💡
Week 1
Date @07/01/2025 → 10/01/2025
courses 💡 Consciousness, free will and real-world-behaviour
Week 1:
HC1: Standard arguments for the hard problem of consciousness
HC2: Unfolding argument of Doerig et al.
Inhoud
Hoorcollege 1: 07-01-25
1. Consciousness
2. Algorithms
Is consciousness an algorithm
3. Famous riddles
Nagel (1974): What is it like to be a bat?
Epiphenomenal challenges
Jackson (1982): Mary the color scientist
Searle (1980): The Chinese room
Chalmers (1995): The hard problem
What is the point
Biological naturalism
Main point
Hoorcollege 2 - 08/01/24
1. The arguments of implementationists
1. Implementationist heories
2. Fundametal flaw
2. Counter-arguments Doerig
1. Functions are independent of implementation
2. Functions determine behavior, implementation does not
3. If implementation = experience, then experience is independent of behavior
Conclusion
3. Analyzing Doerig et al.
1. Technical problems
Analysis
Week 1 1
, 4. Reactie op implementation theories
Illusionism
Non-computationalism
3. Practice questions
Hoorcollege 1: 07-01-25
Learning objectives:
better understanding of the challenges of consciousness
improved understanding of the computational theory of mind
the ability to deduce (empirical) implications from theoretical notions
1. Consciousness
What do we mean by consciousness?
Anything that exists, from a first-person perspective, if you are not in a dreamless sleep
= The ability to have (subjective) experiences
There is a difference between processing and consciousness
example I: red and blue stripes - you experience this flipping = your consciousness
example II: blindsight - you can guess the visual information:
the information is processed
but no visual experience, so no visual consciousness
2. Algorithms
Week 1 2
Week 1
Date @07/01/2025 → 10/01/2025
courses 💡 Consciousness, free will and real-world-behaviour
Week 1:
HC1: Standard arguments for the hard problem of consciousness
HC2: Unfolding argument of Doerig et al.
Inhoud
Hoorcollege 1: 07-01-25
1. Consciousness
2. Algorithms
Is consciousness an algorithm
3. Famous riddles
Nagel (1974): What is it like to be a bat?
Epiphenomenal challenges
Jackson (1982): Mary the color scientist
Searle (1980): The Chinese room
Chalmers (1995): The hard problem
What is the point
Biological naturalism
Main point
Hoorcollege 2 - 08/01/24
1. The arguments of implementationists
1. Implementationist heories
2. Fundametal flaw
2. Counter-arguments Doerig
1. Functions are independent of implementation
2. Functions determine behavior, implementation does not
3. If implementation = experience, then experience is independent of behavior
Conclusion
3. Analyzing Doerig et al.
1. Technical problems
Analysis
Week 1 1
, 4. Reactie op implementation theories
Illusionism
Non-computationalism
3. Practice questions
Hoorcollege 1: 07-01-25
Learning objectives:
better understanding of the challenges of consciousness
improved understanding of the computational theory of mind
the ability to deduce (empirical) implications from theoretical notions
1. Consciousness
What do we mean by consciousness?
Anything that exists, from a first-person perspective, if you are not in a dreamless sleep
= The ability to have (subjective) experiences
There is a difference between processing and consciousness
example I: red and blue stripes - you experience this flipping = your consciousness
example II: blindsight - you can guess the visual information:
the information is processed
but no visual experience, so no visual consciousness
2. Algorithms
Week 1 2
