Summary of the material for the final exam (2021) for Introduction to International Organisations
(IIOs). INCLUDES notes from Diana Panke’s article “The institutional design of the United Nations
General Assembly: an effective equalizer?” (Total: 10 pages).
1
“The institutional design of the United Nations General Assembly: an
effective equalizer?” by Diana Panke - Notes
Table of Contents
Abstract 2
Introduction 2
The UNGA: Institutional Design and Real-World Differences 3
Examining Variation in the Equalizing Effects of Institutional Design 4
Conclusion 8
, 2
Abstract
Most International Organizations (IOs) are based on the principle of state equality, granting all
member states the same formal rights. HOWEVER, states differ immensely concerning their power
capacities and size.
➔ The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) combines an equalizing institutional design
with a large very heterogeneous membership. The strength of the equalizing effect varies
across stages of the policy cycle:
◆ Weakest in the negotiation stage.
◆ Medium strength during the institutional design of IOs.
◆ Strongest in the final decision-making stage.
While power and capacity differences matter, larger powerful states are not systematically better off
throughout the entire policy cycle.
Introduction
IOs are often based on the principle of equality of sovereign states (one-state, one-vote principle)
➔ All states carry the same formal weight when deciding on international norms, same
obligations when complying with international norms, same formal rights concerning
co-sponsorship, tabling draft norms and making their voices heard during international
negotiations.
➔ The UNGA’s institutional setup strongly expresses the principle of equality of members.
Every state has the same rights and obligations concerning:
◆ Agenda setting in negotiations.
◆ Participating in the negotiations in committees and the GA.
◆ Voting on the final version of the resolution.
Nevertheless, the 193 member states are very diverse in power- and size-related capacities.
Which assessment is more accurate to answer whether institutional design can mitigate power- and
size-related differences between IO member states and to what extent.
➔ Rational-Choice Approaches: Assume that ultimately institutional design effects are limited.
➔ Institutionalist Approaches: Attribute great power to the institutional design upon the
behaviour of actors.
The UNGA: The international arena with the broadest membership and the greatest heterogeneity
among the states, while the members are all formally equal.
IOs like all other types of political systems need to transform inputs into outputs.
➔ Policy Cycle: A useful heuristic that allows to analytically capture how political systems
operate to transform inputs into outputs. There are three stages in an IO’s policy cycle that,
through institutional design, affect a state to some degree:
1. Agenda setting stages (medium strength).
2. Negotiation stages (weakest)
3. Decision-making stages (strongest).
, 3
This study uses >100 semi-structured and triangulated interviews with national diplomats from large
and small, rich and poor countries working in New York and provides empirical insights into the
operation of the UNGA.
➔ It illustrates that the equalizing effect of IOs institutional design is not equally strong
throughout the policy process.
➔ Most importantly, the institutional design that is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of states does indeed affect negotiation dynamics.
➔ The strength of the equalizing effect varies across stages of the UNGA policy cycle.
While power- and size-related capacity differences matter, larger, more powerful states are not
systematically better off in all stages of the policy cycle, and smaller, poorer states are not worse off
throughout the policy cycle.
The UNGA: Institutional Design and Real-World Differences
International Legal Sovereignty: Where states recognize each other as equals on the international
level, can be found in the composition of and decision-making mechanisms in IOs.
The UN: An IO created in 1945 by 51 states to maintain international peace, develop and sustain
friendly relations among sovereign states, foster social and humanitarian progress, and promote
human rights.
➔ The UN Charter: The founding treaty that outlines the basic institutional design.
➔ The UNGA: The core decision-making body of the UN (one of the UN’s six principal organs,
next to the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Secretariat, the
Trusteeship Council, and the International Court of Justice).
◆ The UNGA expresses the principle of international equality of states most strongly.
◆ The institutional arena in which the 193 member states decide on resolutions.
◆ All states have equal rights concerning participation in agenda-setting, negotiation,
and decision-making stages of the policy cycle.
◆ A consensus norm guides the deliberations in all stages, but each state has the right to
call for a formal vote (irrespective of its size) in the decision-making stage. When it
comes to voting, each state has one vote – irrespective of its size.
Theoretical approaches to negotiations differ on their ontological assumptions about the relationship
between institutions and actors.
“Old Institutionalism”: Neo-Institutionalism: Actor-Centred Approaches (Rational
Institutions are ↔ Institutions structure ↔ Choice-Based Game Theory): Actors are
constitutive for actor but do not determine ontological priors; with a given set of
behaviour. actor behaviour. The preferences, actors maximize their benefits
equalizing effect of while minimizing costs (institutions
institutional rules function as arenas for interaction and
can be mediated by have regulative properties, which,
actor properties. depending on the cost-benefit
calculations, actors can overpower).
IO institutional design Expect a weak effect The strength of an institutional design’s
has a strong equalizing over all three stages. equalizing effect is mediated by actor
effect over all three stages properties in all three stages.
of IO policy cycles.
