PHIL100 Assessment 4: Research Essay
Jade Lopez – S00285087
IDENTITY & SELFHOOD: Argue a case for or against one (1) philosophical theory of
identity, making reference to Ex Machina (2014).
Throughout the course of the existence of human lives, we endure fundamental and
revolutionary alterations and developments of our personal identity; that is, how we perceive
the identity of ourselves from the first-person point of view and also the way in which we
view others’ identity through the third-person point of view. This broadly refers to any/all
areas of identity; emotional, physical, intellectual, spiritual, etc, each being subjects of
change. So, if we are constantly changing what forms our personal identity and
reconstructing what shapes our ‘being’ every single day, how can we identify ourselves as
ourselves when we are no longer actually our same self to that of when we were born, or that
of two weeks ago? Are we the same self? How is this proven? Many famous philosophers
argue for various philosophical theories of identity in an attempt to understand and define
what ‘identity’ actually is and how we can fully identify the ‘I’ that is living and breathing
before us. The body theory is a common philosophical theory of identity in which argues that
an individual’s physical body is what makes them who they are. This theory, however, arises
many issues to which will be explored later on, in reference to Alex Garland’s film, Ex
Machina (2014). How can anything maintain its identity succeeding to change? More
specifically, how can the body theory of personal identity apply when the physical aspects of
an individual’s body alters? Are they less deserving of identity; do they lose a sense of
identity? These questions will be addressed later on as personal identity is argued against the
body theory in reference to Alex Garland’s film, Ex Machina (2014).
Identity, in a philosophical sense, is an extremely difficult concept to grasp at times. There
rises many issues and questions, and there is no actual proven evidence or proof that can be
physically seen to understand a being’s personal identity. The general metaphysical problem
of identity is the problem of ‘identity’ itself. It is the issue of how anything maintains or
diminishes its identity through its course of change (Bosanquet, 1888). Identity is basically a
concept that goes off of perception. Personal identity relates to the general problem of
identity as individual beings undergo various changes such as physical, emotional and
intellectual as well as many other aspects, but how can we truly identify one’s self when we
constantly change who we are? In an attempt to explain personal identity, there are many
1
, different philosophical theories of identity. The body theory of identity simply refers to an
individual identifying themselves entirely with their body and only from their body. So, an
individual whose personal identity is based on the philosophical theory of identity being, ‘the
body theory’; means that, that individual identifies themselves as themselves, from their
physical appearance and the body in which they walk around in. This theory has some
strengths, including points such as; it provides value of the body in which we live in and
creating a selfhood (Fraser, 1999). But what exactly is selfhood? If we cannot accurately and
effectively identify our own self and the person that we claim as being who we are, how do
we have a ‘self’ to have a selfhood of? (Giampiero, 2009.) In saying that, our ‘self’ is always
changing and evolving, so, where does the body theory fit in here? People can and do very
often change to a considerably large extent in terms of their physical appearance. For
example, Ava, the female robot created by Nathan Bateman in Ex Machina (2014), started off
in the film with partially visible wires and connectors on her arms, stomach, back of her head
and her legs with only her hands and face essentially looking like real human skin. In session
three of Caleb’s interviews with Ava, there is a scene in which Ava tells Caleb to close his
eyes while she goes to her wardrobe and clothes herself in a dress, wig and tights – hiding her
machine body. This is Ava attempting to make Caleb see her as being a human, rather than a
robot. He begins to believe she has a consciousness. At the end of the film when she escapes,
she takes the flesh from other robots, and ‘clothes’ herself in it – appearing to look entirely
human. These changes in physical appearance, from Ava looking like a robot with visible
machinery, to then looking completely human, does not account for a different identity
altogether. Ava is still Ava. She may have physically altered her body to appear to look like a
human, however, she is still the same robot as before. Her personal identity has not changed.
The philosophical theory of the body theory explaining identity does not account for the
physical changes and alterations that individuals experience. If the body theory believes that
individuals are who they are in regard to their physical body only, does that mean that when
an individual experiences change of their physical body, that individual is unworthy of
having an identity? That would be absurd, right? Because as living beings, we all experience
physical change. Whether that includes common things such as cutting our hair and putting
on makeup or less common (and unfortunate) things such as losing hair due to chemotherapy
or even losing an arm due to a disease; our physical appearance of our body is altering but we
are still our self. Similarly, in Ex Machina, the body theory’s idea of the body being the basis
of personal identity does not account for Ava and the changes that she experiences
2
Jade Lopez – S00285087
IDENTITY & SELFHOOD: Argue a case for or against one (1) philosophical theory of
identity, making reference to Ex Machina (2014).
