EMOTIVISM
Introduction
Introductory Lines
Metaethical claims, such as “moral statements are not true or false, they are just expressions of
approval and disapproval”, are concerned with the nature of morality and moral language.
The claim can be directly drawn to a view known as emotivism.
Emotivism
This view ascertains the origins of morality is to be our emotions and deals more specifically
with the logistic questions surrounding moral statements: do they have truth vale or not?
That is, are they propositional or imperative (commands or perhaps expressions). Emotivism’s
argue that there is no objective source of morality and where an absolutely essential distinction
between facts and values that can be drawn back to the Scottish philosopher, David Hume.
Metaethics
In the context of emotivism, various philosophical positions come into play.
Realism posits that ethical statements express objective facts and can be true or false,
suggesting that moral judgments correspond to something real in the world.
Conversely, antirealism contends that ethical statements lack objective truth value and are
expressions of individual emotions or social conventions, denying any objective moral reality.
Cognitivism, often associated with moral realism, asserts that moral judgments are
propositions that can be known and discussed, while non-cognitivism, linked to emotivism,
posits that moral language merely expresses emotions, attitudes, or prescriptions without
conveying factual information.
Emotivism aligns with non-cognitivism, asserting that moral statements serve to express
feelings or attitudes rather than convey objective truths, making it a pivotal point in the ongoing
debate between realism and antirealism within metaethics.
Societal Implications
The societal implication of emotivism affects mainly those in the realms of morality.
Emotivism holds that people can’t disagree over moral facts because there are none, where
presenting reason in support of moral utterance is a matter of offering non moral facts that can
influence one’s actions and nothing is actually good or bad.
Evaluation
This essay will critically evaluate emotivism, finding that whilst arguments proposed by
philosophers such as David Hume, A.J Ayer and CL Stevenson may seem appealing, it contains
many flaws and is defective as a framework of metaethics.
Its many counterarguments and criticisms demonstrate this to be the case.
Thus, I disagree with the claim that moral statements are not true or false, but expressions of
approval and disapproval
David Hume
Introduction to Hume
The Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) argues against the existence of objective
moral facts in a discussion of murder found in his Treatise of Human Nature (1739). Hume is an
empiricist who has been credited for the development and history of emotivism but is not an
emotivist. He believed that there are natural properties which humans have, emotions, to
decide whether things are right or wrong.
The Fact/Value Distinction
, If we consider the objective facts of a wilful murder we will never locate the wrongness of that
action by considering these facts alone, Hume claims. If moral judgements stated facts then
what sorts of observations could we make to prove that 'stealing is wrong?
What facts would we see, hear or taste that would identify the wrongness? We may observe a
knife thrust into a torso; a brightly lit room; a table with a pool of blood nearby, but where do we
observe the wrongness of the act? The wrongness of the action is not a fact we can observe like
the others.
In fact, all these observations could be consistent with a perfectly innocent state of affairs: a
surgeon performing an operation for example.
For Hume, the wrongness lies not in the object but in us. When we see certain actions a feeling
or sentiment arises within us, and we adopt either a disapproving or approving attitude towards
it.
Moral approval and disapproval, therefore, is not a fact about the world but is a matter of our
emotional response to a given situation.
Hume wants to draw a clear distinction between the world of facts and the world of values and
claims that the latter cannot be simply read off from the former.
This means that, in principle, two people could agree on all of the facts, about the war in Iraq
say, but still hold very different moral viewpoints as to whether the war was wrong or not.
In a sense this fits in with some of our experiences of moral debates and disagreements. The
positions that people adopt over an issue like the Iraq war seem intractable: it is very difficult to
get people to change their mind about it once it has been made up.
Hume's argument might explain this tendency of moral opinions to become entrenched since
the moral attitudes that people hold are not a product of understanding facts about the war, but
instead arise from an emotional response to it.
While the laws of logic can be applied to the world of facts there is, notoriously, no logic of
emotions.
Hume’s Fork
Hume’s epistemology identifies two primary forms of knowledge that one can acquire: matters
of fact and relations of ideas (Hume’s fork)
The former regards that which you can derive from sense experience, that is a posteriori.
