Causes of Ghorian Success
In order to discuss the causes of the success of Turkish or Muslim invasion in India and the
reasons behind the failure on part of Indians, we have to depend on the writings of few
contemporary authors like ‘Tabaqat-i-Nasiri’ of Minhaj-i-Siraj, ‘Taz-ul-Masir’ of Hassan
Nizami or ‘Tarikh-i-Ferista’ written by Md. Qasim Ferista and so on. On the other hand
number of writings of the contemporary Indian authors on this issue is quite negligible.
Various theories have been advanced and various explanations have been attempted to explain
the Turkish conquest of northern India. The success of the Ghorid hegemonic state in
Northern India has been widely argued from a social point of view, military factors (including
deficiencies in the Indian army and advantages to Central Asian forces), and India's political
situation.
The success of the Turks should not be seen merely in the context of the events following the
succession of Muizuddin bin Sam at Ghazni in 1773 or his first entry into the north western
parts of India (Peshawar) in 1181. As a modern writer, A.B.M. Habibullah, rightly observes,
the success of Muizuddin was "the consumption of a process which extended over the whole
of the 12th century". In fact, the reconnoitring activities to obtain a foot-hold in Hindustan
outside Sindh had begun at least a century earlier, with the rise of Mahmud Ghazni.
Causes of the Ghorian Success and Defeat of the Rajputs
Several reasons have been assigned for the defeat of the Rajputs and success of the Turks in
India:
Military Causes
One of contemporary historian Fakhr-i-Mudabbir noted that the cavalry army put the
Turks on an advantageous state in wars against Indians. This view has been supported by
modern historians like K.A. Nizami, Satish Chandra and others. They held the view that
the physical strength and speed of the horses of cavalry were much more capable in
overwhelming the enemy than that of elephants and infantry soldiers used by Indian
lords. The equipments required to maintain the cavalry force were not yet available in
India, but were very much accessible in Middle East, Arab and Persian regions.
Irfan Habib emphasised that the Central Asian cavalry benefited from the use of iron
shoes and iron stirrups because the shoes allowed for greater mobility and ability to
transverse various terrain, while the iron stirrup allowed the soldier to have complete
control over the horse. The Turks had weapons which were superior to those of the Rajputs.
It has been argued that the Turks used iron-stirrups which enabled them to use spears without
the rider being thrown off the horse as a result of the impact. However, the use of the iron-
stirrup which is supposed to have come from China or Korea, was spreading in India from the
8th century, though we have no means of knowing how widely it was used. The Central Asian
horses were superior to those born or bred in India. In recognition of this, since ancient times,
there had been a lively trade in horses, both by sea and land, between India and the countries
of West and Central Asia. The trade in horses had not stopped with the rise of Islam. In
fact, colonies of Muslim horse-traders had existed in distinct places in north India during
the 12th century.
Mobility was the key-note of Turkish military organization at this time. It was the age of the
horse, and a well-equipped cavalry with tremendous mobility was the great need of the time.
Indian military strategy gave greater importance to weight than to mobility. The Rajputs
, believed in crushing rather than moving rapidly and striking. Huge and unwieldy phalanxes of
armies headed by elephants with gorgeous trappings were bound to be signally beaten when
face to face with a swift and easy moving cavalry, which could attack the flanks and the rear
of the enemy forces.
This element of mobility was totally absent from Indian armies. Sir Jadunath Sarkar remarks:
“The arms and horses of these transborder invaders gave them indisputable military
superiority over the Indians. Their provisions, also, were carried by fast trotting camels,
which required no fodder for themselves but fed on the roots and leaves of the wayside, while
the Banjara pack-oxen of the Hindu commissariat were slow and burdensome.”
After mobility, as R. C. Smail has pointed out, the second tactical characteristic of the Turks
was their archery. They used the bow from the saddle and while moving. This gave them an
added advantage over the heavy and slow moving Rajput armies.
