as creating
a state with the oprichnina from 1562-72; (f) territorial expansion and devastating
internal policies: ideal of a strong state combined with actions that undermined it.
,Legacy and reception of Ivan IV: Repin, Stalin, Putin
Repin painted ‘Ivan the Terrible and His Son Ivan on November 16, 1581’, inspired by the
assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881. Ivan had a bad temper and punished people
harshly. In 1581, his son Ivan Ivanovich died after a fight with his father. Some records
say Ivan the Terrible hit his son in anger, which caused his death. Other historians think
the son may have died from illness or another cause. The story became a myth because
of the famous painting Ivan the Terrible and His Son Ivan by Ilya Repin. The painting
shows Ivan holding his dying son, looking shocked and full of regret. It is very emotional
and memorable. Zhdanov paints another image of Ivan, and described his rule as
‘progressive, as he administered a blow to feudal reaction, facilitated the acceleration
of the historical process, and transformed Russia into a strong centralized Great Power’.
He notes a diXerence between recognizing the progressiveness of one historical
phenomenon and endorsing it. Stalin, thereafter, greenlit a lavish, three-part movie of
Ivan the Terrible, with new interpretations of the ‘progressive Ivan’. Given the war during
1944, the year this movie released, the reemergence of Ivan the Terrible could be seen
as great importance. It should be seen as ‘filming against’ the known narratives of Ivan.
In the Putin era, Ivan the Great once again served of great importance. In 2016, a
monument of Ivan was erected in Oryol, and in 2025, a nine-meter-tall statue was
inaugurated on ‘National Unity Day’ by an ultra-nationalist governor. Such positive
notions of Ivan IV should be seen as reemergence of Russian national identity, including
the icon of Orthodox Christianity – the cross. Therefore, political violence could be seen
as a part of Russia.
Recap and questions
The animating myths of Russian monarchy from the fifteenth to the late nineteenth
century associated the ruler and the elite with foreign images of political power. From
the formation of the monarchy in the fifteenth century, when Tsar Ivan III rejected the
oXer of the title of king from the Holy Roman Emperor, Russian monarchs understood
sovereignty in terms of empire. The word ‘empire’ carried several interrelated though
distinct connotations. First, empire signified imperial dominion or supreme power
unencumbered by other authority. Second, it implied imperial expansion, extensive
conquests, encompassing non-Russian lands. Third, it referred to the Christian empire,
the heritage of the Byzantine emperor as the defender of Orthodoxy. These meanings
were conflated and served to reinforce each other. The expansion of empire confirmed
the image of supreme power and justified the unlimited authority of the Russian
emperors.
Literature
Sunderland, Introduction: Steppe Building
This article by Sunderland discusses the centuries-long colonization of the southern
grasslands, known as the steppes. For a thousand years, the "forest peoples" (the
ancestors of modern Russians and Ukrainians) moved south to farm, trade, and build
forts, eventually changing the landscape entirely. What was once an open grassland
used by nomadic horsemen was transformed into agricultural fields and settled towns.
The author argues that this process should be viewed as a form of Russian imperialism,
even though many Russian historians prefer to call it "resettlement" or "internal
colonization". The colonization of the steppe was both a physical occupation and an
, imaginary one. It involved a diverse group of people, including peasants, soldiers, and
bureaucrats, but it also involved "inventing" the region in the minds of Russia's rulers. As
the Russian state grew stronger, its "guns, germs, and steel" allowed it to overtake and
eclipse the nomadic societies that had lived there for centuries. Interestingly, the
Russian government often treated its own Russian peasants with the same
"paternalism" and control as the non-Russian "aliens" they were conquering. This led to
a "complicated kind of imperialism" where state building and nation building were
almost impossible to separate.
Wortman, Introduction: Scenarios of Power
Richard Wortman introduces the idea that ceremonies and symbolic displays were a
central mechanism of Russian autocracy. He calls these staged performances
"scenarios of power," where each monarch acted as a "mythic hero" to justify their
unlimited authority. By lifting the monarch into a realm of the "sublime," these
ceremonies made it clear that the tsar was not subject to everyday human judgment.
Wortman argues that Russian monarchs relied on foreign symbols of power—borrowing
from Byzantium, Germany, or France—to set themselves above their subjects. The
article describes a shift between two major types of myths: the "European myth" and
the "National myth". Starting with Peter the Great, rulers followed the European myth,
presenting themselves as Western-style heroes who were bringing "civilization" to
Russia from the outside. However, after the assassination of Alexander II, later tsars like
Alexander III adopted a National myth, which emphasized the spiritual bond between
the tsar and the Russian people. These later rulers tried to show that their power came
from Russian traditions and the Orthodox Church. Regardless of the specific myth, the
primary goal was always to prevent the sharing of power, as any limit on the tsar’s
authority was seen as a path to "anarchy".
Kollmann, The Cap of Monomakh
Nancy Shields Kollmann explores the history and mythology of the Cap of Monomakh,
the most famous crown of the Russian tsars. To most Russians, the cap is a symbol of a
legendary link between Russia, ancient Rome, and Byzantium. According to a 16th-
century myth, the crown was a gift from a Byzantine emperor to a prince of Kiev, proving
that Moscow was the rightful heir to the Christian empire. However, the sources reveal
that this story is a historical "fabrication". In reality, the cap was likely a gift from the
Mongol Golden Horde in the 14th century and was originally a "fancy" Central Asian
skullcap. The article explains how the Russian authorities physically transformed the
object to hide its Eastern origins and make it look more "Russian" and "Christian". They
added sable fur, precious gems, and a pearl-tipped cross to the top of the golden
Mongol filigree. This was done because, by the late 15th century, Russian leaders
wanted to emphasize their Christian heritage rather than their past associations with
the Mongols. Despite its true origins, the Cap of Monomakh remained a "touchstone" of
legitimacy and holiness for centuries, and its shape was even imitated by later rulers
like Peter the Great. Today, it remains so powerful that a replica was even given to
President Vladimir Putin, showing its lasting evocative power.
