, 1. Introduction
Within academic debates on religion and violence, a binary framing tends to dominate. On the
one hand, religion is portrayed as an exceptional source of threat requiring control; on the other,
it is defended as a potential instrument for peace..1 According to religious studies scholar Atalia
Omer, this fixation produces a problematic ‘feedback loop’ in which religion is no longer
understood on its own terms, but primarily evaluated through external policy concerns.2 To
move beyond this binary debate, she argues that religion must be analyzed in relation to power.3
Bringing power into the analysis shifts attention to the role of the state. As religious
scholar John Carlson and theologian William Cavanaugh similarly argue, the current debate
often delegitimizes religion as ‘irrational’ while leaving secularism itself largely unexamined.4
This omission obscures the workings of secular violence, which is typically framed as ‘rational’
and ‘necessary’ and is primarily exercised by states through their monopoly on violence.5 By
constructing religious violence as ‘irrational’ and ‘illegitimate’, states reinforce their own
authority and strengthen the legitimacy of the secular order.6
Secular state violence, however, does not operate solely through direct coercion (“hard
power”), but also through more subtle forms of ideological influence (“soft power”).7 When
such ideology is internalized, state objectives can be achieved without overt physical force. To
better understand the relationship between religion and violence, Cavanaugh therefore asks
1
Atalia Omer, “Religion and the Study of Peace: Practice without Reflection,” Religions 12, no. 12 (2021): 2,
https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12121069.
2
Omer, “Religion and the Study of Peace,” 7.
3
Omer, “Religion and the Study of Peace,” 13.
4
Omer, “Religion and the Study of Peace,” 9; J.D. Carlson, “Religion and violence: Coming to terms with terms,”
in The Blackwell Companion to Religion and Violence, ed. A.R. Murphy (Blackwell Publishing, 2015), 12; W.T.
Cavanaugh, “The myth of religious violence,” in The Blackwell Companion to Religion and Violence, ed. A.R.
Murphy (Blackwell Publishing, 2015), 31-32.
5
Carlson, “Religion and Violence,” 13-16; Paul R. Powers, Religion and violence: A Religious Studies Approach
(Routledge, 2020), 34.
6
Powers, Religion and Violence, 34.
7
Malory Nye, “Race and Religion: Postcolonial Formations of Power and Whiteness,” Method and theory in the
study of religion 31, no. 3 (2019): 222, https://doi.org/10.1163/15700682-12341444; Kai Shmushko, “Buddhism,
An Urban Village and Cultural Soft Power: An Ethnography of Buddhist Practitioners in Wutong,” Entangled
Religions 13, no. 1 (2022): 5, https://doi.org/10.46586/er.13.2022.9709.
1
Within academic debates on religion and violence, a binary framing tends to dominate. On the
one hand, religion is portrayed as an exceptional source of threat requiring control; on the other,
it is defended as a potential instrument for peace..1 According to religious studies scholar Atalia
Omer, this fixation produces a problematic ‘feedback loop’ in which religion is no longer
understood on its own terms, but primarily evaluated through external policy concerns.2 To
move beyond this binary debate, she argues that religion must be analyzed in relation to power.3
Bringing power into the analysis shifts attention to the role of the state. As religious
scholar John Carlson and theologian William Cavanaugh similarly argue, the current debate
often delegitimizes religion as ‘irrational’ while leaving secularism itself largely unexamined.4
This omission obscures the workings of secular violence, which is typically framed as ‘rational’
and ‘necessary’ and is primarily exercised by states through their monopoly on violence.5 By
constructing religious violence as ‘irrational’ and ‘illegitimate’, states reinforce their own
authority and strengthen the legitimacy of the secular order.6
Secular state violence, however, does not operate solely through direct coercion (“hard
power”), but also through more subtle forms of ideological influence (“soft power”).7 When
such ideology is internalized, state objectives can be achieved without overt physical force. To
better understand the relationship between religion and violence, Cavanaugh therefore asks
1
Atalia Omer, “Religion and the Study of Peace: Practice without Reflection,” Religions 12, no. 12 (2021): 2,
https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12121069.
2
Omer, “Religion and the Study of Peace,” 7.
3
Omer, “Religion and the Study of Peace,” 13.
4
Omer, “Religion and the Study of Peace,” 9; J.D. Carlson, “Religion and violence: Coming to terms with terms,”
in The Blackwell Companion to Religion and Violence, ed. A.R. Murphy (Blackwell Publishing, 2015), 12; W.T.
Cavanaugh, “The myth of religious violence,” in The Blackwell Companion to Religion and Violence, ed. A.R.
Murphy (Blackwell Publishing, 2015), 31-32.
5
Carlson, “Religion and Violence,” 13-16; Paul R. Powers, Religion and violence: A Religious Studies Approach
(Routledge, 2020), 34.
6
Powers, Religion and Violence, 34.
7
Malory Nye, “Race and Religion: Postcolonial Formations of Power and Whiteness,” Method and theory in the
study of religion 31, no. 3 (2019): 222, https://doi.org/10.1163/15700682-12341444; Kai Shmushko, “Buddhism,
An Urban Village and Cultural Soft Power: An Ethnography of Buddhist Practitioners in Wutong,” Entangled
Religions 13, no. 1 (2022): 5, https://doi.org/10.46586/er.13.2022.9709.
1