The Turks had manjniqs, arradas and other machines for making breaches in forts but the
Rajputs had no such weapons. Shihabuddin easily captured Bhatinda but Prithviraja took
thirteen long months to capture the same indigenous fort with every detail of whose defences
he was supposed to be familiar. The Turks were always on the offensive and chose the field of
battle according to their convenience. But the Rajputs were almost always on the defensive
and they had to fight when and where the Turks should choose to come. This too favoured the
Turks. All the battles were fought on Indian territory so that no matter which party won, the
sufferers were always the Indian people.
The Turkish army fought under the influence of sentiments of personal gain, worldly
enjoyment and spiritual advancement. Consequently the Rajputs who fought neither for the
defence of the land, nor for upholding the dignity of their creed but to vindicate the salt of a
particular individual could never fight with as much zeal as the Turks. The Rajput army
lacked a sense of homogeneity because of caste differences and a false sense of dignity. The
prospects of personal promotion were also limited.
Fakhr-i-Mudabbir in his Adab-ul Harb wa al-shuja't mentions that Indian forces consisted of
'feudal levies'. Each military contingent was under the command of its immediate
overlord/chief and not that of the king. Thus, the army lacked 'Unity of Command'. Besides,
since only few castes and clans took military profession, the bulk of the population was
excluded from military training. This made the general population of the country totally
detached from the defence of the country; when the Turks came, we find the Indian masses
hardly came to the rescue of their kings. The concept of physical pollution (Chhut) also
hampered military efficiency since it made the division of labour impossible; the soldiers had
to do all their work on their own, from fighting to the fetching of water.
Political Causes
Most of the scholars are unanimous in accepting the theory of political disunity in the
then India while discussing on the causes for Turkish success. Generally it is assumed
that particularly in North-Western and Northern India the growing enmity, mutual
distrust and clash among the rulers created a worst situation of political disunity, which,
in turn, became beneficial for the Turks to get hold of the warfare. Actually after the
downfall of the Guptas and also after the end of the reign of Harshavardhana, a kind of
political instability sprang up in whole of northern India. The foreign invaders, like the
Turks, considered this situation as a golden opportunity to conquer over India. As stated
by Dr. Iswari Prasad, “State fought against state for leadership and there was no paramount
In order to discuss the causes of the success of Turkish or Muslim invasion in India and the
reasons behind the failure on part of Indians, we have to depend on the writings of few
contemporary authors like ‘Tabaqat-i-Nasiri’ of Minhaj-i-Siraj, ‘Taz-ul-Masir’ of Hassan
Nizami or ‘Tarikh-i-Ferista’ written by Md. Qasim Ferista and so on. On the other hand
number of writings of the contemporary Indian authors on this issue is quite negligible.
Various theories have been advanced and various explanations have been attempted to explain
the Turkish conquest of northern India. The success of the Ghorid hegemonic state in
Northern India has been widely argued from a social point of view, military factors (including
deficiencies in the Indian army and advantages to Central Asian forces), and India's political
situation.
The success of the Turks should not be seen merely in the context of the events following the
succession of Muizuddin bin Sam at Ghazni in 1773 or his first entry into the north western
parts of India (Peshawar) in 1181. As a modern writer, A.B.M. Habibullah, rightly observes,
the success of Muizuddin was "the consumption of a process which extended over the whole
of the 12th century". In fact, the reconnoitring activities to obtain a foot-hold in Hindustan
outside Sindh had begun at least a century earlier, with the rise of Mahmud Ghazni.
Causes of the Ghorian Success and Defeat of the Rajputs
Several reasons have been assigned for the defeat of the Rajputs and success of the Turks in
India:
Military Causes
One of contemporary historian Fakhr-i-Mudabbir noted that the cavalry army put the
Turks on an advantageous state in wars against Indians. This view has been supported by
modern historians like K.A. Nizami, Satish Chandra and others. They held the view that
the physical strength and speed of the horses of cavalry were much more capable in
overwhelming the enemy than that of elephants and infantry soldiers used by Indian
lords. The equipments required to maintain the cavalry force were not yet available in
India, but were very much accessible in Middle East, Arab and Persian regions.
