Evaluate the interpretation and explain which you think is more convincing as an explanation of
Napoleon’s military ability.
Both of the sources present a variety of arguments considering Napoleon’s military ability. However,
Passage A mostly provides a critique of what is widely considered Napoleon’s greatest defining
characteristics such as his fast paced movement based tactics, by suggesting the success may be due
to other pre-existing developments in infrastructure and army reforms. In contrast passage B
represents the popularised view of Napoleon as an excellent tactician aided by the French
organisation of the army’s into corps. Despite this it is important to note that both extracts do
balance their arguments, for example passage A praises Napoleon’s personal touch, and passage B
recognises his strategical weaknesses, which therefore strengthens both their arguments as they are
less one sided.
Passage A puts forward the argument that Napoleon inherits and is “ profited by the advances in
manufacturing, population and road building,” which had been slowly developing in the old regime.
Rothberg suggests that instead of being attributed to Napoleon, his success is due to the
infostructure that was previously in place, as well as the population size, and the growth trend. This
is supported by the records of the St. Etienne workshops; In 1809 the factories mass produced
97,000 handguns compared to a mere 26,000 in the previous year. These statistics show an upwards
spike in production to meet Napoleons demands and add validity to the argument that he benefited
as a result of the increasing capacity for mass production. However, this “profit” that Rothberg
describes is fairly limited especially when we look at the population size that he claims had a great
benefit to Napoleon. Levve en mass in theory recruited a great number of men reaching a peak of
about 1,500,000 in September 1794. However Napolean, particularly in the revolutionary wars did
not rely on a large number of men. At the battle of Lotarno napoleon had a mere 1,200 mean
against the Austrian 3,000, consequentially the argument of passage A is flawed, weakening how
convincing it comes across as. However, although there are exceptions to the claims of passage A,
Napoleon did profit from a large number of conscripts across the whole period, the argument is still
valid and partially convincing that parts of Napoleons success was situational and part of an
upwards trend in industrialisation, rather than being a result of his own military ability.
Passage A’s criticisms of napoleon are made more convincing by Rothenberg’s acknowledgment of
Napoleon as a “charismatic genius” who “transformed and made more powerful” the existing
military systems. This illuminates napoleons personal charm and personality as the defining factor of
his leadership. This argument is reinforced by Wellingtons explanation of napoleon as ‘his presence
on the field’ making ‘the difference of forty thousand men.’ Wellingtons quote is a powerful example
of Napoleon’s effect as an inspirational leader, which the passage suggests is the limit to his success.
Consequentially this recognition of napoleons personal successes add weight to the overall
argument, as Rothberg is not critical of all aspects of Napoleon’s military leadership.
In contrast, Black is far less critical of Napoleon’s military ability and compliments the “French
organisational system and command structures” as vital to his “characteristic rapidity of strategy and
tactical movement.” This view is convincing as it is evident at Austerlitz where Napoleon relies on
both he week right flank to lure the Prussian army forward, and the crucial timing of Davout’s third
corps reinforcing these troops. Each coups was a self contained small army of roughly 25,000 men,
complete with cavalry and artillery, and therefore capable of fighting alone if required.
Consequentially, the example of Austerlitz help to affirm the validity of Blacks argument that
Napoleon was an excellent tactician and strategist deserving “high praise for having prepared the
effective military machine that his victories revel.” However as passage A argues, Napoleon does
inherit structures from the revolution and ancient regime, being “the product of historical
Napoleon’s military ability.
Both of the sources present a variety of arguments considering Napoleon’s military ability. However,
Passage A mostly provides a critique of what is widely considered Napoleon’s greatest defining
characteristics such as his fast paced movement based tactics, by suggesting the success may be due
to other pre-existing developments in infrastructure and army reforms. In contrast passage B
represents the popularised view of Napoleon as an excellent tactician aided by the French
organisation of the army’s into corps. Despite this it is important to note that both extracts do
balance their arguments, for example passage A praises Napoleon’s personal touch, and passage B
recognises his strategical weaknesses, which therefore strengthens both their arguments as they are
less one sided.
Passage A puts forward the argument that Napoleon inherits and is “ profited by the advances in
manufacturing, population and road building,” which had been slowly developing in the old regime.
Rothberg suggests that instead of being attributed to Napoleon, his success is due to the
infostructure that was previously in place, as well as the population size, and the growth trend. This
is supported by the records of the St. Etienne workshops; In 1809 the factories mass produced
97,000 handguns compared to a mere 26,000 in the previous year. These statistics show an upwards
spike in production to meet Napoleons demands and add validity to the argument that he benefited
as a result of the increasing capacity for mass production. However, this “profit” that Rothberg
describes is fairly limited especially when we look at the population size that he claims had a great
benefit to Napoleon. Levve en mass in theory recruited a great number of men reaching a peak of
about 1,500,000 in September 1794. However Napolean, particularly in the revolutionary wars did
not rely on a large number of men. At the battle of Lotarno napoleon had a mere 1,200 mean
against the Austrian 3,000, consequentially the argument of passage A is flawed, weakening how
convincing it comes across as. However, although there are exceptions to the claims of passage A,
Napoleon did profit from a large number of conscripts across the whole period, the argument is still
valid and partially convincing that parts of Napoleons success was situational and part of an
upwards trend in industrialisation, rather than being a result of his own military ability.
Passage A’s criticisms of napoleon are made more convincing by Rothenberg’s acknowledgment of
Napoleon as a “charismatic genius” who “transformed and made more powerful” the existing
military systems. This illuminates napoleons personal charm and personality as the defining factor of
his leadership. This argument is reinforced by Wellingtons explanation of napoleon as ‘his presence
on the field’ making ‘the difference of forty thousand men.’ Wellingtons quote is a powerful example
of Napoleon’s effect as an inspirational leader, which the passage suggests is the limit to his success.
Consequentially this recognition of napoleons personal successes add weight to the overall
argument, as Rothberg is not critical of all aspects of Napoleon’s military leadership.
In contrast, Black is far less critical of Napoleon’s military ability and compliments the “French
organisational system and command structures” as vital to his “characteristic rapidity of strategy and
tactical movement.” This view is convincing as it is evident at Austerlitz where Napoleon relies on
both he week right flank to lure the Prussian army forward, and the crucial timing of Davout’s third
corps reinforcing these troops. Each coups was a self contained small army of roughly 25,000 men,
complete with cavalry and artillery, and therefore capable of fighting alone if required.
Consequentially, the example of Austerlitz help to affirm the validity of Blacks argument that
Napoleon was an excellent tactician and strategist deserving “high praise for having prepared the
effective military machine that his victories revel.” However as passage A argues, Napoleon does
inherit structures from the revolution and ancient regime, being “the product of historical