For instance, all scientific theories are matter of fact. The later, relations of ideas, is concerned
with logical and devotional truths, found a priori. Mathematical truths such as Pythagoras
theorem, or definitions – a Batchelor is an unmarried man are examples of relations of ideas,
they are disproved through contradictions.
Hume, however, notes that moral statements or claims cannot be placed in either category as
they are something else entirely. Hume uses the evidence of a crime scene as “wilful murder”:
you can clearly observe the matter of fact such as the degrees of blood, or the location of
murder.
However, when you meditate on the action itself, you are thinking on something very distinct.
Thus, Hume beloves our rationality lies within our core values and our sentience, not our reason
or rationality, for this he regards morality’s location within the action, rather than within
yourself.
Hume’s Law
A related comment by Hume reaffirms this fact/value distinction and is sometimes known as
Hume's Law. Hume's Law states 'You can't get an 'ought' from an 'is" which sums up somewhat
sloganistically a comment made by Hume in a footnote of his Treatise.
What Hume is claiming is that although reason can aid us in deriving factual conclusions from
factual premises, we cannot ever derive moral conclusions from factual premises. An example
might help illustrate this point. argument: Consider the following. Paris is in France. France is in
Europe. Therefore, Paris is in Europe.
This argument is valid because once we accept the two premises, we are committed to accepting
the conclusion on pain of contradiction. I would be contradicting myself if I tried to maintain that
Paris is in France and that France was in Europe while denying that Paris was in Europe. Notice
how the two premises are 'is' statements (ie. they are factual claims) and the conclusion is also
an 'is' statement (je. it is also a factual claim).
Now consider this next example: A human is a creature with canine teeth. A canine tooth is
specifically adapted for eating meat. Therefore humans ought to eat meat. This argument is
very different from the previous one. Just because it is an empirical fact that humans have
canine teeth designed for eating meat, it does not necessarily follow that we therefore ought to
eat meat. It would involve no contradiction to accept those premises while rejecting that
conclusion. This is because the conclusion is a value statement while the premises are factual
Introduction
Introductory Lines
Metaethical claims, such as “moral statements are not true or false, they are just expressions of
approval and disapproval”, are concerned with the nature of morality and moral language.
The claim can be directly drawn to a view known as emotivism.
Emotivism
This view ascertains the origins of morality is to be our emotions and deals more specifically
with the logistic questions surrounding moral statements: do they have truth vale or not?
That is, are they propositional or imperative (commands or perhaps expressions). Emotivism’s
argue that there is no objective source of morality and where an absolutely essential distinction
between facts and values that can be drawn back to the Scottish philosopher, David Hume.
Metaethics
In the context of emotivism, various philosophical positions come into play.
Realism posits that ethical statements express objective facts and can be true or false,
suggesting that moral judgments correspond to something real in the world.
Conversely, antirealism contends that ethical statements lack objective truth value and are
expressions of individual emotions or social conventions, denying any objective moral reality.
Cognitivism, often associated with moral realism, asserts that moral judgments are
propositions that can be known and discussed, while non-cognitivism, linked to emotivism,
posits that moral language merely expresses emotions, attitudes, or prescriptions without
conveying factual information.
Emotivism aligns with non-cognitivism, asserting that moral statements serve to express
feelings or attitudes rather than convey objective truths, making it a pivotal point in the ongoing
debate between realism and antirealism within metaethics.
Societal Implications
The societal implication of emotivism affects mainly those in the realms of morality.
Emotivism holds that people can’t disagree over moral facts because there are none, where
presenting reason in support of moral utterance is a matter of offering non moral facts that can
influence one’s actions and nothing is actually good or bad.
Evaluation
This essay will critically evaluate emotivism, finding that whilst arguments proposed by
philosophers such as David Hume, A.J Ayer and CL Stevenson may seem appealing, it contains
many flaws and is defective as a framework of metaethics.
Its many counterarguments and criticisms demonstrate this to be the case.