(IIOs). INCLUDES notes from Diana Panke’s article “The institutional design of the United Nations
General Assembly: an effective equalizer?” (Total: 10 pages).
1
“The institutional design of the United Nations General Assembly: an
effective equalizer?” by Diana Panke - Notes
Table of Contents
Abstract 2
Introduction 2
The UNGA: Institutional Design and Real-World Differences 3
Examining Variation in the Equalizing Effects of Institutional Design 4
Conclusion 8
, 2
Abstract
Most International Organizations (IOs) are based on the principle of state equality, granting all
member states the same formal rights. HOWEVER, states differ immensely concerning their power
capacities and size.
➔ The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) combines an equalizing institutional design
with a large very heterogeneous membership. The strength of the equalizing effect varies
across stages of the policy cycle:
◆ Weakest in the negotiation stage.
◆ Medium strength during the institutional design of IOs.
◆ Strongest in the final decision-making stage.
While power and capacity differences matter, larger powerful states are not systematically better off
throughout the entire policy cycle.
Introduction
IOs are often based on the principle of equality of sovereign states (one-state, one-vote principle)
➔ All states carry the same formal weight when deciding on international norms, same
obligations when complying with international norms, same formal rights concerning
co-sponsorship, tabling draft norms and making their voices heard during international
negotiations.
➔ The UNGA’s institutional setup strongly expresses the principle of equality of members.
Every state has the same rights and obligations concerning:
◆ Agenda setting in negotiations.
◆ Participating in the negotiations in committees and the GA.
◆ Voting on the final version of the resolution.
Nevertheless, the 193 member states are very diverse in power- and size-related capacities.
Which assessment is more accurate to answer whether institutional design can mitigate power- and
size-related differences between IO member states and to what extent.
➔ Rational-Choice Approaches: Assume that ultimately institutional design effects are limited.
➔ Institutionalist Approaches: Attribute great power to the institutional design upon the
behaviour of actors.
The UNGA: The international arena with the broadest membership and the greatest heterogeneity
among the states, while the members are all formally equal.
IOs like all other types of political systems need to transform inputs into outputs.
➔ Policy Cycle: A useful heuristic that allows to analytically capture how political systems
operate to transform inputs into outputs. There are three stages in an IO’s policy cycle that,
through institutional design, affect a state to some degree:
1. Agenda setting stages (medium strength).
2. Negotiation stages (weakest)
3. Decision-making stages (strongest).
, 3
This study uses >100 semi-structured and triangulated interviews with national diplomats from large
and small, rich and poor countries working in New York and provides empirical insights into the
operation of the UNGA.
➔ It illustrates that the equalizing effect of IOs institutional design is not equally strong
throughout the policy process.
➔ Most importantly, the institutional design that is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of states does indeed affect negotiation dynamics.
➔ The strength of the equalizing effect varies across stages of the UNGA policy cycle.
While power- and size-related capacity differences matter, larger, more powerful states are not
systematically better off in all stages of the policy cycle, and smaller, poorer states are not worse off
throughout the policy cycle.
The UNGA: Institutional Design and Real-World Differences
International Legal Sovereignty: Where states recognize each other as equals on the international
level, can be found in the composition of and decision-making mechanisms in IOs.
The UN: An IO created in 1945 by 51 states to maintain international peace, develop and sustain
friendly relations among sovereign states, foster social and humanitarian progress, and promote
human rights.
➔ The UN Charter: The founding treaty that outlines the basic institutional design.
➔ The UNGA: The core decision-making body of the UN (one of the UN’s six principal organs,
next to the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Secretariat, the
Trusteeship Council, and the International Court of Justice).
◆ The UNGA expresses the principle of international equality of states most strongly.
◆ The institutional arena in which the 193 member states decide on resolutions.
◆ All states have equal rights concerning participation in agenda-setting, negotiation,
and decision-making stages of the policy cycle.
◆ A consensus norm guides the deliberations in all stages, but each state has the right to
call for a formal vote (irrespective of its size) in the decision-making stage. When it
comes to voting, each state has one vote – irrespective of its size.
Theoretical approaches to negotiations differ on their ontological assumptions about the relationship
between institutions and actors.
“Old Institutionalism”: Neo-Institutionalism: Actor-Centred Approaches (Rational
Institutions are ↔ Institutions structure ↔ Choice-Based Game Theory): Actors are
constitutive for actor but do not determine ontological priors; with a given set of
behaviour. actor behaviour. The preferences, actors maximize their benefits
equalizing effect of while minimizing costs (institutions
institutional rules function as arenas for interaction and
can be mediated by have regulative properties, which,
actor properties. depending on the cost-benefit
calculations, actors can overpower).
IO institutional design Expect a weak effect The strength of an institutional design’s
has a strong equalizing over all three stages. equalizing effect is mediated by actor
effect over all three stages properties in all three stages.
of IO policy cycles.
