‘Without the appointment of Speer as Armaments Minister in February 1943, Germany
would have collapsed economically.’ Assess the validity of this view.
By early 1942, Germany’s economy was plagued by inefficiency, resource shortages
and mismanagement, exacerbated by the early outbreak of war in September 1939,
which hastened Germany’s approach towards a total war effort. The appointment of
Albert Speer as Armaments Minister marked a turning point, as his rationalisation of
production, effective mobilisation of labour and his central planning committee
significantly improved efficiency and prevented economic breakdown. However, while
Speer’s reforms were decisive, Hjalmar Schacht’s earlier economic policies provided a
foundation that delayed collapse, whereas Goering’s leadership exacerbated
inefficiencies. Ultimately, Speer’s intervention was the crucial factor in sustaining
Germany’s economy, making his appointment indispensable to its survival, particularly
during the Allies bombing and critical campaigns in the latter years of the war.
Arguably, Schacht’s pre-war economic policies laid the foundations for Germany’s
wartime economy by stabilising financial systems and facilitating rearmament. As
Minister of Economics from 1934-37, Schacht introduced the Mefo Bill scheme, which
allowed Germany to finance its rearmament programme in 1935 in secret, without
triggering hyperinflation, which had troubled many Germans in the years prior due to the
Great Depression. Additionally, Schacht promoted bilateral trade agreements, especially
with the Balkan states and South America, securing essential raw materials like iron ore
and oil, which were vital for sustaining a prolonged conflict. The New Plan of 1934
further reinforced these efforts by restricting imports and encouraging foreign nations to
buy German goods, thereby helping to control Germany's balance of trade deficit.
However, despite these successes, Schacht was arguably unsuccessful in fulfilling his
aim of developing the Wehrwirtschaft (defence economy) and establishing economic
autarky. This is demonstrated by the fact that by 1939, Germany was still dependent on
imports for key commodities, with 43% of fats sourced from abroad, compounded by the
government’s fixture on rearmament, which fuelled imports and distorted the economy,
as consumer goods and non-military industries were ignored; this represented the
‘Guns or Butter’ debate, whereby the Nazis were forced to balance their desire for
rearmament with upholding public morale. Furthermore, it can be argued that
propaganda perhaps over exaggerated the success of Schacht’s policies, as the
Autobahns project only employed 125,000 people at its peak. As the Nazis had not
anticipated the outbreak of war until after their invasion of the USSR in 1941, it could be
argued that Schacht’s economic policies did not go far enough in preparing the
economy for war. This is reflected in his marginalisation by Hitler and resignation in
1937, due to his opposition to full-scale rearmament, which only Speer would later
achieve successfully. Thus, while Schacht’s carefully thought-out economic policy was
© Humanities Unlocked. | AQA A-Level English Literature 2025 | For personal use only. Redistribution is
prohibited.
would have collapsed economically.’ Assess the validity of this view.
By early 1942, Germany’s economy was plagued by inefficiency, resource shortages
and mismanagement, exacerbated by the early outbreak of war in September 1939,
which hastened Germany’s approach towards a total war effort. The appointment of
Albert Speer as Armaments Minister marked a turning point, as his rationalisation of
production, effective mobilisation of labour and his central planning committee
significantly improved efficiency and prevented economic breakdown. However, while
Speer’s reforms were decisive, Hjalmar Schacht’s earlier economic policies provided a
foundation that delayed collapse, whereas Goering’s leadership exacerbated
inefficiencies. Ultimately, Speer’s intervention was the crucial factor in sustaining
Germany’s economy, making his appointment indispensable to its survival, particularly
during the Allies bombing and critical campaigns in the latter years of the war.
Arguably, Schacht’s pre-war economic policies laid the foundations for Germany’s
wartime economy by stabilising financial systems and facilitating rearmament. As
Minister of Economics from 1934-37, Schacht introduced the Mefo Bill scheme, which
allowed Germany to finance its rearmament programme in 1935 in secret, without
triggering hyperinflation, which had troubled many Germans in the years prior due to the
Great Depression. Additionally, Schacht promoted bilateral trade agreements, especially
with the Balkan states and South America, securing essential raw materials like iron ore
and oil, which were vital for sustaining a prolonged conflict. The New Plan of 1934
further reinforced these efforts by restricting imports and encouraging foreign nations to
buy German goods, thereby helping to control Germany's balance of trade deficit.
However, despite these successes, Schacht was arguably unsuccessful in fulfilling his
aim of developing the Wehrwirtschaft (defence economy) and establishing economic
autarky. This is demonstrated by the fact that by 1939, Germany was still dependent on
imports for key commodities, with 43% of fats sourced from abroad, compounded by the
government’s fixture on rearmament, which fuelled imports and distorted the economy,
as consumer goods and non-military industries were ignored; this represented the
‘Guns or Butter’ debate, whereby the Nazis were forced to balance their desire for
rearmament with upholding public morale. Furthermore, it can be argued that
propaganda perhaps over exaggerated the success of Schacht’s policies, as the
Autobahns project only employed 125,000 people at its peak. As the Nazis had not
anticipated the outbreak of war until after their invasion of the USSR in 1941, it could be
argued that Schacht’s economic policies did not go far enough in preparing the
economy for war. This is reflected in his marginalisation by Hitler and resignation in
1937, due to his opposition to full-scale rearmament, which only Speer would later
achieve successfully. Thus, while Schacht’s carefully thought-out economic policy was
© Humanities Unlocked. | AQA A-Level English Literature 2025 | For personal use only. Redistribution is
prohibited.
