Automatism Evaluation
Introduction
In Bratty, it was suggested that automatism is a term connoting the state of a person
who, though capable of action, is not “conscious of what he is doing”, causing him to
commit an “unconscious voluntary action”.
Definition
The definition in itself can be deemed problematic because although Bratty offers
guidance, it is difficult to identify a definition which runs consistently through cases.
A further problem is that the Bratty definition places emphasis on the term
‘unconscious’, despite the fact that a defendant need not be unconscious before
their capacities are suppressed or inoperative.
The Law Commission therefore agrees with scholars such as Simester and Sullivan,
who suggest that what counts is the inability deliberatively to control one’s conduct.
Furthermore, the present use of the defence is for the defendant to show that he
could not form the mens rea of the offence due to an external factor. However, the
Law Commission considers that the correct classification of the defence is the actus
reus as they consider the true basis of the defence as a denial of voluntary ‘action’
due to actus reus.
This alternative approach would arguably be more successful as it would mean that
the defence could be available for people with offences of strict liability, which is not
the case at present.
In light of this, controversial cases such as Larsonneur could then be avoided.
Internal/External Factor
External and internal causes are used to determine which type of automatism a
defendant may be able to plead.
This distinction can be identified in the cases of Quick and Hennessey, where in the
former, D had taken insulin and so relied on automatism, and in the latter, D had not
taken insulin and so had to rely on insanity.
The potential benefit of this is that instances of non-insane automatism, there is
perhaps less chance of an instance reoccurring, because the defendant can limit their
exposure to the external factor to prevent the situation from happening again.
This can be explained by the case of Hardie, where Valium had an adverse effect on
D. Through not taking it again in the future, he could avoid further agitation.
Therefore, he did not need to be subject to the scope of verdicts available through
insanity, so a simple acquittal under automatism seemed appropriate.
In this regard, the distinction between internal and external factors is satisfactory and
helps to fulfil the important policy objective of social protection.
Nevertheless, in practice, some defendants who are currently classed as insane pose
little or no continuing danger to the public while others who are acquitted on the
basis of sane automatism may in fact be liable to react in the same way again.
Introduction
In Bratty, it was suggested that automatism is a term connoting the state of a person
who, though capable of action, is not “conscious of what he is doing”, causing him to
commit an “unconscious voluntary action”.
Definition
The definition in itself can be deemed problematic because although Bratty offers
guidance, it is difficult to identify a definition which runs consistently through cases.
A further problem is that the Bratty definition places emphasis on the term
‘unconscious’, despite the fact that a defendant need not be unconscious before
their capacities are suppressed or inoperative.
The Law Commission therefore agrees with scholars such as Simester and Sullivan,
who suggest that what counts is the inability deliberatively to control one’s conduct.
Furthermore, the present use of the defence is for the defendant to show that he
could not form the mens rea of the offence due to an external factor. However, the
Law Commission considers that the correct classification of the defence is the actus
reus as they consider the true basis of the defence as a denial of voluntary ‘action’
due to actus reus.
This alternative approach would arguably be more successful as it would mean that
the defence could be available for people with offences of strict liability, which is not
the case at present.
In light of this, controversial cases such as Larsonneur could then be avoided.
Internal/External Factor
External and internal causes are used to determine which type of automatism a
defendant may be able to plead.
This distinction can be identified in the cases of Quick and Hennessey, where in the
former, D had taken insulin and so relied on automatism, and in the latter, D had not
taken insulin and so had to rely on insanity.
The potential benefit of this is that instances of non-insane automatism, there is
perhaps less chance of an instance reoccurring, because the defendant can limit their
exposure to the external factor to prevent the situation from happening again.
This can be explained by the case of Hardie, where Valium had an adverse effect on
D. Through not taking it again in the future, he could avoid further agitation.
Therefore, he did not need to be subject to the scope of verdicts available through
insanity, so a simple acquittal under automatism seemed appropriate.
In this regard, the distinction between internal and external factors is satisfactory and
helps to fulfil the important policy objective of social protection.
Nevertheless, in practice, some defendants who are currently classed as insane pose
little or no continuing danger to the public while others who are acquitted on the
basis of sane automatism may in fact be liable to react in the same way again.
