Overview
• Common understanding of intersubjectivity based on idea of shared knowledge
- The phenomenological position of Alfred Schutz
- The technical methodology of Conversation Analysis
• But what is the ‘subjectivity’ in intersubjectivity?
- Subjectivity fundamentally relational
- What seems private is actually social
• How this topic relates to themes of the module
- the centrality of relationships
- the move away from a focus on the individual mind
- the role of communication in interaction
Identity and self are not from internal psychological characteristics but produced form
interaction with others.
Avoid using Wikipedia for definitions and google – use readings.
Proper definition - Intersubjectivity refers to shared understanding. Drawing on the
philosophical notion of subjectivity (i.e., that meaning is necessarily colored by one's
experiences and biases), intersubjectivity recognizes that meaning is based on one's position
of reference and is socially mediated through interaction. In other words, knowing is not
simply the product of individual minds in isolation. (Anderson, 2012)
Asks questions about something that seems fundamentally self-evident, that you
have private experience and that self-conciseness is isolated mind separate from
others.
‘Understanding’, ‘meaning’ and ‘social mediation’
- Try to think of and part of your life in which these are not relevant
- So we need to be able to manage these: to achieve understanding (etc.) which is
shared, and held in common
‘Not…isolated minds in action’ – a more radical implication
Intersubjectivity: ‘Not isolated minds in action’
Very difficult to grasp
- We are led to idea of a personal and individual mind by virtue of physiology
- Our conscious awareness seems to be behind our eyes
- Our personal awareness of the world feels private, and isolated from the
knowing of others
Be prepared for this assumption to be challenged
But first, approaches to the technical problem of maintaining intersubjective
knowledge
Intersubjectivity as technical problem
Alfred Schutz’s (philosophical) writings on intersubjectivity
He asks: how can intersubjective understanding occur?
For example, with regard to common knowledge of a physical object in the world
, - one person's perception of the object will be different to any other's simply
because each act of perceiving will necessarily happen in different physical
locations,
- hence, varying perspectives, not common perspectives
- Also: personal inclinations and motivation for looking at the object will vary
between the two percipients.
In what sense, then, can we talk of 'common knowledge' of the 'same' states of
affairs?
How do we have a shared understanding of the world
We have to step back from this assumption, we are significantly embedded in
relationships, the notion of an isolated mind becomes less useful for thinking about
the self and identity and as a basis for understanding intersubjectivity.
Negotiation of meaning and interaction.
Inversibility is not just a topic you can examine, it has impacts on the way we think
about what we are as a social being – more radical. Not just isolated minds in
interaction, we are a point of consciousness in a universe, and this point is behind
your mind in your head – easy to take this to say we are more separate than we are
connected.
Move away from privacy
We have private minds, private separate self not connected to the people with
whom we interact – challenge this.
How can intersubjective knowledge occur, how do we know we have so much in
common that we know we can interact with one another without having a set of
understandings of what is going on
We are occupying different spaces, our perceptions are different
Different physical spaces, and likely to have different orientations.
o Water bottle on table – stance and attitude to it will be different to lectuerer
and student, so how can we talk of common understanding.
Schutz can explain this.
Schutz and Luckmann (1967) argue that this dilemma always remains abstract, never
comes into focus of our attention, or theoretical because of the operation of two
‘idealizations’, or sets of commonly available assumptions and procedures, by which
these problems are practically negotiated.
The idealization of the interchangeability of standpoints – assumption one
‘If I were there, where he is now, then I would experience things in the same
perspective, distance, and reach as he does. And, if he were here where I am now,
he would experience things from the same perspective as I.’ (Schutz and Luckmann,
1967: 60)
- assumption of stable objective world with fixed properties
- a negotiation, and attribution, a political act
- Implicitly assume the world will remain stable – don’t think next time I walk will
the world be beneath my feet
The second assumption: The idealization of congruence of relevance systems.
May assume that people have different orientations to a thing, but if we have the
same set of relevance’s or we could share them, then those orientations would be
shared.