Week 5- Japan’s Road to War
A Choice or Necessity?
● Introduction: Japan’s decisions for War(s)
○ Three Questions:
■ Were Japan’s decisions for war acts of madness leading to inevitable
defeat?
■ Was the war as it appeared at the end of 1941 what the Japanese
wanted?
■ What accounted for the remarkable string of Japanese successes on land
and sea in the first 6 months of the war. Were these successes of
Blitzkrieg or something else?
● Personalities: How Important were They?
○ Emperor Hirohito
○ Prime Minister Konoe
○ Prime Minister Tojo
○ Amry Chief/ War Minister Hajimi
○ Navy Chief Yamamoto
○ Of course, these individuals were important, but the decision making process
was crucial: Liaison Conferences and Imperial Conferences; influence of the
military and the role of concensus
● Japan and Germany: Similar but not…
○ Both Japan and Germant shared broadly similar paths of state development and
ambitions
○ Both “new” nations: Germany born in 1871; Japan developed modern institutions
starting in the 1860s (Meiji Restoration 1867-)
○ Both sought “Great Power” status and this was regionally destabilizing
○ Both were dissatisfied with Paris Conference 1919, and both suffered in the
Depression leading to radical politics and the failure of “democratic” systems
● Competing Aims: Army and Navy
○ Japan looked to China as their region of imperial expansion: the army
emphasized this but was concerned with Russian interests (China would become
Japan’s “Russia”)
○ Navy emphasized a maritime empire in Southeast Asia: Oil in the Dutch Indies…
but this would threaten both European and US territories
○ All saw the need for resources and believed in the japanese right to expand; a
material imperative
○ Conundrum: how to expand but avoid a war that would tap resources that Japan
lacked. War seemed an acceptable option given their economic vulnerability
● Increasing Influence of the Military
○ 1930s failure of the global economy drove up the influence of the military; political
assassinations and threat of coups
○ Army in Manchuria initiated local conflicts in China (1931 and then in 1937);
politicians helpless to shape events … tail wagging the dog
A Choice or Necessity?
● Introduction: Japan’s decisions for War(s)
○ Three Questions:
■ Were Japan’s decisions for war acts of madness leading to inevitable
defeat?
■ Was the war as it appeared at the end of 1941 what the Japanese
wanted?
■ What accounted for the remarkable string of Japanese successes on land
and sea in the first 6 months of the war. Were these successes of
Blitzkrieg or something else?
● Personalities: How Important were They?
○ Emperor Hirohito
○ Prime Minister Konoe
○ Prime Minister Tojo
○ Amry Chief/ War Minister Hajimi
○ Navy Chief Yamamoto
○ Of course, these individuals were important, but the decision making process
was crucial: Liaison Conferences and Imperial Conferences; influence of the
military and the role of concensus
● Japan and Germany: Similar but not…
○ Both Japan and Germant shared broadly similar paths of state development and
ambitions
○ Both “new” nations: Germany born in 1871; Japan developed modern institutions
starting in the 1860s (Meiji Restoration 1867-)
○ Both sought “Great Power” status and this was regionally destabilizing
○ Both were dissatisfied with Paris Conference 1919, and both suffered in the
Depression leading to radical politics and the failure of “democratic” systems
● Competing Aims: Army and Navy
○ Japan looked to China as their region of imperial expansion: the army
emphasized this but was concerned with Russian interests (China would become
Japan’s “Russia”)
○ Navy emphasized a maritime empire in Southeast Asia: Oil in the Dutch Indies…
but this would threaten both European and US territories
○ All saw the need for resources and believed in the japanese right to expand; a
material imperative
○ Conundrum: how to expand but avoid a war that would tap resources that Japan
lacked. War seemed an acceptable option given their economic vulnerability
● Increasing Influence of the Military
○ 1930s failure of the global economy drove up the influence of the military; political
assassinations and threat of coups
○ Army in Manchuria initiated local conflicts in China (1931 and then in 1937);
politicians helpless to shape events … tail wagging the dog