Throughout the course of the existence of human lives, we endure fundamental and
revolutionary alterations and developments of our personal identity; that is, how we perceive
the identity of ourselves from the first-person point of view and also the way in which we
view others’ identity through the third-person point of view. This broadly refers to any/all
areas of identity; emotional, physical, intellectual, spiritual, etc, each being subjects of
change. So, if we are constantly changing what forms our personal identity and
reconstructing what shapes our ‘being’ every single day, how can we identify ourselves as
ourselves when we are no longer actually our same self to that of when we were born, or that
of two weeks ago? Are we the same self? How is this proven? Many famous philosophers
argue for various philosophical theories of identity in an attempt to understand and define
what ‘identity’ actually is and how we can fully identify the ‘I’ that is living and breathing
before us. The body theory is a common philosophical theory of identity in which argues that
an individual’s physical body is what makes them who they are. This theory, however, arises
many issues to which will be explored later on, in reference to Alex Garland’s film, Ex
Machina (2014). How can anything maintain its identity succeeding to change? More
specifically, how can the body theory of personal identity apply when the physical aspects of
an individual’s body alters? Are they less deserving of identity; do they lose a sense of
identity? These questions will be addressed later on as personal identity is argued against the
body theory in reference to Alex Garland’s film, Ex Machina (2014).
Identity, in a philosophical sense, is an extremely difficult concept to grasp at times. There
rises many issues and questions, and there is no actual proven evidence or proof that can be
physically seen to understand a being’s personal identity. The general metaphysical problem
of identity is the problem of ‘identity’ itself. It is the issue of how anything maintains or
diminishes its identity through its course of change (Bosanquet, 1888). Identity is basically a
concept that goes off of perception. Personal identity relates to the general problem of
identity as individual beings undergo various changes such as physical, emotional and
intellectual as well as many other aspects, but how can we truly identify one’s self when we
constantly change who we are? In an attempt to explain personal identity, there are many
1
, different philosophical theories of identity. The body theory of identity simply refers to an
individual identifying themselves entirely with their body and only from their body. So, an
individual whose personal identity is based on the philosophical theory of identity being, ‘the
body theory’; means that, that individual identifies themselves as themselves, from their
physical appearance and the body in which they walk around in. This theory has some
strengths, including points such as; it provides value of the body in which we live in and
creating a selfhood (Fraser, 1999). But what exactly is selfhood? If we cannot accurately and
effectively identify our own self and the person that we claim as being who we are, how do
we have a ‘self’ to have a selfhood of? (Giampiero, 2009.) In saying that, our ‘self’ is always
changing and evolving, so, where does the body theory fit in here? People can and do very
often change to a considerably large extent in terms of their physical appearance. For
example, Ava, the female robot created by Nathan Bateman in Ex Machina (2014), started off
in the film with partially visible wires and connectors on her arms, stomach, back of her head
and her legs with only her hands and face essentially looking like real human skin. In session
three of Caleb’s interviews with Ava, there is a scene in which Ava tells Caleb to close his
eyes while she goes to her wardrobe and clothes herself in a dress, wig and tights – hiding her
machine body. This is Ava attempting to make Caleb see her as being a human, rather than a
robot. He begins to believe she has a consciousness. At the end of the film when she escapes,
she takes the flesh from other robots, and ‘clothes’ herself in it – appearing to look entirely
human. These changes in physical appearance, from Ava looking like a robot with visible
machinery, to then looking completely human, does not account for a different identity
altogether. Ava is still Ava. She may have physically altered her body to appear to look like a
human, however, she is still the same robot as before. Her personal identity has not changed.
The philosophical theory of the body theory explaining identity does not account for the
physical changes and alterations that individuals experience. If the body theory believes that
individuals are who they are in regard to their physical body only, does that mean that when
an individual experiences change of their physical body, that individual is unworthy of
having an identity? That would be absurd, right? Because as living beings, we all experience
physical change. Whether that includes common things such as cutting our hair and putting
on makeup or less common (and unfortunate) things such as losing hair due to chemotherapy
or even losing an arm due to a disease; our physical appearance of our body is altering but we
are still our self. Similarly, in Ex Machina, the body theory’s idea of the body being the basis
of personal identity does not account for Ava and the changes that she experiences
2
