Evaluating Metaethics
Evaluating Metaethics:
Agree Disagree
● Ethical Naturalism (Foot + ● Is-Ought Gap (Hume) - Moral
Bentham) - Foot defends Aristotle’s judgments cannot be inferred from
view that goodness = flourishing, a facts since facts and values are
factual feature of natural organisms. logically distinct; you can’t get an
She points to the example of plants, ought from an is. It is not a valid
since there is a natural difference deduction to say ‘It is human nature
between a plant that is flourishing to find pleasure good’ and then
and a plant that is not. For Foot, conclude that ‘we ought to maximise
morality is a characteristic part of pleasure’.
human life just as a bee’s sting is
characteristic for the bee. Bentham ● Slave of the Passions (Hume) -
argued that it is part of our nature to Moral judgements involve motivation
seek pleasure and avoid pain and to action and are joined with
so defined goodness in those terms. emotional approval or disapproval
which come from our socially
Counter : Naturalistic Fallacy conditioned preferences, however
(Moore), it is a fallacy to assume reason is not motivating and so
that something being natural means moral judgements cannot come from
that it is good. All definitions of good reason. Reason is “the slave of the
rest on baseless assumption and passions”, so it can only ad hoc
therefore commit the fallacy. We rationalisations for moral
can’t say what goodness is because judgements. Since desire is the
it is only itself, it is sui generis foundational motivator of moral
(unique). Goodness is like the color judgements, ethical language
yellow, you can’t describe or define expresses non-cognitive desires
it, but can only know it intuitively.
Counter : Rationally Cultivated
Counter : Open Question Argument Virtue (Haidt), Hume went too far
(Moore), saying goodness = calling reason a ‘slave’. Emotions
pleasure is the same as saying are like an elephant and reason is
pleasure = pleasure, however the like its rider, over the long-term, the
former is informative, yet the latter is rider can control the general
tautological. If X is good, then it direction of the elephant. Virtue
should be a closed question to ask Ethicists argue that we can rationally
‘is it true that X is good’, which is an control and cultivate our emotional
open question, so the two cannot be reactions and habits towards
equivalent. flourishing.
● Separation from Practice Counter Counter : Driven by Desire
(McIntyre + Stocker) - Stocker (Hume), Virtue Ethics fails to
argues that modernity’s transition consider that our rational cultivation
from community-life to city-life of our emotional reactions could
required the development of a more itself be driven by desire, since
impersonal, legalistic and cultivation requires motivation which
, bureaucratic form of morality. reason cannot provide. Reason is
McIntyre argues that modernity the Slave of the Passions.
separated morality from its
foundation in ‘practice’ and ● Hume’s Fork (Hume) - There are
reasoning about ends. Without its two types of judgements of reason:
foundation in practice, morality Synthetic judgements (matters of
seems arbitrary and without basis in fact) which are a posteriori, and
reality. Analytic judgements (relations of
ideas) which are a priori. Moral
● Ought means Needs (Anscombe judgements are neither synthetic
+ Foot) - The word “ought” really (since they don’t exist as observable
functions like the word “need”. For properties) nor analytic (since they
life in general, ‘ought’ is simply ‘the can be denied without
needs of flourishing’, e.g. “a contradiction), so they cannot be
machine needs oil to flourish” and “a judgements of reason.
machine ought to have oil”. Foot
concludes there is “no difficulty” in ● Emotivism (Ayer + Stevenson) -
deriving ought from is. It is a fact When we call something good or
that children cannot flourish without bad, we are expressing how we
help from adults, from which we can personally feel about it. Saying ‘X is
derive that adults ‘ought’ to protect wrong’ is just like saying ‘boo to X’.
children. Similarly, saying ‘X is good’ is just
saying ‘hurrah to X’. Stevenson
Counter : Implicit Ought (Hume), added moral language expresses
stating that something is needed for approval and disapproval based on
one to flourish, does not necessarily deeply held beliefs. Moral language
mean that that thing is good. This is is meant to persuade others about
not deriving an ought from an is, these beliefs.
since there is an implicit claim that
‘flourishing is good’. This is the ● Argument from Analysis (Ayer) -
question Hume is asking, on what Ayer rejected that ethical language
grounds is flourishing good. is cognitive by using philosophical
analysis. Ethical terms are pseudo-
Counter Counter : Confusion of concepts, they are unanalysable
Modernity (Anscombe + Nietzsche), (cannot be expressed in terms that
the Idea that there needs to be aren’t themselves), and so could not
some further meta-ethical warrant refer to actual properties and are
for morality is the confusion of thus noncognitive.
modernity. Anscombe and Nietzsche
argued that this impulse of ● Verification Principle (Ayer) - A
philosophers is the result of the statement is only meaningful if it is
remaining religious influence on our either analytic or empirically
ethical concepts. verifiable through experience. Moral
judgements are neither analytic
● Intuitionism (Moore + Prichard) - (since they can be denied without
We know what is good/bad or contradiction) nor empirically
right/wrong through intuition. When verifiable, therefore ethical language
we reflect on a moral action, we is meaningless.
