Lecture notes Fundamentals of Psychology Interim exam 2 (7-12)
Lecture 7, The mind-body problem
One kind of substance Materialism (Hobbes) = everything is material
Idealism (Berkely) = everything is mental
Two kind of substances Dualism (Descartes) = mind-body distinct
I. Dualism
Descartes: the body is a machine and the mind is not.
Problematic: idea that the mind is a causal director of the body.
Interaction problem (Elisabeth): how can a nonmaterial entity cause physical events?
Causal closure problem: if every physical event has a physical cause, where does the mind
enter? Law of conservation of energy
Brain damage problem: why would a non-material entity react to brain damage?
The inability to provide a theory of mind-body interaction led to demise dualism.
II. Materialism – “There is only matter”
- Matter is flexible: can be states, processes, functions etc.
- Mind = part of the physical world, obeys laws of nature.
Belief-desire psychology = In daily life mental states explain behavior
Theory of planned behavior (Icek Ajzens)
Problem of consciousness – how and why do we have conscious mental states?
Mental states (or not): if the mind does not exist as a distinct substance how can mental states
exist at all?
Reductionism (or not):
Subjective experience (or not):
Eliminative materialism = deny existence of mental states (Churchland in extreme: all is neural
chemistry)
This was a bridge to far, mental states are important and better at predicting behavior than for
example, brain scans.
Non-eliminative materialism = no mind as substance but there mental states. How are mental states
rooted in brain states? (identity theory and functionalism try to explain this)
,Identity theory (Lewis): mental states are brain states, keeps causal role mental states
- To want ice cream = brain state X
- John bought an ice cream because he wanted one, is true. But really means, John bought an
ice cream because he had brain state X
Type-Type identity: one-to-one mapping. Mental state X = brain state X
Full reduction of psychology to neuroscience is possible.
Reductionism in steps (example with gas/temperature):
1. Start with scientific law in the higher order science
2. Establish bridge laws: one-to-one correspondence relations between terms in higher order
science and terms in the lower order science
3. Show that the higher order law follows from the laws of the reducing science given the bridge
laws
Teleportation (Type-Type identity): in case you successfully reinstate the same brain, you have
thereby automatically reinstated the same mental state.
Type-Type is too strong: mental states are often defined by their contents, and that content is very
likely to be encoded in many different ways. (Type-Type is killed by multiple realizability)
Neural plasticity: same mental functions can be performed in different ways
Individual differences: in physical makeup, suggests that the brain is quite heterogeneous
Even the same brain encodes differently at different time points
Token-Token identity: There is not one common type of brain state (multiple realizability, by Fodor).
Each token of a mental state (one specific thing) they share the type. But each token is identical to
some brain token.
- Wanting ice cream = brain state X for John, brain state Z for Jenny etc.
- This blocks reductionism: we cant construct bridge laws. non-reductive materialsm
, If only Token-Token identity holds, and mental states are multiple realizable then it might not be
useful to characterize mental states by how they are realized in the brain. The mind as by-product
of the brain failed.
The turning machine had more success Functionalism
Computer metaphor: mind : body = software : hardware. Mental states are characterized by
their function, not their realization.
III. Functionalism – defines mental states in terms of role/function
Realization (focus = role) vs. causation (focus = physical makeup)
Ten euro metaphor: ten euro is ten euro because you can buy certain things with it, not because
of what it is made of (paper or iron; multiple realizable)
Materialists claim functionalism because mental states are realized in physical states.
Lecture 8, Thinking computers, subjective experience, and free will
Token-Token identity: Multiple realizability
Lower-order collections of realizations from
the lower-order perspective is heterogeneous
and arbitrary; can only be grouped from the
higher order perspective.
Reduction is not possible – no bridge laws
Type-Type Identity: reduction is possible.
Lecture 7, The mind-body problem
One kind of substance Materialism (Hobbes) = everything is material
Idealism (Berkely) = everything is mental
Two kind of substances Dualism (Descartes) = mind-body distinct
I. Dualism
Descartes: the body is a machine and the mind is not.
Problematic: idea that the mind is a causal director of the body.
Interaction problem (Elisabeth): how can a nonmaterial entity cause physical events?
Causal closure problem: if every physical event has a physical cause, where does the mind
enter? Law of conservation of energy
Brain damage problem: why would a non-material entity react to brain damage?
The inability to provide a theory of mind-body interaction led to demise dualism.
II. Materialism – “There is only matter”
- Matter is flexible: can be states, processes, functions etc.
- Mind = part of the physical world, obeys laws of nature.
Belief-desire psychology = In daily life mental states explain behavior
Theory of planned behavior (Icek Ajzens)
Problem of consciousness – how and why do we have conscious mental states?
Mental states (or not): if the mind does not exist as a distinct substance how can mental states
exist at all?
Reductionism (or not):
Subjective experience (or not):
Eliminative materialism = deny existence of mental states (Churchland in extreme: all is neural
chemistry)
This was a bridge to far, mental states are important and better at predicting behavior than for
example, brain scans.
Non-eliminative materialism = no mind as substance but there mental states. How are mental states
rooted in brain states? (identity theory and functionalism try to explain this)
,Identity theory (Lewis): mental states are brain states, keeps causal role mental states
- To want ice cream = brain state X
- John bought an ice cream because he wanted one, is true. But really means, John bought an
ice cream because he had brain state X
Type-Type identity: one-to-one mapping. Mental state X = brain state X
Full reduction of psychology to neuroscience is possible.
Reductionism in steps (example with gas/temperature):
1. Start with scientific law in the higher order science
2. Establish bridge laws: one-to-one correspondence relations between terms in higher order
science and terms in the lower order science
3. Show that the higher order law follows from the laws of the reducing science given the bridge
laws
Teleportation (Type-Type identity): in case you successfully reinstate the same brain, you have
thereby automatically reinstated the same mental state.
Type-Type is too strong: mental states are often defined by their contents, and that content is very
likely to be encoded in many different ways. (Type-Type is killed by multiple realizability)
Neural plasticity: same mental functions can be performed in different ways
Individual differences: in physical makeup, suggests that the brain is quite heterogeneous
Even the same brain encodes differently at different time points
Token-Token identity: There is not one common type of brain state (multiple realizability, by Fodor).
Each token of a mental state (one specific thing) they share the type. But each token is identical to
some brain token.
- Wanting ice cream = brain state X for John, brain state Z for Jenny etc.
- This blocks reductionism: we cant construct bridge laws. non-reductive materialsm
, If only Token-Token identity holds, and mental states are multiple realizable then it might not be
useful to characterize mental states by how they are realized in the brain. The mind as by-product
of the brain failed.
The turning machine had more success Functionalism
Computer metaphor: mind : body = software : hardware. Mental states are characterized by
their function, not their realization.
III. Functionalism – defines mental states in terms of role/function
Realization (focus = role) vs. causation (focus = physical makeup)
Ten euro metaphor: ten euro is ten euro because you can buy certain things with it, not because
of what it is made of (paper or iron; multiple realizable)
Materialists claim functionalism because mental states are realized in physical states.
Lecture 8, Thinking computers, subjective experience, and free will
Token-Token identity: Multiple realizability
Lower-order collections of realizations from
the lower-order perspective is heterogeneous
and arbitrary; can only be grouped from the
higher order perspective.
Reduction is not possible – no bridge laws
Type-Type Identity: reduction is possible.
