PRRD’S INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY AND OTHER POLICY THRUST
Article II, section VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides: “The State shall pursue an
independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall
be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-
determination.” In practice, successive Philippine presidents rarely labeled Philippine foreign
policy as “independent,” albeit occasionally mentioning the term as part of their rhetoric.
However, President Rodrigo Duterte repeatedly stated that his administration will pursue an
“independent foreign policy”, but giving no definite meaning to the term made it a subject to
various discussions. In a televised interview last 3 April 2017, Ambassador of the Philippines to
China, Jose Santiago Sta. Romana provided thus far the most thorough explanation of an
independent foreign policy coming from an official of the Duterte administration.
Ambassador Sta. Romana noted that the emerging power shift in the Asia-Pacific region holds
the larger context of Philippine foreign policy. “What we are seeing right now,” Sta. Romana
argued, “is the rise of a power in Asia and we are seeing the decline of the dominant power that
used to dominate the region since the end of World War II.” Ambassador Sta. Romana identified
the three major tenets of Duterte’s independent foreign policy. First, in an apparent reference to
one of the President’s speeches during his state visit to China, the “separation of Philippine
foreign policy from the US.” Sta. Romana pointed out that it “does not mean that we totally cut
off from the US.” Rather, it means lessening Manila’s dependence on Washington while
maintaining “historic alliance” with America. Second, the “improvement of relations with
China.” Emphasizing that this does not mean that the Philippines should shift to an alliance with
China, the Ambassador argued that strengthening ties with Beijing would focus on economic
cooperation while exploring ways of lowering tensions over the two countries’ maritime
disputes. Lastly, “the improvement of relations with non-traditional partners,” including Russia,
Japan, and India, while striving to “maintain the centrality of ASEAN.”
Arguably, the another plank of the independent foreign policy is part of this objective of
offsetting risks. Meeting his Japanese counterpart thrice in less than a year, Duterte has sent an
unmistakable signal that he intends to further enhance the strategic partnership between Manila
and Tokyo. In addition, Duterte's overtures to Moscow could be seen as part of broader attempt
in diversifying security relationships.
Ambassador Sta. Romana admitted: "Forging an independent foreign policy will not be an easy
task." Indeed, implementing such a foreign policy which is anchored on a hedging approach,
which goal is to acquire as many returns from different powers as possible while simultaneously
seeking to offset longer-term risks, requires the necessary skill and foresight in balancing
competing domestic and foreign interests in an unpredictable regional security environment.
, IV. A decade-old alliance
Although the Philippines gained independence from the US in 1946, it continued to host a
large number of US troops. It became a forward deployment base for projection of US power in
Asia, making it completely dependent on the US for its defense.
US military presence in the country also ensured direct US interference in Manila's domestic
affairs. Washington readily propped up the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos for 30 years,
supporting his efforts to eradicate a Maoist uprising.
His regime collapsed in 1986, and with the subsequent end of the Cold War shortly after, there
was a growing clamor for the removal of American bases in the Philippines. Nationalist
elements, which dominated the Philippine Senate, along with progressive civil society groups,
portrayed the US military presence as anachronistic and a strategic liability, which exposed the
country to potential hostile action by enemies of the US and prevented it from becoming fully
independent.
Though the bases brought significant economic benefits, including annual military aid,
Washington's collaboration with the Marcos dictatorship as well as crimes by American
servicemen on Philippine soil only added to the new nationalist fervor. Following the collapse of
the Soviet Union, both sides agreed to remove large-scale US bases in the Philippines.
Soon, however, it became increasingly clear that the Philippines, long accustomed to relying on
the US defense umbrella, was unprepared to stand on its own. In 1995, China took over
Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in the strategic Spratly islands archipelago in the South China
Sea, which is a disputed territory between several countries in the region. Since then, the Chinese
authorities have not only built infrastructure on the reef but also forcibly claimed another island
in the area.
Fearing the growing Chinese military presence in the region, in 1998 the Philippine government
decided to bring US troops back to its territory through the negotiation of a VFA, which provides
the legal framework for the large-scale entry and rotational stationing of US soldiers.
Since then, the US and the Philippines have conducted regular joint war games and naval drills
and deepened cooperation on coastguard training. The US has also expanded defense aid to as
well as reiterated its commitment to assist the Philippines in the event of a conflict in the South
China Sea, including attacks by Chinese militia forces against Philippine troops and vessels in
the area.
