1A. Summary of Gallagher, S. (2006)'s Criticism
Gallagher (2006) argues that Libet's experiments (1983), which focus on the timing of
conscious decisions in relation to bodily movement, miss the essence of what free will is
about. He believes that these experiments are too narrowly focused on immediate motor
control and don't consider the broader, more contextual aspects of human decision-making.
Gallagher posits that decisions, especially those involving free will, are embedded in larger
timeframes and contexts. He illustrates this with an example of a person deciding to catch a
lizard, highlighting that such a choice involves a deeper, more extended conscious reflection
rather than a mere split-second decision. Gallagher emphasizes that free will should be
understood in terms of these more complex, situated reflections, not just instantaneous
bodily reactions.
1B. Personal Opinion
I find Gallagher's criticism convincing. Libet's experiments (1983) offer valuable
insights into the immediacy of decision-making related to motor control but may not fully
encompass the complexities of free will. Free will, as a concept, is multi-dimensional and
could be influenced by various factors, including one's experiences, emotions, and broader
contexts. (Dennet, 2015) And this is not captured in the narrow window of milliseconds used
in Libet's setup.
2. Gallagher (2006) free will and bodily movement
Gallagher (2006) argues that free will cannot be simply reduced to or equated with
the immediate processes controlling bodily movement, as the traditional interpretation of
the Libet experiment (1983) suggests. Instead, he emphasizes a more holistic view. For
Gallagher, the exercise of free will involves broader, temporally extended, and contextually
embedded decision-making processes. While he acknowledges that certain bodily
movements, like reflexes, are automatic and not driven by conscious decision, intentional
actions like "catching a lizard" arise from a conscious reflection embedded in the specific
situation and context. Thus, he differentiates between mere bodily movements and
intentional actions, suggesting that free will pertains more to the latter. Free will, in
Gallagher's view, is intimately tied to conscious deliberation and reflection that is informed
Gallagher (2006) argues that Libet's experiments (1983), which focus on the timing of
conscious decisions in relation to bodily movement, miss the essence of what free will is
about. He believes that these experiments are too narrowly focused on immediate motor
control and don't consider the broader, more contextual aspects of human decision-making.
Gallagher posits that decisions, especially those involving free will, are embedded in larger
timeframes and contexts. He illustrates this with an example of a person deciding to catch a
lizard, highlighting that such a choice involves a deeper, more extended conscious reflection
rather than a mere split-second decision. Gallagher emphasizes that free will should be
understood in terms of these more complex, situated reflections, not just instantaneous
bodily reactions.
1B. Personal Opinion
I find Gallagher's criticism convincing. Libet's experiments (1983) offer valuable
insights into the immediacy of decision-making related to motor control but may not fully
encompass the complexities of free will. Free will, as a concept, is multi-dimensional and
could be influenced by various factors, including one's experiences, emotions, and broader
contexts. (Dennet, 2015) And this is not captured in the narrow window of milliseconds used
in Libet's setup.
2. Gallagher (2006) free will and bodily movement
Gallagher (2006) argues that free will cannot be simply reduced to or equated with
the immediate processes controlling bodily movement, as the traditional interpretation of
the Libet experiment (1983) suggests. Instead, he emphasizes a more holistic view. For
Gallagher, the exercise of free will involves broader, temporally extended, and contextually
embedded decision-making processes. While he acknowledges that certain bodily
movements, like reflexes, are automatic and not driven by conscious decision, intentional
actions like "catching a lizard" arise from a conscious reflection embedded in the specific
situation and context. Thus, he differentiates between mere bodily movements and
intentional actions, suggesting that free will pertains more to the latter. Free will, in
Gallagher's view, is intimately tied to conscious deliberation and reflection that is informed