Thus, I disagree with the claim that moral statements are not true or false, but expressions of
approval and disapproval
David Hume
Introduction to Hume
The Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) argues against the existence of objective
moral facts in a discussion of murder found in his Treatise of Human Nature (1739). Hume is an
empiricist who has been credited for the development and history of emotivism but is not an
emotivist. He believed that there are natural properties which humans have, emotions, to
decide whether things are right or wrong.
The Fact/Value Distinction
, If we consider the objective facts of a wilful murder we will never locate the wrongness of that
action by considering these facts alone, Hume claims. If moral judgements stated facts then
what sorts of observations could we make to prove that 'stealing is wrong?
What facts would we see, hear or taste that would identify the wrongness? We may observe a
knife thrust into a torso; a brightly lit room; a table with a pool of blood nearby, but where do we
observe the wrongness of the act? The wrongness of the action is not a fact we can observe like
the others.
In fact, all these observations could be consistent with a perfectly innocent state of affairs: a
surgeon performing an operation for example.
For Hume, the wrongness lies not in the object but in us. When we see certain actions a feeling
or sentiment arises within us, and we adopt either a disapproving or approving attitude towards
it.
Moral approval and disapproval, therefore, is not a fact about the world but is a matter of our
emotional response to a given situation.
Hume wants to draw a clear distinction between the world of facts and the world of values and
claims that the latter cannot be simply read off from the former.
This means that, in principle, two people could agree on all of the facts, about the war in Iraq
say, but still hold very different moral viewpoints as to whether the war was wrong or not.
In a sense this fits in with some of our experiences of moral debates and disagreements. The
positions that people adopt over an issue like the Iraq war seem intractable: it is very difficult to
get people to change their mind about it once it has been made up.
Hume's argument might explain this tendency of moral opinions to become entrenched since
the moral attitudes that people hold are not a product of understanding facts about the war, but
instead arise from an emotional response to it.
While the laws of logic can be applied to the world of facts there is, notoriously, no logic of
emotions.
Hume’s Fork
Hume’s epistemology identifies two primary forms of knowledge that one can acquire: matters
of fact and relations of ideas (Hume’s fork)
The former regards that which you can derive from sense experience, that is a posteriori.
For instance, all scientific theories are matter of fact. The later, relations of ideas, is concerned
with logical and devotional truths, found a priori. Mathematical truths such as Pythagoras
theorem, or definitions – a Batchelor is an unmarried man are examples of relations of ideas,
they are disproved through contradictions.
Hume, however, notes that moral statements or claims cannot be placed in either category as
they are something else entirely. Hume uses the evidence of a crime scene as “wilful murder”:
you can clearly observe the matter of fact such as the degrees of blood, or the location of
murder.
However, when you meditate on the action itself, you are thinking on something very distinct.
Thus, Hume beloves our rationality lies within our core values and our sentience, not our reason
or rationality, for this he regards morality’s location within the action, rather than within
yourself.
Hume’s Law
A related comment by Hume reaffirms this fact/value distinction and is sometimes known as
Hume's Law. Hume's Law states 'You can't get an 'ought' from an 'is" which sums up somewhat
sloganistically a comment made by Hume in a footnote of his Treatise.
What Hume is claiming is that although reason can aid us in deriving factual conclusions from
factual premises, we cannot ever derive moral conclusions from factual premises. An example
might help illustrate this point. argument: Consider the following. Paris is in France. France is in
Europe. Therefore, Paris is in Europe.
This argument is valid because once we accept the two premises, we are committed to accepting
the conclusion on pain of contradiction. I would be contradicting myself if I tried to maintain that
Paris is in France and that France was in Europe while denying that Paris was in Europe. Notice
how the two premises are 'is' statements (ie. they are factual claims) and the conclusion is also
an 'is' statement (je. it is also a factual claim).
Now consider this next example: A human is a creature with canine teeth. A canine tooth is
specifically adapted for eating meat. Therefore humans ought to eat meat. This argument is
very different from the previous one. Just because it is an empirical fact that humans have
canine teeth designed for eating meat, it does not necessarily follow that we therefore ought to
eat meat. It would involve no contradiction to accept those premises while rejecting that
conclusion. This is because the conclusion is a value statement while the premises are factual
