24.01: Classics of Western Philosophy
Prof. Sally Haslanger
Socratic Definition and the Elenchus
I. Recap of some Socratic theses:
c) Virtue is a form of moral knowledge. Philosophical inquiry is morally therapeutic.
d) Socrates knows that he does not have knowledge, and that is all.
The articulation condition: If a person S is knowledgeable about X, S will be able to offer a [Socratically-acceptable]
definition of X.
If we combine the articulation condition with with (c), then if someone S has a virtue V, then S will know what V is, i.e.,
they will be able to give a definition of V. For example, a courageous person should be able to say what courage is.
• Why? Is this plausible? Compare:
o If I am knowledgeable about zebras, I will be able to explain what zebras are.
o If I am knowledgeable about courage, I will be able to explain what courage is.
o If I know how to tie a square knot, I will be able to explain how to tie a square knot.
o If I am an expert in tying a square knot, I will be able to explain how to tie a square knot.
o If I am truly courageous, I will be able to explain what courage is (or how to be courageous?).
II. The Socratic Quest for Definitions
Regardless of the question being raised in discussion, Socrates typically leads the conversation to a concern with
definition: What is virtue? What is piety? What is courage? What is knowledge? He brings to this several
assumptions. (In the Euthyphro the issue is piety.)
Commonality: There is a form (eidos) of piety that is the same in all and only pious things. (5d2-5)
Explanatory Priority: The form of piety makes pious actions pious, i.e., it is what is responsible for their being pious,
and explains why they are pious. (6d10-e1)
• the form is the essence or nature of piety
Ideal/Standard: The form is a standard by which to judge which things are pious and which are impious. (6e3-6)
Object of Definition: This form or nature or essence of piety is what we seek in giving a definition, i.e., it will
provide the correct answer to the "What is X?" question.
Corollaries:
1. The answer to "What is X?" cannot be an individual instance of X, since it must be common to all instances.
2. Because the form must be the standard or ideal pattern for X's, it cannot be qualified by its opposite, i.e., it
cannot be not-X.
3. Since one role of the standard is to provide a basis for recognizing instances, we can make knowledgeable
claims about instances of X, only if we have a definition.
III. The Standard Pattern of Socratic Elenchus1
Purpose:
The Socratic elenchus has a double purpose: to discover truths about how one ought to live and to test the
interlocutor to determine if they are living a moral life. Thus, its purpose is both philosophical and therapeutic. The
elenchus will provide a test of the interlocutor's virtue, and will assist one in the task of becoming virtuous only if
participation is sincere.
Procedure:
1. The interlocutor asserts a thesis P which Socrates considers false and targets for refutation.
2. Socrates secures agreement to some further premises, e.g., Q, and R. Q and R are (usually) not argued for.
Vlastos, Gregory. The Socratic Elenchus. Journal of Philosophy 79 (11):711-714. © Journal of Philosophy. All rights reserved.
This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see https://ocw.mit.edu/help/faq-fair-use/.
1
Adapted from G. Vlastos: "The Socratic Elenchus"
24.01 1
Prof. Sally Haslanger
Socratic Definition and the Elenchus
I. Recap of some Socratic theses:
c) Virtue is a form of moral knowledge. Philosophical inquiry is morally therapeutic.
d) Socrates knows that he does not have knowledge, and that is all.
The articulation condition: If a person S is knowledgeable about X, S will be able to offer a [Socratically-acceptable]
definition of X.
If we combine the articulation condition with with (c), then if someone S has a virtue V, then S will know what V is, i.e.,
they will be able to give a definition of V. For example, a courageous person should be able to say what courage is.
• Why? Is this plausible? Compare:
o If I am knowledgeable about zebras, I will be able to explain what zebras are.
o If I am knowledgeable about courage, I will be able to explain what courage is.
o If I know how to tie a square knot, I will be able to explain how to tie a square knot.
o If I am an expert in tying a square knot, I will be able to explain how to tie a square knot.
o If I am truly courageous, I will be able to explain what courage is (or how to be courageous?).
II. The Socratic Quest for Definitions
Regardless of the question being raised in discussion, Socrates typically leads the conversation to a concern with
definition: What is virtue? What is piety? What is courage? What is knowledge? He brings to this several
assumptions. (In the Euthyphro the issue is piety.)
Commonality: There is a form (eidos) of piety that is the same in all and only pious things. (5d2-5)
Explanatory Priority: The form of piety makes pious actions pious, i.e., it is what is responsible for their being pious,
and explains why they are pious. (6d10-e1)
• the form is the essence or nature of piety
Ideal/Standard: The form is a standard by which to judge which things are pious and which are impious. (6e3-6)
Object of Definition: This form or nature or essence of piety is what we seek in giving a definition, i.e., it will
provide the correct answer to the "What is X?" question.
Corollaries:
1. The answer to "What is X?" cannot be an individual instance of X, since it must be common to all instances.
2. Because the form must be the standard or ideal pattern for X's, it cannot be qualified by its opposite, i.e., it
cannot be not-X.
3. Since one role of the standard is to provide a basis for recognizing instances, we can make knowledgeable
claims about instances of X, only if we have a definition.
III. The Standard Pattern of Socratic Elenchus1
Purpose:
The Socratic elenchus has a double purpose: to discover truths about how one ought to live and to test the
interlocutor to determine if they are living a moral life. Thus, its purpose is both philosophical and therapeutic. The
elenchus will provide a test of the interlocutor's virtue, and will assist one in the task of becoming virtuous only if
participation is sincere.
Procedure:
1. The interlocutor asserts a thesis P which Socrates considers false and targets for refutation.
2. Socrates secures agreement to some further premises, e.g., Q, and R. Q and R are (usually) not argued for.
Vlastos, Gregory. The Socratic Elenchus. Journal of Philosophy 79 (11):711-714. © Journal of Philosophy. All rights reserved.
This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see https://ocw.mit.edu/help/faq-fair-use/.
1
Adapted from G. Vlastos: "The Socratic Elenchus"
24.01 1