intuitively know whether it was right
or wrong. Goodness is real in a Counter : Self-Defeating Principle
similar way to numbers, they are (Popper), in order for the verification
real in some way but clearly not principle itself to be meaningful, it
physically real. Moral intuition is must be analytic or empirically
analogous to colour vision, it is
Evaluating Metaethics:
Agree Disagree
● Ethical Naturalism (Foot + ● Is-Ought Gap (Hume) - Moral
Bentham) - Foot defends Aristotle’s judgments cannot be inferred from
view that goodness = flourishing, a facts since facts and values are
factual feature of natural organisms. logically distinct; you can’t get an
She points to the example of plants, ought from an is. It is not a valid
since there is a natural difference deduction to say ‘It is human nature
between a plant that is flourishing to find pleasure good’ and then
and a plant that is not. For Foot, conclude that ‘we ought to maximise
morality is a characteristic part of pleasure’.
human life just as a bee’s sting is
characteristic for the bee. Bentham ● Slave of the Passions (Hume) -
argued that it is part of our nature to Moral judgements involve motivation
seek pleasure and avoid pain and to action and are joined with
so defined goodness in those terms. emotional approval or disapproval
which come from our socially
Counter : Naturalistic Fallacy conditioned preferences, however
(Moore), it is a fallacy to assume reason is not motivating and so
that something being natural means moral judgements cannot come from
that it is good. All definitions of good reason. Reason is “the slave of the
rest on baseless assumption and passions”, so it can only ad hoc
therefore commit the fallacy. We rationalisations for moral
can’t say what goodness is because judgements. Since desire is the
it is only itself, it is sui generis foundational motivator of moral
(unique). Goodness is like the color judgements, ethical language
yellow, you can’t describe or define expresses non-cognitive desires
it, but can only know it intuitively.
Counter : Rationally Cultivated
Counter : Open Question Argument Virtue (Haidt), Hume went too far
(Moore), saying goodness = calling reason a ‘slave’. Emotions
pleasure is the same as saying are like an elephant and reason is
pleasure = pleasure, however the like its rider, over the long-term, the
former is informative, yet the latter is rider can control the general
tautological. If X is good, then it direction of the elephant. Virtue
should be a closed question to ask Ethicists argue that we can rationally
‘is it true that X is good’, which is an control and cultivate our emotional
open question, so the two cannot be reactions and habits towards
equivalent. flourishing.
● Separation from Practice Counter Counter : Driven by Desire
(McIntyre + Stocker) - Stocker (Hume), Virtue Ethics fails to
argues that modernity’s transition consider that our rational cultivation
from community-life to city-life of our emotional reactions could
required the development of a more itself be driven by desire, since
impersonal, legalistic and cultivation requires motivation which
, bureaucratic form of morality. reason cannot provide. Reason is
McIntyre argues that modernity the Slave of the Passions.
separated morality from its
foundation in ‘practice’ and ● Hume’s Fork (Hume) - There are
reasoning about ends. Without its two types of judgements of reason:
foundation in practice, morality Synthetic judgements (matters of
seems arbitrary and without basis in fact) which are a posteriori, and
reality. Analytic judgements (relations of
ideas) which are a priori. Moral
● Ought means Needs (Anscombe judgements are neither synthetic
+ Foot) - The word “ought” really (since they don’t exist as observable
functions like the word “need”. For properties) nor analytic (since they
life in general, ‘ought’ is simply ‘the can be denied without
needs of flourishing’, e.g. “a contradiction), so they cannot be
machine needs oil to flourish” and “a judgements of reason.
machine ought to have oil”. Foot
concludes there is “no difficulty” in ● Emotivism (Ayer + Stevenson) -
deriving ought from is. It is a fact When we call something good or
that children cannot flourish without bad, we are expressing how we
help from adults, from which we can personally feel about it. Saying ‘X is
derive that adults ‘ought’ to protect wrong’ is just like saying ‘boo to X’.
children. Similarly, saying ‘X is good’ is just
saying ‘hurrah to X’. Stevenson
Counter : Implicit Ought (Hume), added moral language expresses
stating that something is needed for approval and disapproval based on
one to flourish, does not necessarily deeply held beliefs. Moral language
mean that that thing is good. This is is meant to persuade others about
not deriving an ought from an is, these beliefs.
since there is an implicit claim that
‘flourishing is good’. This is the ● Argument from Analysis (Ayer) -
question Hume is asking, on what Ayer rejected that ethical language
grounds is flourishing good. is cognitive by using philosophical
analysis. Ethical terms are pseudo-
Counter Counter : Confusion of concepts, they are unanalysable
Modernity (Anscombe + Nietzsche), (cannot be expressed in terms that
the Idea that there needs to be aren’t themselves), and so could not
some further meta-ethical warrant refer to actual properties and are
for morality is the confusion of thus noncognitive.
modernity. Anscombe and Nietzsche
argued that this impulse of ● Verification Principle (Ayer) - A
philosophers is the result of the statement is only meaningful if it is
remaining religious influence on our either analytic or empirically
ethical concepts. verifiable through experience. Moral
judgements are neither analytic
● Intuitionism (Moore + Prichard) - (since they can be denied without
We know what is good/bad or contradiction) nor empirically
right/wrong through intuition. When verifiable, therefore ethical language
we reflect on a moral action, we is meaningless.
intuitively know whether it was right
or wrong. Goodness is real in a Counter : Self-Defeating Principle
similar way to numbers, they are (Popper), in order for the verification
real in some way but clearly not principle itself to be meaningful, it
physically real. Moral intuition is must be analytic or empirically
analogous to colour vision, it is