Article II, section VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides: “The State shall pursue an
independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall
be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-
determination.” In practice, successive Philippine presidents rarely labeled Philippine foreign
policy as “independent,” albeit occasionally mentioning the term as part of their rhetoric.
However, President Rodrigo Duterte repeatedly stated that his administration will pursue an
“independent foreign policy”, but giving no definite meaning to the term made it a subject to
various discussions. In a televised interview last 3 April 2017, Ambassador of the Philippines to
China, Jose Santiago Sta. Romana provided thus far the most thorough explanation of an
independent foreign policy coming from an official of the Duterte administration.
Ambassador Sta. Romana noted that the emerging power shift in the Asia-Pacific region holds
the larger context of Philippine foreign policy. “What we are seeing right now,” Sta. Romana
argued, “is the rise of a power in Asia and we are seeing the decline of the dominant power that
used to dominate the region since the end of World War II.” Ambassador Sta. Romana identified
the three major tenets of Duterte’s independent foreign policy. First, in an apparent reference to
one of the President’s speeches during his state visit to China, the “separation of Philippine
foreign policy from the US.” Sta. Romana pointed out that it “does not mean that we totally cut
off from the US.” Rather, it means lessening Manila’s dependence on Washington while
maintaining “historic alliance” with America. Second, the “improvement of relations with
China.” Emphasizing that this does not mean that the Philippines should shift to an alliance with
China, the Ambassador argued that strengthening ties with Beijing would focus on economic
cooperation while exploring ways of lowering tensions over the two countries’ maritime
disputes. Lastly, “the improvement of relations with non-traditional partners,” including Russia,
Japan, and India, while striving to “maintain the centrality of ASEAN.”
Arguably, the another plank of the independent foreign policy is part of this objective of
offsetting risks. Meeting his Japanese counterpart thrice in less than a year, Duterte has sent an
unmistakable signal that he intends to further enhance the strategic partnership between Manila
and Tokyo. In addition, Duterte's overtures to Moscow could be seen as part of broader attempt
in diversifying security relationships.
Ambassador Sta. Romana admitted: "Forging an independent foreign policy will not be an easy
task." Indeed, implementing such a foreign policy which is anchored on a hedging approach,
which goal is to acquire as many returns from different powers as possible while simultaneously
seeking to offset longer-term risks, requires the necessary skill and foresight in balancing
competing domestic and foreign interests in an unpredictable regional security environment.
, IV. A decade-old alliance
Although the Philippines gained independence from the US in 1946, it continued to host a
large number of US troops. It became a forward deployment base for projection of US power in
Asia, making it completely dependent on the US for its defense.
US military presence in the country also ensured direct US interference in Manila's domestic
affairs. Washington readily propped up the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos for 30 years,
supporting his efforts to eradicate a Maoist uprising.
His regime collapsed in 1986, and with the subsequent end of the Cold War shortly after, there
was a growing clamor for the removal of American bases in the Philippines. Nationalist
elements, which dominated the Philippine Senate, along with progressive civil society groups,
portrayed the US military presence as anachronistic and a strategic liability, which exposed the
country to potential hostile action by enemies of the US and prevented it from becoming fully
independent.
Though the bases brought significant economic benefits, including annual military aid,
Washington's collaboration with the Marcos dictatorship as well as crimes by American
servicemen on Philippine soil only added to the new nationalist fervor. Following the collapse of
the Soviet Union, both sides agreed to remove large-scale US bases in the Philippines.
Soon, however, it became increasingly clear that the Philippines, long accustomed to relying on
the US defense umbrella, was unprepared to stand on its own. In 1995, China took over
Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in the strategic Spratly islands archipelago in the South China
Sea, which is a disputed territory between several countries in the region. Since then, the Chinese
authorities have not only built infrastructure on the reef but also forcibly claimed another island
in the area.
Fearing the growing Chinese military presence in the region, in 1998 the Philippine government
decided to bring US troops back to its territory through the negotiation of a VFA, which provides
the legal framework for the large-scale entry and rotational stationing of US soldiers.
Since then, the US and the Philippines have conducted regular joint war games and naval drills
and deepened cooperation on coastguard training. The US has also expanded defense aid to as
well as reiterated its commitment to assist the Philippines in the event of a conflict in the South
China Sea, including attacks by Chinese militia forces against Philippine troops and vessels in
the area.