Irfan Habib emphasised that the Central Asian cavalry benefited from the use of iron
shoes and iron stirrups because the shoes allowed for greater mobility and ability to
transverse various terrain, while the iron stirrup allowed the soldier to have complete
control over the horse. The Turks had weapons which were superior to those of the Rajputs.
It has been argued that the Turks used iron-stirrups which enabled them to use spears without
the rider being thrown off the horse as a result of the impact. However, the use of the iron-
stirrup which is supposed to have come from China or Korea, was spreading in India from the
8th century, though we have no means of knowing how widely it was used. The Central Asian
horses were superior to those born or bred in India. In recognition of this, since ancient times,
there had been a lively trade in horses, both by sea and land, between India and the countries
of West and Central Asia. The trade in horses had not stopped with the rise of Islam. In
fact, colonies of Muslim horse-traders had existed in distinct places in north India during
the 12th century.
Mobility was the key-note of Turkish military organization at this time. It was the age of the
horse, and a well-equipped cavalry with tremendous mobility was the great need of the time.
Indian military strategy gave greater importance to weight than to mobility. The Rajputs
, believed in crushing rather than moving rapidly and striking. Huge and unwieldy phalanxes of
armies headed by elephants with gorgeous trappings were bound to be signally beaten when
face to face with a swift and easy moving cavalry, which could attack the flanks and the rear
of the enemy forces.
This element of mobility was totally absent from Indian armies. Sir Jadunath Sarkar remarks:
“The arms and horses of these transborder invaders gave them indisputable military
superiority over the Indians. Their provisions, also, were carried by fast trotting camels,
which required no fodder for themselves but fed on the roots and leaves of the wayside, while
the Banjara pack-oxen of the Hindu commissariat were slow and burdensome.”
After mobility, as R. C. Smail has pointed out, the second tactical characteristic of the Turks
was their archery. They used the bow from the saddle and while moving. This gave them an
added advantage over the heavy and slow moving Rajput armies.
The Turks had manjniqs, arradas and other machines for making breaches in forts but the
Rajputs had no such weapons. Shihabuddin easily captured Bhatinda but Prithviraja took
thirteen long months to capture the same indigenous fort with every detail of whose defences
he was supposed to be familiar. The Turks were always on the offensive and chose the field of
battle according to their convenience. But the Rajputs were almost always on the defensive
and they had to fight when and where the Turks should choose to come. This too favoured the
Turks. All the battles were fought on Indian territory so that no matter which party won, the
sufferers were always the Indian people.
The Turkish army fought under the influence of sentiments of personal gain, worldly
enjoyment and spiritual advancement. Consequently the Rajputs who fought neither for the
defence of the land, nor for upholding the dignity of their creed but to vindicate the salt of a
particular individual could never fight with as much zeal as the Turks. The Rajput army
lacked a sense of homogeneity because of caste differences and a false sense of dignity. The
prospects of personal promotion were also limited.
Fakhr-i-Mudabbir in his Adab-ul Harb wa al-shuja't mentions that Indian forces consisted of
'feudal levies'. Each military contingent was under the command of its immediate
overlord/chief and not that of the king. Thus, the army lacked 'Unity of Command'. Besides,
since only few castes and clans took military profession, the bulk of the population was
excluded from military training. This made the general population of the country totally
detached from the defence of the country; when the Turks came, we find the Indian masses
hardly came to the rescue of their kings. The concept of physical pollution (Chhut) also
hampered military efficiency since it made the division of labour impossible; the soldiers had
to do all their work on their own, from fighting to the fetching of water.
Political Causes
Most of the scholars are unanimous in accepting the theory of political disunity in the
then India while discussing on the causes for Turkish success. Generally it is assumed
that particularly in North-Western and Northern India the growing enmity, mutual
distrust and clash among the rulers created a worst situation of political disunity, which,
in turn, became beneficial for the Turks to get hold of the warfare. Actually after the
downfall of the Guptas and also after the end of the reign of Harshavardhana, a kind of
political instability sprang up in whole of northern India. The foreign invaders, like the
Turks, considered this situation as a golden opportunity to conquer over India. As stated
by Dr. Iswari Prasad, “State fought against state for leadership and there was no paramount
